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F.O. 424/228

PART III.

CLOSED UNTIL

# FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

# AFFAIRS

OF

# ASIATIC TURKEY AND ARABIA.

228

July to September 1911.

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PART III.

# FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

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July to September 1911.

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CONFIDENTIAL.

# Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Asiatic Turkey and Arabia.

## Part III.

[25721]

No. 1.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 439.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June 25, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 429 of the 19th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Jeddah, reporting on a reverse suffered by the Turkish forces in an encounter with rebel tribesmen in the neighbourhood of Coonfudah.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

Enclosure in No. 1.

*Consul Monahan to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 23.)

Sir, *Jeddah, May 30, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Ottoman gun-boat "Tash Kupri" arrived here on the 26th instant from Coonfudah, bringing the news that there had been, about ten days before, an encounter between two battalions of regulars with two or three guns and a force of loyal irregular tribesmen under the Grand Shereef's son on the one side and insurgent Assyr tribesmen on the other side, at a place about six hours inland from Coonfudah, in which encounter the Turkish troops and loyal Bedouins were worsted and had to retire to Coonfudah, losing of the regulars 54 soldiers and 4 officers killed, the losses among the irregulars being unknown. The reverse is attributed to deficiency of water and ammunition. The Grand Shereef was proposing to sally forth on the 27th instant in person from Coonfudah with a large force of Turkish regulars and Bedouin irregulars, but it is not yet known whether he has done so.

In Coonfudah there appear to be about twelve battalions of regulars and about sixteen light guns.

During the above-reported encounter the "Tash Kupri" aimed a few shells at a village near Coonfudah, but appears to have done little or no damage. I have just now heard a seemingly unfounded report of an important bombardment by Turkish gun-boats of a place near Geezan on the Assyr or Yemen coast to the south of Coonfudah, it being said that the British flag hoisted over a building occupied by the agent of a British trader was not respected by the bombarding gun-boats. His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah or myself must soon know whether there is any foundation for this story.

I have, &c.
J. H. MONAHAN.

[25722] No. 2.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 441.)

Sir, *Constantinople, June* 26, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 437 of the 21st June, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum, forwarding a translation of a letter from the Archbishop of Mush on the subject of the recent murders of Armenians by Kurds at Khuyt. According to a telegram published in the "Jeune Turc" on the 24th June, eight of the assassins have now been arrested and sent to prison.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 2.

*Consul McGregor to Sir G. Louther.*

(No. 42.)

Sir, *Erzeroum, June* 14, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 40, Confidential, of the 9th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a translation of a letter which I have received from the Acting Armenian Bishop of Mush, giving further details regarding the recent murders of Armenians in that district, and giving a gloomy picture of the state of things in the Mush Plain.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 2.

*Acting Bishop of Mush to Consul McGregor.*

(Translation.)

His Excellency, *Mush, June* 5, 1911.

THE land question is causing grave troubles in this district. The Kurds and Turks have meetings every day with a view to act against the Constitution and the Armenians. The Kurds are backed by the reactionary employés of the Government and by the members of the Union and Progress Committee of this town. The heads of this reactionary committee are the well-known criminals Haji Mussa Bey and Haji Féro, who go round in Kurdish districts and try to raise a Kurdish agitation.

On the 25th ultimo, Haji Mussa and his armed men went to the house of Habsho Chato, in the village of Babentak, at Khuyt, where they met with the following Kurds: Ahmed, son of Shaker, of the Balka tribe; Sado, son of Makso; Nader, son of Beshar; Selim, son of Avez; and Sadun Kurjo. After consultation they sent a Kurd named Kurjané to Haji Féro, who is living at the village of Kolosik, in the plain of Mush, informing him of their proceedings.

A few days after this, a Kurd named Haji Ahmed, who is living in the village of Taghavank, and for the removal of whom from there the Armenians have been applying to the Government of Bitlis since 1900, told Erzak Effendi, a tax collector from Bitlis, to go to the village and tell the priest and the headmen that the kaïmakam of Tadvan (Modekan) wanted to see them, and that after he (Erzak Effendi) got the above men out of the village the remainder was his (Haji Ahmed's) business.

When the priest Sarkies, Raes Kero, Usta Chato, and Markar Shahinian got ready to go to see the kaïmakam of Tadvan, the Kurds Haji Ahmed, son of Shakir; Alegan, son of Mehmet; Jemo, son of Chelebi; Unuz, son of Beshar; Mehmet, son of Beshar; Aliki, son of Chelebi; Rashid, son of Chelebi; Kurjo, son of Sadun; Arif, son of Kurjo; Seyfo, son of Mirzo; Selim, son of Avez; Alikan, son of Sheikero; Sadek, son of Maksud; Haji Féro's brother Mussa, son of Ismail; Nader, son of Beshar; Alo, son of Zorik; followed them secretly on their way and arrived in the evening at the village of Goz, where they stayed in the houses of Kurds. The Armenians, not knowing that they were followed by the Kurds, spent the night in the same village in the houses of Armenians, about five minutes from the Kurdish quarter.

In the morning, when the Armenians got ready to continue their journey, the





sheikh of the village said to the priest, "Come and remain here to-day; do not go"; but the priest did not take the hint, and started together with the other Armenians. The aforenamed Kurds, who had started before the Armenians, and hidden themselves in a place on the way called Bor and Khateh, attacked the Armenians upon their arrival. They killed the priest and burnt his body, they decapitated Raes Kero and took out his eyes, they flayed Chato, and Markar managed to run away.

The murderers, upon returning to Taghavank, heard that six Armenians, Naroyan-sefo, 40 years old; Keniaz, the son of the murdered priest, aged 28; Umurshadian Dono, aged 31; Mekhigian Khazar, aged 15; Hovanian Megrs and Manukian Setrak, aged 12; were on their way from Mush, so, without taking any rest, they at once started for the plain of Mush and went to the village of Kholosik, where they spent the night in the house of Haji Féro. The same night the above Armenians arrived at the same village and spent the night in the houses of a Kurd named Hassan and an Armenian named Mardo.

In the morning the Kurds, together with Hassan, son of Haji Féro; and Kassem, son of Haji Ali; went to the mountain pass called Shelimok, between the villages of Tekhtzmer and Kholosik, and, hiding themselves in thickets, fell upon the Armenians and murdered them all.

After doing this they returned to the village of Taghavank, where they killed one of Haji Ahmed's oxen, ate it, and enjoyed themselves. They also told the Armenian women that they had killed their husbands on the mountain and that they could go to fetch their bodies.

Upon your applying to the Acting Governor he said that "these murders are caused by the land question; why did the Armenians raise this question? The Armenians must give up this land question for the sake of public security." It is now about a week since Haji Féro arrived here, and he visits the Government House daily, but has not been arrested, nor has the Government taken any action for getting hold of the murderers. To-day troops were sent to Rabad in order to prevent the villagers from leaving, but the Armenians of Khuyt, Pernashen, Tashtatem, Shen, Shenist Taghavank, Lordentzor, Goma, Kelluna, Pijon, and Hoshod, had already left their houses, animals, and small children, and are scattered in villages on the plain. Communication is stopped; there is also fear in the plain, armed Kurds being all over the place.

My object in informing your Excellency of the above is to beg of you kindly to do all you possibly can by communicating the news to the proper quarters in order to prevent the recurrence of such murders.

Yours, &c
YÉGHISHÉ D. BARSAMIAN.

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[25700] No. 3.

*Mr. O'Beirne to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 180. Secret.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, June* 27, 1911.

I ASKED the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday whether he could tell me anything to report to you regarding the progress of his pending negotiations with Germany. He said that he had asked Count Benckendorff to speak to you regarding the clause concerning the Khanikin–Tehran railway. He was in doubt whether it was necessary to insert in that clause a provision to meet the case of neither Russian, French, nor British capital being forthcoming in sufficient amount for the eventual construction of the line. At any rate, he thought that we ought in good time to consider the question of how the capital was to be provided and of "guarantees" for the interest.

I said that I thought, when the question had been discussed before, it had been agreed that it would be sufficient to have a clause providing that Russia would undertake the construction of the line and reserved to herself the right to bring in foreign capital. If when the time came the capital was not forthcoming, it would be early enough to think of the communication which would have to be made to Germany.

M. Nératof replied that if the clause were drafted in the way suggested, and if Russia when the time came could not procure sufficient capital for the construction of the line, Russia would have failed to carry out her undertaking, and the other clauses

of the agreement would fall through. It might be better to add a provision giving Russia liberty to renounce the right of building the line if she chose to do so.

I have, &c.
HUGH O'BEIRNE.

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[25727] No. 4.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 3.)*

(No. 446.)
Sir, *Constantinople, June 28, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 441 of the 26th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum reporting on the measures taken against the Kurds of Khuyt.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 4.

*Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 43.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, June 17, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 40, Confidential, of the 9th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a report from Mr. Safrastian, acting vice-consul at Bitlis, announcing the taking of certain preliminary military measures against the Kurds of Khuyt.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 4.

*Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor.*

(No 13.)
Sir, *Bitlis, June 12, 1911.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 5 of the 10th instant to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople and in continuation of my despatch No. 12 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to report as follows upon the affairs of Khuyt and the Kurdish unrest which, in consequence of the rebellion of Kurds in Khuyt, is manifesting itself more distinctly within the last two weeks :—

As stated in my telegram above referred to, three battalions of infantry, numbering some 1,200 soldiers, accompanied by two pieces of mountain artillery, have been massed in Khuyt under the command of Ismail Hakki Bey, the vali, who, as a former military officer, is entrusted with the conduct of the whole affair. His Excellency has established his head-quarters at Taghavank, in Khuyt, the sorely bereaved village from which came the eight Armenians killed recently.

On the approach of the troops, Hadji Amaré, the principal criminal, and his Kurds fled to mountains, deserting their villages. It is understood that they have sent their families, as well as their live stock and property, to their relatives in Bitlis, Mush, &c.

On the 9th instant the vali called upon Kurdish chiefs and agas in Khuyt and Modky to surrender all criminals and murderers involved in the events of last year and the recent outrage. He granted them a term of three weeks, I am told, for making up their minds and handing over the guilty. In case of failure he threatened them with force. The Kurdish chiefs, however, are stated as having replied that it is not in their power to meet the wishes of the Government, and that the latter can get hold of anybody it wanted.

I understand from an official source that the Khuyt Kurds required by the Government number about 600, fifty of whom have already been sentenced to death, and the remainder are condemned to terms of imprisonment varying from three to fifteen years.

On the other hand, Ismail Hakki Bey has applied for further reinforcements from



the neighbouring provinces, and for three machine guns from Erzinjan, with a view to operating on a large area in Khuyt and suppressing this permanent hotbed of rebellion and disorder. It is reported that the Ministers of War and of the Interior have agreed to send the reinforcements required by the Vali of Bitlis.

It is scarcely possible that the Belekli Kurds of Khuyt would be willing to yield to a formal call of the vali and surrender the murderers. The full impunity which they have enjoyed under the old régime had been allowed to go on under the new Government; it is therefore not to be wondered that these wild and ignorant mountaineers seem to be unable to conceive any distinction between the old and the new Governments.

*The Kurdish Unrest.*—The latest exploits of the Kurds of Khuyt and the alleged inability of the authorities to cope with the situation seem to have driven the Kurdish element throughout this province to a serious exasperation. Many Kurdish professional agitators, amongst whom the notorious Musa Bey, of Khevner, and his brother Kassim Bey, Hadji Nedjmeddine Effendi, and Sadullah Effendi (head of the Census Bureau here), of this town, and several other chiefs of great power in Bitlis, Mush, and Bulanik are untiringly stirring up the Kurds against the Government and inciting them to violence against the Armenians. Common talk says that there is a secret organisation among the chiefs to rise against the constitutional Government by massacring the Armenians. Large quantities of weapons and ammunition have of late been bought by Kurds, and I am informed that the price of rifles and cartridges is more than doubled within the last fortnight.

I am further informed that the movements of the vali in Khuyt are being eagerly watched by the above chiefs, and the solution of that problem is anxiously awaited—a solution which will decide the policy to be followed by Kurds. Secret meetings and visits between the above reactionary chiefs are said to be of daily occurrence.

Making even some allowance to the general belief that the Kurdish chiefs have this time assumed a much more seriously threatening attitude against the Liberal Government and the Armenian population, I cannot refrain from humbly reminding you that, as throughout the Kurdish unrest of last year, I again venture to express the opinion as firmly as ever that the Kurdish population of this vilayet, in view of its moral degeneration and petty tribal quarrels, is unable under the present circumstances to bring about any combined force against the authorities if the latter take some sort of effective action to break down the influence of some notorious chiefs. On every side I am told, even by representative Kurds, that if two Kurds of some importance were to-day hanged in Bitlis or Mush all Kurdish agitation and unrest would die down the next day, and this vilayet would then enjoy the best peace and tranquillity that could be realised in Turkey.

All depends, no doubt, upon the attitude which the Government, after the mobilisation of troops, would take towards the Kurdish rebels in Khuyt.

I have, &c.
A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

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[26522] No. 5.

*Question asked in the House of Commons, July 3, 1911.*

*Mr. Noel Buxton*,—To ask the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs whether the reports of His Majesty's consuls in Armenia show that progress in reform of the administration has taken place, and that lawless conduct towards the Armenian population has decreased during the last year.

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*Answer by Mr. McKinnon Wood (for Sir Edward Grey).*

The condition of the Armenians has unquestionably improved in the last three years, owing to the improved collection of taxes and to the abolition of internal passports. Tranquillity is, on the whole, being maintained, and, with the exception of some recent murders by Kurds at Khuyt, in the sanjak of Bitlis, there have been but few instances of lawless conduct towards the Armenians.

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[26324] No. 6.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 6.)*

(No. 158.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, July 5, 1911.*

YEMEN.

Please see my despatch No. 457 of the 2nd instant.

His Majesty's acting consul-general at Smyrna reported yesterday that the Government had mobilised the whole of the reserve division of Adalia with a view, it is believed, to their dispatch to the Yemen, together with the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 17th Regiment who have been ordered to embark at Scalanova.

I am informed by my Russian colleague that, although without definite information on the subject, he believes that the news from Albania is grave.

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[26373] No. 7.

*Papers communicated by India Office, July 6.*

(1.)

*Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.*

(Telegraphic.) P. *June 27, 1911.*

PERSIAN Gulf buoying and lighting. See your telegram dated the 10th instant.

I agree after further enquiry both as to provision of acetylene gas buoy at inner bar, and as to desirability of British light vessel being placed, as recommended by admiral, 4 or 5 miles to seaward of gas outer buoy. Further enquiry is being made, there being some difficulty as to preparation of detailed estimates, and a further report will be sent.

(2.)

*The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, July 3, 1911.*

PERSIAN Gulf.

With reference to your telegram of 8th June, regarding survey, I propose before replying to see what progress is made with the negotiations with Turkey. These have not yet begun, and the matter of the survey does not appear to be urgent.

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[26563] No. 8.

*Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received July 7.)*

*Board of Trade, July 7, 1911.*

Sir,

ADVERTING to previous correspondence on the question of contracts for irrigation and other developments in the Mesopotamian region, I am directed by the Board of Trade to state that it has come to their knowledge that tenders have recently been opened in Constantinople for the constructions of the Hindié barrage on the Euphrates, and that tenders have been put in by two important British firms, Messrs. S. Pearson and Sons (Limited) and Sir J. Jackson (Limited).

I am to suggest that, if Sir E. Grey sees no objection, telegraphic instructions might be sent to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople to use every endeavour that he may find possible to secure the acceptance of the tender of one or other of these firms, without, of course, in any representations he may make, giving preference to either.

I am, &c.
H. LLEWELLYN SMITH.

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[26563] No. 9.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.*

(No. 263.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July 8, 1911.*

HINDIEH barrage on Euphrates.

Information has reached the Board of Trade to the effect that tenders have been opened recently, and that tenders have been made both by Sir J. Jackson (Limited) and by Messrs. S. Pearson.

Without specially favouring either of these competitors, you should do all you can to secure that the tender of one or the other is accepted.

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[26810] No. 10.

*Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 10.)*

(No. 69. Confidential.)
Sir, *Ramleh, June 30, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note which I have received from the Director of Intelligence in regard to communications which have passed between the Turkish authorities and certain Arab notables in Egypt on the subject of the Yemen and Asir.

I have, &c.
MILNE CHEETHAM.

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Enclosure in No. 10.

*Note by the Intelligence Department (Cairo).*

(Secret.)

A TELEGRAM was received about the 15th June by the ex-Sherif of Mecca, who is living here, from the Secretary of the Committee of Union and Progress, asking him to persuade Mohammed Bey Elwi to go to Constantinople in connection with affairs in the Yemen and Asir, and intimating that if he came all expenses would be paid by the Turkish Government. The latter left for Constantinople on the 21st instant.

Elwi Bey, who comes of an old family which traces its descent on the father's side from the great Saladin and on the mother's side from a daughter of the Prophet, was for many years a dragoman of the Italian agency. On resigning this post some three years ago he was given the title of honorary dragoman, which enables the Italian agency to still make use of him on special occasions.

Owing to his descent, Mohammed Bey Elwi is not only personally well known to the Imam, Mohammed El Edris, and the Senussi, but keeps up a regular and intimate correspondence with all three.

This invitation coinciding in dates with the recent news of a serious reverse to Turkish arms near Gezan, indicates that the Ottoman authorities are desirous of consulting Elwi Bey as to the best means of arriving at a settlement of affairs in the Yemen and Asir without a further dispatch of troops, and possibly utilising him as a go-between to arrange terms. The latter rôle Elwi Bey is prepared to fill on condition that whatever terms are agreed upon shall be guaranteed by a European Power. His inclinations are known to lean towards Great Britain being that Power.

In this connection the following information is also of interest: the Ottoman representatives of the Yemen in the Turkish Parliament reached Egypt also about the middle of June, and are staying now in Alexandria. On the 17th June they dispatched a telegram to Cairo to Sheikh Belai El Yemeni couched in the following terms:—

"We have come here specially to inform you of the recognition of His Majesty the Sultan of your good services, and to ask you to return with us to Constantinople, in accordance with His Imperial Majesty's orders for questions connected with El Yemen. We are awaiting your reply in Hotel Istambul."

Sheikh Belal has gone down to Alexandria to see the representatives, but is rather frightened to accept the invitation extended to him.

Sheikh Belal Ibn Obeid Yehia El Yemeni is a native of Hodeidah, and was head

sheikh of the Morghania Tarika in the Yemen. He came to Egypt several years ago and acquired a reputation as a spiritual healer of diseases. He has since married a daughter of rich parents and has given up his spiritual doctoring. He is a man of moderate intelligence with a love of fame. His house is the resort of Yemenite notables who come to Cairo. He has taken up a line of hostility to the Imam and El Idris in order to curry favour with the Turkish Government, in which he has succeeded, for he has recently been granted a 4th Class Osmania by the Sultan.

Recent information received by El Belal and Mohammed Bey Elwi not only corroborates the Turkish reverse, but also adds that Abha (the capital of Asir) has fallen.

*Cairo, June* 25, 1911.

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[26739] No. 11.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July* 10.)

(No. 456.)
Sir, *Therapia, July* 3, 1911.

WITH reference to Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 401 of the 10th ultimo, on the subject of the disorders in the Muntefik country, I have the honour to report that a further telegram from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah states that Nassrie is said to be closely besieged by Arabs, and that no improvement is to be noted in the general situation on the Euphrates.

I learn that the Government are sending twelve battalions from Bagdad to the scene of the troubles; eight being redifs and four nizam.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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[26740] No. 12.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July* 10.)

(No. 457.)
Sir, *Therapia, July* 2, 1911.

I LEARN on good authority that, in consequence of the reverse suffered by the Turkish troops at Jizzan, as reported in my telegram No. 144 of the 20th June, the Ottoman Government is sending 12,000 additional troops to Assyr and the Yemen. Part of these reinforcements are no doubt required to make up the inevitable ordinary wastage of the campaign, which must have been considerable.

My informant added that he understood that Izzet Pasha is quite unable for the present to take any part in the operations against Seid Idriss in Assyr, as his forces were scattered about in small detachments in the neighbourhood of Sanaa engaged in pacifying those districts.

The extreme heat of the summer is likely to prove very trying to the troops and to render all operations on a large scale extremely difficult.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

P.S.—A part of these troops, viz., three nizam battalions and the ihtiat reserve of Damascus, Baalbek, and Zebdani, will be drawn from Syria, and the remainder, so it is announced, from Rodosto, Smyrna, Beyrout, and Tripoli of Africa.

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[26741] No. 13.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July* 10.)

(No. 458.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July* 3, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 430 of the 25th June, 1911, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Jeddah, reporting on a successful encounter of the Government troops with the rebels near Confudah.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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Enclosure in No. 13.

*Consul Monahan to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 24.)
Sir, *Jeddah, June* 10, 1911.

IN continuation of my despatches Nos. 22 and 23 of the 25th and 30th ultimo respectively, I have the honour to report what follows :—

On the 29th ultimo the Grand Shereef's sons, Abdullah and Faisal, sallied forth from Confudah with five battalions of regulars, a few guns, and a large force of Bedouins, and at and near a place called Gaus, about six hours from Confudah, the very place of the unsuccessful encounter reported in my despatch No. 23 of the 30th ultimo, there was this time a victorious desultory encounter or series of encounters with Idrisee's insurgents lasting three days, after which the Government forces have advanced further into the interior. According to the official report, the losses on the side of the Government were seven killed (four regulars) and fifteen wounded, and seventy of the insurgents were found killed. Gaus and some of the neighbouring little villages were burnt by the troops. A small red flag of the Idrisee insurgents, with the usual "La illaha illallaha" on it, has been brought here in triumph by the Ottoman gunboat "Giuktche Dagh," arriving from Confudah on the 5th instant, which also brought eighty-five of the Grand Shereef's Bedouins, two of them wounded and the rest rejected as unfit for service. It is said here that eight battalions of regulars are coming from Hodeidah to Geezan (Assyr coast) to march presumably on Idrisee's head-quarters, Sabiyeh. The Grand Shereef remains in Confudah with, it is now said, ten battalions of regulars and his Bedouins. The Ottoman steam-ship "Koniah" arrived here on the 9th instant from Constantinople with the 32nd Nishanji battalion for Confudah. She remains here for the present, disabled by some defect which will probably oblige her to return to Suez for repairs, and has landed here that battalion which will proceed to Confudah by the first opportunity.

I have, &c.
J. H. MONAHAN.

P.S.—The chief of staff, Suliman Bey, with four Hotchkiss guns, under an artillery officer, arrived here this (10th June) evening from Mecca, and will proceed with the guns in a day or two in the gunboat "Giuktche Dagh" to Confudah.

J. H. M.

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[26743] No. 14.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July* 10.)

(No. 460.)
Sir, *Therapia, July* 3, 1911.

I HAD some conversation this afternoon with Sir Henry Babington Smith on the subject of the concessions for the construction of commercial ports at Samsun and Trebizond, and he explained to me the difficulty of the situation in which the National Bank of Turkey finds itself in very much the same language as that of his letter to Sir Arthur Nicolson of to-day's date, which he kindly allowed me to read.

In the existing circumstances, it seems quite possible that the Minister for Foreign Affairs or the Grand Vizier may enquire what is the attitude of His Majesty's Government towards the enterprise, and I should be glad to be informed what reply I should make.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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[26744] No. 15.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July* 10.)

(No. 461.)
Sir, *Therapia, July* 3, 1911.

SIR HENRY BABINGTON SMITH informed me to-day that the National Bank of Turkey was examining a project for a light railway from Kuluk, a small natural harbour on the Gulf of Asia (Mendelia), to Moughla, in the neighbourhood of which there is a valuable emery mine, and has dispatched their expert, Mr. Money, to study

the possibilities of the scheme on the spot. He added that the National Bank had offered participation in the enterprise to the Ottoman Bank and the Deutsche Bank, the former refusing and the latter accepting the proposal. The districts through which the railway would pass are fertile, and Sir Henry thought the undertaking might be a profitable one.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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[26746] No. 16.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 10.)*

(No. 463.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 4, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 223 of the 5th April, I have the honour to forward herewith reports on the provinces of Turkey in Asia and Turkish Africa for the quarter ended the 30th June.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 16.

*Quarterly Report on Anatolia and Kurdistan.*

1. *Smyrna Vilayet.*

*Greek Boycott.*—The Greek boycott was revived with renewed severity in March on instructions from the boycott committee in Salonica, and placed under the direction of a central committee, which enforced it with the utmost rigour. One British case—that of Fritz Vedova—was referred to His Majesty's Embassy, and representations were made which secured a satisfactory settlement.

On the 1st June the boycott was still strongly enforced. The committee threatened to interfere with the lighters of Messrs. Whittall and Co., a British firm, unless they dismissed two of their employés who were Greek subjects, but on representations from His Majesty's Embassy orders were sent from the Sublime Porte to prevent any injury to Messrs. Whittall's interests.

The case of Messrs. Clonarides, which occurred in November last, was advanced to the extent that the Vali of Smyrna was ordered to draw up a report.

*Anti-Capitulation Policy.*—Instances of attempts of local authorities to drive breaches in the Capitulations walls continue to increase throughout the Empire. His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna had to intervene in the case of Mrs. E. Borg, a British subject, whose houses had been closed without reference to the consulate-general on the ground of insanitary condition, by order of the Sanitary Commission.

The Smyrna Commercial Court laid down the principle that recognition by the Ottoman Government of the nationality of foreign anonymous companies was required before protection could be afforded them. His Majesty's Embassy did not, however, in this case deem it advisable to raise the question, seeing that no serious attempts to interfere with ordinary foreign companies appear to have been made.

*Brigandage.*—Two notorious members of Tchakirjuli's band were executed on the 30th May, and a member of another band was also caught and executed in April. All these executions took place publicly and with a great display of troops at Eridemish, a well-known brigand centre. So far the attempts to catch the brigand chief Tchakirjuli have been vain, but the troops are reported to be very active in his pursuit, and to be accompanied by bloodhounds.

2. *Adana Vilayet.*

On the 7th April the Vali of Adana, Jemal Bey, left his post for the capital, and he has since been chosen to succeed Nazim Pasha as Vali of Bagdad.

His Excellency's departure was the signal for the population in general, with whom he was not popular, to speak more freely against the present régime, and their attitude, as well as that of several officers of the garrison, leaves small doubt that any change of régime in the capital would be welcomed by the inhabitants of Adana.





*Bagdad Railway.*—The Bagdad Railway is advancing steadily. The company expect to have the section Dorak-Osmanié ready for traffic in another seven or eight months' time, while work is expected to begin from Ulu Kisla on the Konia side and from Dorak on the Adana side in another three months, but, owing to the great difficulties of this section, the actual *tracé* does not appear to have been settled yet.

The Bagdad Railway Company are by contract also constructing embankments, which are nearing completion, on both sides of the river above Adana and which will protect the town against floods. There is also a proposal on foot to straighten the river's course by means of 7 kilom. of canals, and so protect the crops grown in the plain. For this purpose a grant of £T. 30,000 has been asked for from Constantinople.

Surveys for the irrigation of the Adana plain have also been made by German engineers.

*Local Improvements.*—An agricultural school and an orphanage are being constructed, and great progress being made in the rebuilding of the ruined parts of Adana.

*Cretan Question.*—An organised meeting to assert the right of the Porte to send aidis to Crete was held in Adana on the 6th June, and a list opened at the konak for prospective volunteers to serve in case of need in Crete.

3. *Erzeroum Vilayet.*

A deputation left Erzeroum on the 1st May to greet the Sultan on the field of Kossovo after listening to a warlike harangue from the vali recalling the historical associations of Kossovo.

The deputation, which did not include a single Armenian, was joined two days later by a son of the notorious chieftain, Hussein Pasha of Patnotz.

Abdul Rezak Bey, who belongs to the most influential family of Kurdistan, has been pardoned by the Government for his share in the murder of Redvan Pasha five or six years ago, and has returned to Kurdistan. It is believed he will stand as a candidate for Parliament in 1912, and he is known to be in favour of Kurdish autonomy.

Two other grandsons of the late Bederkhan Pasha, both influential Kurdish chieftains, have also been travelling through Kurdistan to Jesiré, under the auspices of the Committee of Union and Progress.

*Troubles between Kurds and Armenians owing to the Land Question.*

*Murders of Armenians: Expedition against the Kurds of Khuyt.*

As early as the 15th March last, murders of Armenians due to Kurdish resentment over the land question were reported from the Bitlis vilayet, five Armenians being murdered in one day by a Kurd named Mervan Aga, whose impunity caused much alarm among the Armenians. The Vali of Bitlis, Ismail Hakki Bey, who, ever since his arrival in October, had desired to lead a punitive expedition against the Kurds of Khuyt, was still not allowed to do so.

In the beginning of May the situation was getting gradually worse. The Kurds were preventing the Armenians from ploughing some lands recently restored to them, and the vali did not dare to send any gendarmes for their protection.

In Kharzan an Armenian village was attacked and the school burnt. The authorities were powerless, and it was becoming evident that both in Khuyt and Kharzan, on account of the tacit neglect of the authorities, the Kurds were being given a free hand.

By the beginning of June a state of absolute anarchy and rebellion was reported to exist at Khuyt. Besides two murders reported on the 1st June, eight other Armenians had been killed by Moslems there.

The roads were closed at Mush and Bitlis by Kurds, and the local gendarmes were quite powerless.

The Vali of Bitlis now insisted on taking energetic action, and proceeded with a force of about 1,200 men against the Kurds of Khuyt.

He demanded that the murderers should be handed over to him, but on his approach on the 12th June, the principal criminal fled to the mountains with his Kurds, who sent their families away to other regions, and the Kurdish chiefs stated that it was not in their power to hand over the criminals, but that the Government could get hold

of whom they wanted. Eight Kurds are reported to have been arrested for their share in the murders, but the chief actors have apparently not yet been secured.

The whole Kurdish element appears to be watching his Excellency's movements in Khuyt, and the solution of the Khuyt problem will probably determine the policy to be followed by the Kurds.

The Armenian situation has been much commented on in the Constantinople press, which calls on the central authorities to take serious action. Notably, the "Sabah," in an article on the 15th June, drew attention to the perils of the situation created throughout Asia Minor, especially at Bitlis, by the apathy and inertia of the authorities in the face of the continued usurpations of the beys, and pressed for the definite settlement of the land question as the only means of restoring tranquillity.

The Turkish Government appear to realise their responsibilities, but to shrink from adding a Kurdish campaign to their other difficulties.

4. *Diarbekir Vilayet.*

It was reported towards the end of March that a hodja from the Hedjaz was touring through the Midiat and Mardin districts urging the Kurds to demand the Sheriat, and that during the months of February and March emissaries of Sherif Pasha, the notorious opponent of the Committee of Union and Progress, were endeavouring to found secret committees at Diarbekir under the name of Radical Reform Committees, and to ally themselves with reactionary Kurdish clubs.

At the end of April the Kurdish chiefs were still gathering illegal taxes both from Kurds and Christians, and were threatening certain Chaldaean villages unless the Chaldeans agreed to register their lands in their (the chiefs') names.

5. *Van Vilayet.*

Before the arrival of the new vali on the 21st April the local Government of the Van vilayet was reported to be in a deplorably weak condition. In addition to the lack of co-operation between the military and civil authorities, the latter were divided among themselves.

The gendarmerie was said to be worthless, and, although the troops were occasionally sent out, very little appears to have been done to suppress brigandage.

On the other hand, the troops were reported to be far more efficient than they were last year, and the civil and military authorities to be, on the 22nd May, in complete accord.

*Alleged Theft of Arms.*—Although a few Government cartridges have apparently been sold to some of the pro-committee Armenian Dashnakist leaders by certain officers, there seems to be little cause for the alarm reported in the last quarterly summary that arms had been stolen from the arsenal.

*Persian Frontier Region.*—The outlaw Seid Bey was reported to be among the Kurdish tribes on the frontier inciting them against the Government.

On the occupation of Nevahi-i-Jedide by the Turks a number of Persian khans were expelled and their lands given over to the cultivators, who had been working them for the khans, as their own property.

It is now reported that the khans have since then sold the title-deeds of these lands to a Russian bank, and the Turkish authorities fear that this will involve them in a future political question with the Russian Government.

About the 20th May an intertribal conflict took place near Serai, and the Ottoman troops have apparently driven the combatants across the frontier into Persian territory.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 16.

*Quarterly Report on the Affairs of Mesopotamia for the quarter ended June* 30, 1911.

*Military Operations against the Arabs of the Montific.*

TOWARDS the beginning of March about 1,600 troops and ten guns were dispatched from Bagdad to Kut-el-Amara. The plan of operations included the closing of the Hai Canal, to facilitate military operations, but as the river was rapidly rising the project was abandoned and the force left Kut-el-Amara for Hai. The authorities



then determined to carry out further operations by sending armoured launches down the Hai Canal to operate in the heart of the Montific country. An expedition started on the 17th May, and some fighting occurred. Reinforcements were sent on the 6th June, but the fall of the river would soon render further operations of this nature impossible.

*Bagdad Residency Guard.*

A force of one native officer, thirty-five sepoys, and three followers, sent to relieve the Indian guard at the Bagdad Residency, reached Bussorah on the 3rd April. The vali entered an official protest against their landing. His Majesty's vice-consul pointed out that the men were merely sent to relieve the usual residency guard as was customary yearly at that season. The guard landed at Bussorah on the 6th April, and reached Bagdad on the 13th April without opposition.

*Expedition against Shammar Arabs.*

The object of this expedition, under Colonel Riza Bey, seems to have been to collect arrears (estimated at £T. 7,000) of the Government tax on animals rather than to punish lawlessness or recover compensation for raids. The force was held up by the cold at El Hathr, and suffered to a considerable extent. No fighting took place, and Colonel Riza Bey, who showed a conciliatory spirit, contented himself with negotiating with the two principal sheikhs of the tribe.

On the 12th April the expedition was suddenly recalled. This abrupt termination of the operations caused some surprise, as it was believed that permanent military posts would be established in the district. The expedition is said to have cost £T. 25,000, while £T. 7,000 was realised by the sale of camels, &c., seized from the tribesmen.

*Reactionaries at Mosul and Sulcimanieh.*

As a result of the attack made on Safwat Bey (see report for quarter ended the 31st March) in the reactionary organ the "Nijah," Nazim Pasha, Vali of Bagdad, caused a telegram received from Safwa Bey, in which the latter explained the reasons for the dismissal of three members of the administrative council of Sulcimanieh, to be published in the official organ of the Mosul vilayet. This telegram enumerated the charges against the dismissed officials, who seem to have used their official position solely for the advancement of themselves, their relations, and friends.

The gravity of these revelations consisted in the fact that it was apparent that these irregularities were condoned by the authorities of the Mosul vilayet themselves, principal among whom was the notorious Sabonji Pasha. This individual gained a complete ascendancy over the vali, Tahir Pasha, and frustrated the latter's apparently honest attempts at reform.

Nazim Pasha's action in attempting, through the instrumentality of Safwat Bey, to introduce reforms into the local administration brought him into considerable unpopularity with the local officials, and consequently the news of his recall was received with satisfaction in official circles, while Safwat Bey fled suddenly from Sulcimanieh on the 23rd March, fearing, no doubt, that Nazim Pasha's fall might be followed by reprisals against himself.

The situation, however, in Mosul appears to have improved subsequently, His Majesty's vice-consul reporting on the 3rd May that fresh elections to the administrative council had at last been held, as a result of repeated instructions from the central Government, hitherto ignored. The new elections necessitated the withdrawal of Sabonji, and it seems reasonable now to hope that Tahir Pasha may be able to carry out some of the reforms which he has contemplated.

*Sadun-Mubarak Campaign.*

This feud, which it was hoped had been extinguished at the beginning of the year, revived; and it was reported that Sadun Pasha was defeated with heavy loss in an engagement which took place towards the end of March.

*Lighting and Buoying of the Persian Gulf.*

On the 1st April the Vali of Bussorah sent to His Majesty's consul a copy of a memorandum from the Turkish commodore showing details and position of five buoys

and other marks placed by the Turks at the Fao bar. On the 26th May the Turkish light-ship "Kilid-ul-Bahr" was towed down the river to the bar at Fao, and subsequently a change was also effected in the position of the floating light there.

Rumours were current in Bussorah at the beginning of June that the Turks contemplated removing the British buoys from the bar, and in consequence the Turkish Government was warned that a ship of war would be sent to prevent any tampering with them. His Majesty's ship "Alert" arrived at Bussorah on the 18th June, where she remained till the 23rd June.

*Arrest of Bahreinis at Bussorah.*

An incident arose towards the end of March in connection with the arrest, by the orders of the Vali of Bussorah, of three natives of Bahrein. These men, who were provided with Bahrein passports, on refusing to take Ottoman papers, were handed over to the police by the vali (20th March) with instructions to detain them and report to the effect that they were disturbers of the peace. They were charged with applying by letter to Bahrein for papers of protection. (This they denied, apparently with justice, as the application would have been unnecessary, seeing that their Bahrein papers were in order.) Warrants were then issued charging them with "disturbing the peace."

In reply to a protest made by His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, the vali sent a written reply stating that the "Turkish Government neither know nor admit" that natives of Bahrein are under the protection of His Majesty's Government.

Representations were made to the Sublime Porte urging that orders be sent for their immediate release, and as a consequence instructions were sent from Constantinople (2nd April) for the release on bail of the three prisoners.

On the 5th April His Majesty's consul at Bussorah sent his dragoman to enquire of the vali whether these orders had been received. The vali admitted receipt of the order, but in the course of an insolent reply declared that the Minister for Foreign Affairs could not interfere with the tribunals in such cases, and that he would pay no attention to the order for release.

Two of the prisoners, however, were discharged from prison on the following day.

A written communication was made to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 8th April, detailing the facts of the case, and recapitulating the position as between the Sublime Porte and His Majesty's Government on the subject of the status of Bahreinis as defined by correspondence between His Majesty's Embassy and the Porte in 1851, 1892, and 1893. The communication further demanded that a severe reprimand be administered to the Vali of Bussorah for the irregularity of his proceedings, and for the discourtesy of his attitude towards His Majesty's consul, and pressed for the immediate and unconditional release of all the prisoners, and the acceptance of Bahrein passports "as heretofore."

The third prisoner was released unconditionally on the 8th April.

The Turkish Government were probably glad enough to release the prisoners without trial, and so avoid a definite solution of the question of the status of Bahreinis, gratuitously raised by the Vali of Bussorah, which might have been effected by His Majesty's Government insisting on the presence of a dragoman at the trial.

The vali's written declaration, however, could not be overlooked, and it was determined to make an effort to obtain a written reply to our communication to the Porte of the 8th April.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs gave vague verbal promises of a written reply, and verbally disowned the statement of the vali, but he seemed disinclined to put anything on paper. The claim for compensation for illegal detention he refused to entertain. He further objected that there would be no object in this coming to a definite solution of this one question, when the two Governments were about to discuss all the various points at issue in the region of the Persian Gulf. No written reply on the subject has yet been received.

*Lynch's Barges.*

In view of a large accumulation of cargo at Bussorah (about 4,500 tons), Messrs. Lynch desired to get permission for their steamers to tow each a second barge in order to work off this accumulation. Certain Turkish steamers had been towing full complements of barges under similar circumstances. The permission was obtained and taken advantage of on the 16th May, but it was understood that it was only temporary, and that the arrangement was to hold good only until the accumulation had been worked off. In spite of difficulties raised by the vali, the arrangement was put in force, and is still being carried out.



A difficulty arose between Messrs. Lynch and the Vali of Bussorah owing to the latter's refusal to allow the "Julnar" to be replaced by the "Blosse Lynch," but the central Government was induced to send him telegraphic instructions, and the exchange was effected, after a short delay, on the 24th June.

*Turco-Persian Frontier.*

Negotiations continued throughout the early part of the year on the subject of the joint frontier commission which it had been proposed to send to investigate and endeavour to settle all the questions outstanding between the Turkish and Persian Governments.

Finally, on the 16th May, an identic communication was made to the Minister for Foreign Affairs by the British and Russian Ambassadors giving the names and the composition of the escorts of their two delegates on the commission, and details as to their proceedings. The itinerary was not given in full, it being stated merely that they were to start from Tabreez and proceed to the region of Urmia, visiting various places in the neighbourhood and other parts of the frontier region of the province of Azerbaidjan, returning to Tabreez. The tour was to commence about the middle of May (o.s.). The object of the tour was stated to be the collection of exact information concerning the existing state of affairs in the districts to be visited. The Porte was requested to afford every facility for the journey of the delegates.

Subsequently (the 24th May) a further identic communication was made agreeing to the delegates' escorts being replaced by Turkish escorts in the event of the commission being obliged to cross Turkish territory, with the proviso that the composition of the escort was in no way to affect the rights of sovereignty of Turkey or of Persia over any of the territories so traversed.

The Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs still declared that he could not see what object could be attained by the commission, and expressed his strong disapproval of the idea of a Persian delegate accompanying the commission. No Turkish delegate had been appointed, and consequently it was thought best to advise the Persian Government not to send one, and the Russian and British delegates set out alone on the 8th June.

The object of the commission is the collection of information which may be useful in the event of the Turkish and Persian Governments referring to The Hague Tribunal points on which they may fail to reach an agreement in the course of the negotiations which they propose shortly to enter into at Constantinople.

*Collision between Steam-ship "Haddon Hall" and Turkish Gun-boat "Marmaris."*

The claim for damages has now been settled by the dispatch of instructions by Lloyd's to their Bussorah agents authorising them to pay the sum of 4,500*l*. The Minister of Marine has telegraphed to the Bussorah authorities to agree to this settlement.

*New Vali of Bagdad.*

Nazim Pasha, the former Vali of Bagdad, whose recall was reported in the last quarterly despatch on Mesopotamia, has been replaced in that office by Djemal Bey, ex-Vali of Adana.

*Demolitions at Bagdad.*

No further progress has been made with the negotiations concerning this matter, as the Turkish Government are awaiting a further report, to be drawn up as soon as the new Vali of Bagdad arrives at his post.

Enclosure 3 in No. 116.

*Quarterly Report on Syria.*

1. *Beirout Vilayet.*

A SPLIT has occurred in the Beirout Committee of Union and Progress between the Turkish and the Arab members.

At the beginning of April, at the instigation of the Salonica Committee, a motion was proposed censuring two Arab deputies for making themselves the champions of Arab grievances against the Government, as tending to create inter-Moslem dissensions.

As a result, however, of the growing spirit of discontent in Syria at the neglect by the Government of what the Arabs consider their constitutional rights, such as appointments in the Government service, the use of Arabic in the courts, &c., the Arab members in a body opposed the measure, and refused to allow a telegram of censure to be sent to the Government at Constantinople.

The Christian members of the local committee, who had sided with the Turks in the dispute, sent a telegram protesting against the use by the Arab deputies in question of the term "Ottoman Mussulman unity" instead of "Ottoman unity."

They received a reassuring telegram in reply, which was published in the local papers.

As regards the administrative and economic affairs of the vilayet of Beirout and of Mount Lebanon, Mr. Cumberbatch's report for the first quarter of the year, being the latest information which has reached this embassy, is enclosed herewith.

*The Ansayriehs.*—As the Ansayriehs have so far shown no disposition to give up their arms or to submit to assimilation to the rest of the Empire, it is probable that coercive measures will shortly be taken against them by General Sami Pasha, the subduer of the Druses in the Hauran.

2. *Damascus Vilayet.*

*Bedouin and Druse Questions.*—In March it was reported that in future all allowances and subventions to Bedouin tribes would be suppressed.

In April the new Vali of Syria, Ali Ghalib Pasha, proceeded on a visit of inspection to the Hauran, doubtless in order to conciliate the Druses, whose feelings were much stirred by the recent executions of their chiefs at Damascus. At the end of May his Excellency proceeded on a similar tour to Kerak.

Sami Pasha, the commander-in-chief of the Hauran expeditionary force, returned to Damascus on the 22nd May, in order to deal with the introduction of reforms in the Hauran and among the Bedouin tribes.

The lines on which Sami Pasha is working appear to be briefly as follows:—

Regulations to be issued marking the spheres of pasturage of the nomad tribes, and excluding certain tribes from entering the Hauran, while others are to remain in fixed districts.

His Excellency has also instituted a special council to study agricultural conditions and possible developments in the Hauran, and has conferred decorations on four or five Druses, and promised a large sum of money for schools.

He has obtained the restoration of a considerable proportion (1,352 sheep and 78 camels) of the cattle stolen by Bedouins from the Druses, and has written to certain sheikhs, representing 50,000 nomads, who took refuge in the desert after the troubles at Kerak, promising them immunity.

An officer has also been sent by him from Kerak to endeavour to secure the allegiance of the Beni Khaled tribe, and the expeditionary troops have returned from Kerak to Damascus after collecting a fair amount of the plunder carried off by the tribes during the Kerak disturbances.

On the other hand, three Bedouin sheikhs were publicly hanged at Damascus on the 31st May for their participation in the Kerak outbreak of last winter and two more at Kerak itself on the 3rd June, while the overcrowding of the prisons at Damascus was increased to such an extent that dangerous fevers broke out among the prisoners, no measures being apparently taken to check the spread of disease.





3. *Aleppo Vilayet.*

Owing to unfounded charges brought against him by certain Moslem notables whose interests his Excellency had injured in endeavouring to protect the villagers against the grasping and unscrupulous landowners, Hussein Kiazim Bey, Vali of Aleppo, applied for leave in order that he might explain matters at Constantinople. His request was granted, and he left Aleppo on the 14th April with the avowed intention of refusing to return unless he were granted plenary powers and support in any action he might deem necessary to ensure the protection of the peasantry against their oppressors.

In his absence the Mutessarif of Marash was appointed acting vali, and took sides with Hussein Kiazim's opponents, with the result that his Excellency ordered him to return to Marash, and he was replaced by the defterdar.

Kiazim Bey, who has the support of the Minister of the Interior, returned to Aleppo in triumph on the 28th May, and was enthusiastically received by a concourse of 50,000 people, but no Moslem notables were present, and the dispute between them and the vali shows every sign of increasing in violence.

*Alarm at Antioch.*—Nahad Aga, a local notable and president of the local Committee of Union and Progress, had been prevented by the Kaïmakam of Antioch from becoming Mayor of Antioch on account of his (Nahad Aga's) notorious participation in the massacres of 1909 at Antioch, for which he had been imprisoned but subsequently pardoned by the Sultan.

In revenge he was apparently endeavouring to bring about the kaïmakam's removal by engineering a renewal of the massacres to discredit him.

On the 15th April the situation got so serious that Dr. Martin, a missionary residing at Antioch, wrote to His Majesty's consul at Aleppo that the Moslems of Antioch were openly telling the Christians that they would be massacred at the Greek Easter, and preachers appear also to have been visiting the surrounding villages in order to incite the Moslems to rise.

On the 19th Dr. Martin telegraphed to the consulate at Aleppo that prompt action was necessary. Mr. Fontana at once communicated with His Majesty's Ambassador, who mentioned the matter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 20th.

Meanwhile His Majesty's consulate at Aleppo had made strong representations to the Acting Vali of Aleppo, who promised to send reinforcements to Antioch, which, however, he subsequently did not do.

On the 27th April Dr. Martin telegraphed again saying danger was imminent, and, on receipt of a further telegram from Aleppo, His Majesty's Ambassador spoke again to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject. Rifaat Pasha denied that the situation was abnormal in any way.

The central authorities admitted, however, that there had been dissensions between the Antioch officials.

On the 1st May, as a result of the very strong representations made on the 27th April to the acting vali by Mr. Fontana, the colonel of the Aleppo gendarmerie and thirty police arrived at Antioch and some measure of confidence was restored.

Soon afterwards Nahad Aga left for Aleppo and the Kaïmakam of Antioch was recalled.

Dr. Martin was meanwhile being accused by a section of the committee under Nahad Aga of being in league with the kaïmakam against him and believed his life to be in danger.

On the 31st May Mr. Fontana reported that the Vali of Aleppo had returned to his post from Constantinople, had seen Dr. Martin, who had come to Aleppo, and had promised to ensure his personal safety, to visit Antioch soon himself, and to take drastic measures there.

4. *Jerusalem.*

*Mosque of Omar Incident.*—On the 21st April considerable excitement was aroused among the Moslem population at Jerusalem by a rumour that the Mosque of Omar had been desecrated by a party of English excavators and that certain holy relics had been removed.

The Mufti of Jerusalem telegraphed this news to all the vilayets of the Empire, and a commission under the military commandant of Jerusalem was at once ordered to investigate.

Angry demonstrations took place against the Governor of Jerusalem and the shoikh of the mosque, and the latter was arrested, as were also the dragoman of Captain Parker, the head of the excavating expedition, and two gendarmes, and a proclamation was issued by the Governor of Jerusalem and the local Committee of Union and Progress to quiet the people.

His Majesty's Embassy has had no cognisance of the arrangements between Captain Parker and the Ottoman Government which are said to have been facilitated by a secret agreement with Djavid Bey. The original contract granting him permission to excavate was accorded during Kiamil Pasha's tenure of office as Grand Vizier and renewed by Hakki Pasha last year.

The incident was raised somewhat acrimoniously in Parliament, and on the 3rd June the Minister of the Interior stated in the Chamber that the report of the commission sent to investigate the matter showed that the local authorities had been guilty of negligence. The Governor of Jerusalem had consequently been recalled and the commandant of the Jerusalem gendarmerie handed over to the military commission. No definite statement of any theft from the mosque was made by the Minister.

Captain Parker's luggage was searched at Jaffa, and, as nothing was found, there is ground for believing that nothing was carried off by him.

Meanwhile the local feeling against the English had not died down at Jerusalem, and on the 26th May Mr. Satow expressed the opinion that in the circumstances it would seem injudicious to allow Captain Parker to resume his excavations in August, as that gentleman had proposed to do.

The prisoners arrested for their connection with the excavations are at Beirout awaiting their trial, and His Majesty's consul-general there has been instructed to watch the proceedings against them.

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Enclosure 4 in No. 16.

*Report on the Administrative and Economic Conditions of Beirout Vilayet and Mount Lebanon.*

(Confidential.)

1. *Beirout Vilayet.*

*General Remarks.*—The administration is still weak in many departments, principally owing to incapacity of subordinate officials and defects set forth in my report in June 1910.

*Vali.*—Unfortunately, the vali, Noureddin Bey, who has proved himself an impartial, honest, and conscientious official, laboured under the disadvantage of indifferent health, and in March he had to return to Constantinople.

Though he had not much previous experience in administrative duties, he had succeeded in convincing everyone of his desire to govern constitutionally, but he sometimes found himself in a difficult position when called upon to decide between conflicting Moslem and Christian influences or between Arab and Turk, as he is no doubt inculcated with the Committee of Union and Progress's policy of "Turkey for the Turks."

His only real trouble was in connection with municipal affairs, which have got into the hands of men who place their personal interests before those of the public, with the result that the town presents as discreditable a state as ever.

In addition to his tour in the Lattakia district, Noureddin Bey also inspected Tyre and Sidon in the early part of the winter.

*General Council.*—The general council (provincial) assembled in December, and as usual discussed many schemes and passed many resolutions which will remain in the project stage.

*Ministerial Circulars.*—Circulars were published in the papers from both the present Minister of the Interior and his immediate predecessor on their assuming office containing an outline of the objects they intend to work for, and, *inter alia*, impressing upon their subordinates the desirability of respecting the rights of foreigners as acquired by treaties and Capitulations, the possible removal of the last being hinted at.

*Public Works.*—With the exception of the new railway from Tripoli to Homs, nearing completion, the only public works undertaken are the operations under the auspices of the French society for making new roads and repairing old ones in Turkey. The road between Beirout and Sidon is being repaired, and the old and important Beirout–Damascus "chaussée" across Mount Lebanon will be taken in hand next.





In the meantime, partly owing to mismanagement, partly to inherent local difficulties, the Gas (French), Electric Tramway (Belgian), and Lebanon Tramway (French) Companies are far from giving satisfaction either to the public or to their shareholders.

An electrical lighting company has recently been inaugurated, and it is hoped that its contemplated amalgamation with the gas and electrical tramway companies, bringing with it an addition to their working capital, will conduce to a betterment all round.

The Waterworks Company, formerly a British concern, was last year transferred to a French syndicate, but it menaces to come to grief unless more funds are forthcoming for the renewal of its plant, which, besides being old, is insufficient to supply the growing needs of the town.

The completion of the new railway from Tripoli to Homs (French) has been retarded by the severity of the winter and the heavy snowfalls, and, instead of being ready for traffic in March, it will not be opened before July.

The Beirout–Damascus and Rayak–Aleppo Railway (French) has also suffered greatly from the unusual snowfalls, which blocked the line in several places, especially in the Lebanon Pass, where the line was obstructed for forty days, necessitating very heavy expenses (20,000*l.*), which will not improve the already unsatisfactory financial position of the company.

*Beirout's future.*—Notwithstanding the opening of the Haifa–Damascus Railway five years ago, the prosperity of Beirout has not so far been affected, and the latter place has continued to be the port for the Damascus trade as well as for that of Aleppo; but, with the making of a harbour at Haifa, which project appears to be receiving the serious attention of the Government, and the completion of the Tripoli–Homs Railway, with probably a harbour in the near future at Tripoli, not to mention the contemplated line connecting Aleppo with Alexandretta, the goods and passengers to and from the Damascus and Aleppo vilayets will flow into those channels and considerably affect the present importance of Beirout, which will only depend on the agricultural and commercial development of the Lebanon, a very problematical contingency owing to natural causes.

As the large firms controlling the export and import of these districts are at Beirout, they will probably resort to the establishment of agencies at Haifa and Tripoli whilst retaining the management themselves, but, unless railway, steamer, and telegraphic communications with those parts are greatly improved, they will gradually lose that control.

In any case the outlook is not a favourable one for Beirout, and in the opinion of many people it can only be remedied by the construction of a broad-gauge railway to Damascus to replace the present narrow-gauge line, with a prospective prolongation from Damascus or from Homs.

*Emigration.*—In the meantime, notwithstanding the hopes entertained that the constitutional change of 1908 would stop the flow of emigration from Syria, the Christian population continues to leave the country, not only enticed by the prospect of making money more rapidly than they can do here, but in order to avoid military service.

*Immigration.*—On the other hand, the inflow of Jews to the Haifa and Nablous districts (portions of Palestine) steadily continues, notwithstanding the difficulties created by the Government in the acquisition of land, and if this policy were to be changed for one of State encouragement, the Jewish colonies, aided by the "Zionist" funds, would replace the outgoing Christian population from the conterminous districts.

*Military Service.*—The enrolment of Christians in the army took effect last autumn, and at the present moment there are fully 200 of them undergoing their training. About 100 purchased their exoneration from active service in the "Nizams," and after three months' training they will be drafted into the "reserves." The rest are going through their whole course of military service similar to their Moslem comrades, with whom they appear to be on friendly terms. No complaints have reached me as to the treatment they receive, except from young men accustomed to personal comforts and a more sanitary condition of things than prevails in barracks, especially in those of this country.

*Disarmament.*—The disarmament operations carried out by General Sami Pasha in the Hauran were extended in the autumn to the Acre and Nablous sanjaks, and were carried out peacefully.

In Beirout and other parts of the vilayet there has not yet been any special disarmament under military auspices, but the gendarmerie and police confiscate prohibited fire-

arms whenever found in the possession of the public, and they keep an eye on the gunmakers' shops.

*Gun-Running.*—The necessity of taking effective measures to prevent the smuggling of rifles and revolvers has been at last realised, and a special combined coast-guard service is being arranged between the Customs, Régie, and Public Debt Administrations.

They will no doubt be materially assisted on land by the reorganised gendarmerie service, which, with the army, shows greater advance towards efficiency than any other departments.

*Gendarmerie.*—In March 274 gendarmes terminated their studies and exercises at the gendarmerie school; 77 have been allotted to Beirout, 85 to Damascus, 75 to Aleppo, 19 to Jerusalem, and 18 remain at the school as teachers.

The present commandant of the gendarmerie is Colonel Nazmi Bey, seconded from the regular army. He is the son of the late General Husni Pasha, formerly at Adrianople. Care has been taken in the choice of men admitted to the gendarmerie and police corps, and every hope is entertained that they will prove a more active and honest body of men than their predecessors.

The French and Italian majors stationed at Damascus, Aleppo, and Adana have been withdrawn, and it is also rumoured that Colonel Albera, the senior foreign officer of the Beirout sub-commission, is to leave too. Their duties as advisers and instructors have apparently been taken over by the permanent Turkish members of the organisation commission, and their mandate becomes that of inspectors. The three officers of this section are now Colonel Albera, Captain Carossine, and Commandant Nojean.

*Transfers of Officials.*—The principal changes among officials have been as follows:—

The transfer of the secretary-general ("mektoubdji"), Ahmed Bey, to Smyrna, and the appointment in his place of Abdul Ghany Sony Bey, at present Acting Governor-General. Ahmed Bey has pleasant manners, and his knowledge of French enables him to frequent foreign society; but he is credited with a weakness for interference on behalf of persons ready to secure his influence by pecuniary methods that it was hoped died with the old régime.

Sony Bey is young and inexperienced, but, I believe, well meaning.

There have been two or three changes in the post of chief of police, which has been filled since February by Husni Bey, from Adana, who seems to give satisfaction.

Nazmi Effendi, president of the court of first instance, has been transferred in the same capacity to Tripoli (Barbary). He is an honest and impartial judge. His place is occupied by Djemal Bey from Jerusalem, who, though displaying a very independent character, is fair in his decisions.

Colonel Tewfik Bey, "commandant de place" since 1908, was transferred to Adana as redif commandant in January. He is up to the mark as an officer, and is a very strong constitutionalist.

*Law Courts.*—In judicial affairs there is perhaps less real progress to report than in any other department. The judges are perhaps of a higher standard of education, and assume an attitude of independence of outside influence, but lawyers and others who come in contact with the courts allege that impartial justice cannot yet be entirely relied upon, and that officials of the court are still open to "outside influences" of an irresistible nature, which have been specially noticed in the difficult proceedings against the unscrupulous creditor of Manchester firms which His Majesty's Embassy is acquainted with.

Unreasonable delays in disposing of pending cases are still the rule. One court has on its list over 1,000 cases awaiting a hearing.

To expedite criminal cases a second section of the criminal court of first instance has been formed.

*Finances.*—In financial affairs the activity in collecting taxes has not relaxed, owing, no doubt, to pressure from the Finance Ministry, which has to meet the urgent needs of the War Office.

With the exception of the increase of the patent tax ("temettu") there have been no new taxes.

Rumour is gaining ground that attempts are being made to levy this tax on foreigners, but for the time being they are only forcing it on Hellenic and Persian subjects, concerning whose liability to pay it there has always existed a contention





between their Governments and the Sublime Porte, leading, as at Smyrna some years ago, to trouble whenever spasmodic attempts were made to impose it.

The zeal displayed by the defterdar in ferreting out claims for arrears of property tax against educational institutions, reported upon separately, is another indication of financial activity, but whether wholly free from motives of a non-financial nature is doubtful.

*Tripoli.*—Acting Vice-Consul Harris at Tripoli reports to the following effect:—

The Mutessarif, Azmi Bey, formerly occupying a post in the Constantinople Police Department, has been showing great personal activity in getting things straight. Soon after his appointment in August 1910, his attempt to establish order among the unruly beys of the Akar district, where a blood feud existed, was not successful. The effect in Tripoli of his energetic action in that matter was good, and greater tranquillity has since existed in that turbulent town.

His conduct since can best be compared to the arbitrary and despotic acts imputed to Nazim Pasha in Bagdad, as, like that high functionary, he tried to impose special taxes for public improvements which could not be carried out for lack of public funds, and he tried to force the people to subscribe for a hospital, and a water supply, and the Navy League Fund.

Disgusted with the little support he got from the people and also with the appointment of a protégé of Izzet Pasha as Kaimakam of Akar, he ended by threatening to resign unless the central Government supported him against his interested detractors and removed the obnoxious kaimakam. Not getting a satisfactory reply, after some delay he, in March, packed up all his effects and left Tripoli. At Beirout he received assurances from Constantinople and returned to Tripoli. But the want of public spirit among the leading men of the town, who prefer to look to foreign capital for the improvement of the country rather than contribute themselves, makes it unlikely that Nazmi Bey will make much progress in his laudable efforts to improve things in his district, and a feeling of pessimism as to the ultimate ability of the present party in power to give the country a stable Government with liberty, justice, and equality is gaining ground.

In the meantime, the hastening of the completion of the railway to Homs at the rate of two-fifths of a mile per day tends to strengthen the hope that a harbour will follow next, the necessary survey having been made last year, but the news of the concession to the Bagdad Railway Company to build a line connecting Aleppo with Alexandretta has considerably dispelled the dreams of benefits to accrue to Tripoli locally from the Homs line, and last year's "boom" in land values has subsided.

*Haifa.*—Vice-Consul P. Abela at Haifa reports at follows:—

No improvement in the general administration of this consular district can be stated to have taken place during the last quarter. Public security, the administration of justice, and municipal management leave much to be desired.

There is an apparent movement among Ottoman officials to take as little heed as possible of foreign privileges. They sometimes question the validity of certain privileges on some points which in fact leave no doubt as to their clearness. The fact that such questions are even raised by subordinate officials, who ordinarily settle all matters quietly and give way in any discussion, though proof often lay on their side, makes one believe that confidential instructions must have been issued to the officials to adopt such an attitude.

Haifa has become now the head-quarters of the 27th Nizam Division, of which Brigadier-General Hashim Pasha is the commanding officer. He arrived here during the close of the last quarter, but the whole of his staff and the forty other officers also expected in various capacities have not yet arrived.

A hospital and barracks are to be constructed. The Government has decided to build a railroad from Haifa to Acre and the Hedjaz Railway.

Officials have already received instructions to start the preliminary surveying. This line will not be of any commercial importance.

*Sidon.*—The late Vice-Consul Joseph Abela reported as follows:—

The elections of the members of the "Conseil administratif" and of the assessors to the tribunal were effected under irregular conditions. Most of the candidates looked after their personal interests and used bribes to secure votes. All of them are incompetent.

The main reasons why competent men abstain from proposing their candidature are the expensive electoral campaign and the very poor salaries (200 piastres a-month) assigned to each assessor, and membership of the "Conseil administratif" being an unpaid office.

The Vali of Beirout paid a short visit to Sidon, Tyre, and Djedaidet-Merjioun in November. He promised to assist in the opening at Sidon of a branch of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, and to allot to the schools a larger place in the budget.

Being within the circumscription of the Beirout Regiment, the enrolment of the non-Moslem classes for military service has been effected. Sixty per cent. of the registered recruits are recorded as "emigrants" and 10 per cent. are described as supporters of their family or not of the required age. Emigration has much increased since the extension of the military service to non-Moslems, in spite of measures taken by the authorities.

Both the deputies for Beirout have paid visits to Sidon and also to Djedaidet-Merjioun, Nabatieh and Tyre, &c. They were received everywhere with honours. Their attention was frequently called to the exacting tithe system, which is a scourge to the agriculture of the country.

The Kaïmakam of Sidon is an upright official; yet he seems not to be energetic enough.

All payments of salaries are regularly made, but there are many complaints about the irregular distribution of the tenettu revised of late.

Both the "substitut procureur" and the examining judge meet with general dissatisfaction; their methods are exacting, and both impede the application of administrative process for the punishment and prevention of petty offences.

Much satisfaction is felt with the gendarmerie and police forces. Crime is less frequent than formerly, and the bastinado has given satisfactory results. Only one case of murder has been reported during all the quarter.

The roads between Beirout and Sidon and between Sidon and Tyre are being rebuilt by the French society.

At 12 miles from Sidon, in the direction of Tyre, runs the River Kasmieh, or Leontes. For years past many applications have been made for the concession to canalise the river and irrigate the low-lying lands situated between Sidon and Tyre, and it is reasonably expected that soon after the canalisation of the river these plains will be ten times more productive. It is said that this concession has been granted of late through the intervention of M. de Boustany, late deputy for Beirout.

The Government is giving more care and larger grants to the Government schools, which are prospering.

The private schools of the American Presbyterian Mission, of the Marist Brothers, and of the Sisters of St. Joseph are also very prosperous, and the number of pupils in all schools is increasing yearly.

There is still great lack of confidence in the service of the post office of Sidon, which is irregular.

Satisfaction is felt with regard to the actual administration of the municipality of Sidon.

The improvements in the light-house of Sidon were carried out recently; the tower supporting the light is being heightened by several feet, and a sum of 1,000*l.* has been granted for dredging and repairing the port.

Further enlargements in the custom-house buildings are expected.

*Lattakia.*—Vice-Consul Vitali at Lattakia reports that an engineer attached to the Ministry of Public Works visited Lattakia this winter and made a plan of the port with a view to its being systematically dredged. He is credited with having a sum of 1,000*l.* placed at his disposal for the work, which it is reported will be entrusted to the French firm Augier, of Constantinople.

The same engineer has been commissioned to make plans for a water supply from the Nahr-el-Kebir.

### 2. *Lebanon.*

*Administrative Council.*—The affairs of Mount Lebanon have presented no material change, and though the relations between the Governor-General and the administrative council have been less strained than they were this time last year, the suspension last autumn of Halil Akel and Elias Shoueri, the Maronite and Greek Orthodox members for Metn, on the charge of corrupt practice in connection with





their election the previous spring, caused much ill-feeling against Youssouf Pasha, whose action against them was erroneously put down to personal vindictiveness for their support of their refractory colleague Georges Zwein, previously suspended, and whose trial is still pending in the Court of Appeal.

Owing to the refusal on the part of those two suspended members to submit to the jurisdiction of the court of Metn on the grounds that only the administrative council was competent to try them, and to the indifference of the Governor-General as to their return to their duties, their places have remained vacant for many months, and, with Zwein's removal pending trial, there are now three seats vacant in the council.

In the case of Akel and Shoueri an arrangement has been suggested by which the proceedings against them might be withdrawn and thus end an unsatisfactory and mollifying state of things, but Zwein's ultimate resumption of his seat must await the result of his trial.

*Elections.*—The retirement by rotation of four members of the council in February was preceded by the usual electioneering activity on the part of the candidates and their partisans, especially in the Shouf, owing to the appearance in that district of two strong Druse candidates, the one Mahmoud Bey Djumblatt (retiring Druse member of Djezzin), supported by Nessib Bey Djumblatt, and the other Fuad Bey Abdul Melek (retiring Druse member of Shouf), who had the more or less open sympathy of the Government.

The campaign practically commenced in the autumn, when the retarded elections of sheikhs in several villages had to be made. Every influence was brought to bear on the villagers by the rival candidates in order to secure the election of sheikhs belonging to their respective sides, in anticipation of their own election. Flagrant abuses were committed on both sides, to be renewed with greater ardour when the day of their own election approached.

Whereas on previous occasions bribery had little or no part in the Shouf election, owing to previous accord among the influential Druse chiefs, this time it played an important part, and each side is said to have spent 1,000*l.* to 2,000*l.* to buy over the sheikhs. Those secured by Mahmoud Bey were brought to Beirout, where they were safely installed in an hotel at his expense and under his and his friends' effective supervision to prevent their being enticed over to the other side. Fuad Bey's sheikhs were similarly treated at Hadat, near Baabda, the official residence of the Governor-General, to which place those from Beirout, as well as those from Hadat, were conveyed in carriages under the escort of each candidate and his friends.

At Baabda they were placed in a hall adjoining the voting chamber, and guards were placed over them, ostensibly to prevent a possible quarrel, but really to prevent conversions at the last moment.

The actual balloting took place in the presence of the Governor-General and the high officials, with the result that Mahmoud Bey was returned by a bare majority of one or two votes.

Fuad Bey Abdul Melek was consoled for his disappointment by being returned for Djezzin a few days later without much effort on his part and without any purchasing of votes, as his candidature was supported by Sheikh Suleiman Kanaan, the Maronite member for Djezzin, and the most influential man in that district, Nessib Bey Djumblatt, the leading Druse chief and the largest land-owner in Djezzin, who opposed Fuad Bey in the Shouf in order to support his brother-in-law, Mahmoud Bey Djumblatt, assisted in Fuad Bey's election by not putting up a candidate of his own. In this way Mahmoud Bey and Fuad Bey merely changed seats.

In Batroun the fight was practically a trial of strength between the Patriarch and Faris Mushrek, the leader of the Freemasons, or Anti-Clerical party, and resulted in the election of Saadallah Hoayek, the Patriarch's brother, by a large majority. In this case the active sympathy of the Government agents was on the side of the Freemasons, who are steadily gaining ground.

In Zahleh the retiring member, Youssef Braidy (Greek Catholic) was also re-elected, his opponent having been Djemil Malouf.

The flagrant irregularities committed all along the line in this electoral campaign demonstrate that the proposals submitted by my colleagues and myself to the Governor-General in 1908 for remedying such abuses are as necessary as ever (*vide* my No. 89 of the 14th December and your Excellency's telegram of the 29th December, 1908), but I am afraid it will require a more authoritative Governor-General than Youssouf Pasha, and one who enjoys the confidence of the ruling party at Constantinople,

for the adoption of our scheme, which is of a nature to engender suspicion of a local desire to give the administrative council a semblance of a small parliament.

Your Excellency might, however, think fit to consider whether the occasion that will present itself next year for the nomination of a new Governor-General on the retirement of Youssouf Pasha, on the termination of his mandate, might not be taken advantage of to embody our project in the protocol confirming the next Governor-General's appointment, in accordance with precedent, and thus ensure its adoption, which, I have every reason to believe, will be favourably received by the sheikhs themselves and by the public in general. The only adverse critics in Mount Lebanon of such a step would be the men of the position of Nessib Bey Djumblatt, Emir Mustapha Arslan and his nephew Mir Chekib, the Maronite Patriarch and his bishops, Habib Pasha Saad and the kaimakams, and present members of the administrative council in general, who all maintain their power over the affairs of Mount Lebanon by personal influence, seldom employed for the benefit of their country, but mainly to further their personal interests and those of their friends.

*Changes.*—There have been fewer changes among officials than usual owing to the Governor-General realising what I have continually tried to impress upon him, *i.e.*, the desirability of choosing the best available men for appointment as vacancies occur, and retaining their services until they commit irregularities of a serious nature, instead of favouring the protégés of influential leaders of parties and dismissing them on the slightest pretext when their places are wanted for intriguing rivals.

Mgr. Boutros Zoghbi, Maronite Bishop of Cyprus, and one of the most distinguished Maronite prelates, having died in December, the Patriarch nominated Mgr. Paul Aouad, one of his vicars, in his stead.

Mgr. Aouad is clever, and was educated in Rome. He has been assistant to the Papal delegate in Beirout, and has published several theological treatises. He is, however, credited with insincerity, and has a very independent character.

His official residence is at Corniet-Chahwan, near Bekfaya, in Mount Lebanon, and he seldom, if ever, visits Cyprus, where the Maronites number about 1,500.

*Youssouf Pasha.*—Personal attacks against Youssouf Pasha, prompted by personal motives, continue to appear frequently in two or three papers of Beirout, but his Excellency wisely takes no notice of them.

*Roads.*—In addition to the usual thoroughness in the upkeep of the existing "chaussées" all over the Lebanon, the construction of a much needed carriage road between Batroun and Tripoli, viâ Musseyleha, along the coast has been recently completed after many adverse ups and downs, amongst which was a long-protracted lawsuit with a defaulting Italian contractor and his guarantors.

*Special.*—Two matters have caused some excitement in Mount Lebanon, *i.e.*, the enrolment for military service of Lebanese residing in Beirout and other parts of the Ottoman Empire and the imposition of the "bauderole" tax on home-grown tobacco. Both these questions have been reported on separately.

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Enclosure 5 in No. 16.

*Quarterly Report on Arabia.*

*The Revolt in the Yemen.*

AFTER the relief of Menakha on the 24th February, the insurgents retreated in the direction of Sanaa and began to concentrate their attacks on the Turkish outposts between Menakha and the capital.

On the 27th February the new commander-in-chief, General Izzet Pasha, arrived at Jeddah and left on the following day for Hodeidah. Here he interviewed the Grand Shereef of Mecca, who was supposed to be contemplating a punitive expedition into the Assyr against the rebel Sheikh-al-Idrisee.

On the 9th March General Izzet Pasha, accompanied by General Syyed Pasha, left Hodeidah for Menakha to conduct operations against the insurgents centred round Sanaa. Simultaneously with the advance on Menakha, Colonel Riza Bey, with a force of some 5,000 or 6,000 men, moved onwards in the direction of the capital and, after encountering considerable opposition from the rebels *en route*, established himself at Suf-el-Khaimis, a military outpost, situated to the north-west of Menakha. Here he awaited General Izzet Pasha, who joined him about the 25th March, but the latter was



obliged to return once more to Menakha and divert his attention to the course of events elsewhere.

Colonel Riza Bey continued his advance on Sanaa, and after two final encounters with the Arabs, resulting in a decisive victory for the Turkish troops, he entered the capital without opposition on the afternoon of the 4th April. On the following day General Izzet Pasha arrived with the main army.

The relief of the capital was celebrated with general rejoicings and a review of all the troops in garrison.

The town had been in a state of siege since the beginning of January. During that period several sorties were made, but only on one occasion did any serious fighting take place between the besieged garrison and the rebels. The activity of the latter was chiefly confined to sniping at the walls of the town, while the garrison amused themselves by keeping up a desultory bombardment of the neighbouring villages. Altogether, very little damage was done in proportion to the ammunition expended. According to an eyewitness, neither party displayed any very remarkable efficiency, and the arrangements for the defence of the town were such that, had the Arabs been capable of using their guns, they could have taken the place by assault at any time and without any very great difficulty.

General Syyed Pasha, who had accompanied General Izzet Pasha to Menakha, returned to Hodeidah on the 26th March and set out on the following day for Hajjeh in consequence of the serious turn affairs had taken in that district. It appeared, from a communication received from one of the sheikhs, that the kaza was being hard pressed by the Imam Yahya's levies, several Turkish outposts had fallen into the hands of the rebels, and the town of Hajjeh was invested.

The situation in the province of Assyr had also grown very serious. Heavy fighting had taken place in the vicinity of Ibha; the town itself was in danger of succumbing, and, moreover, there appeared to be little prospect of relief.

Throughout the month of March considerable activity was displayed by Ottoman gun-boats in patrolling the Yemen littoral with a view to suppressing the arms traffic. In consequence of a report that a German steamer, the "Louise," had sailed from Europe with a consignment of arms and dynamite, apparently bound for Bussorah, but possibly destined for the Yemen rebels, this system of patrol was extended to the eastern littoral of the Red Sea between the Straits of Bab-el-Mandeb and Cunfuda.

At the beginning of March a document exhorting the rebels to submit to the Sultan as rightful Caliph was circulated in the Yemen and the Hedjaz. It was printed in Cairo and bore the signatures of Sheikh Belal, an eminent Yemeni living in Cairo, and of seventeen Yemeni students of the Azhar, the Moslem University in Cairo.

*The Wavell Case.*

In November 1910 a certain Hadj Ali arrived at Hodeidah provided with passports from the British Foreign Office and the Zanzibar Protectorate. This Hadj Ali, professedly a Moslem, was an Englishman by birth, named Arthur Wavell, a scientific explorer, and accredited by the Royal Geographical Society. His object was to explore certain unknown parts of the Arabian interior. The local authorities, naturally suspicious of an Englishman in the Yemen, refused to grant him facilities for proceeding to Sanaa. Mr. Wavell, however, undertook the journey at his own risk and succeeded in reaching the capital. A fortnight after his arrival the town was besieged.

On his first appearance there he appears to have been courteously received by the vali, but during the progress of the siege, owing to malicious rumours to the effect that he was a British officer in disguise, and had come to the Yemen with the object of commanding the Imam's artillery against the Turks, he was subjected to a strict supervision by the authorities, and finally, after the relief of Sanaa, he was treated with such indignity by the mudir that he complained to Mr. Richardson, who telegraphed to Izzet Pasha stating that Mr. Wavell was a simple explorer. This caused the authorities to assume a more reasonable attitude, and Mr. Wavell's position thenceforth became more tolerable.

Mr. Wavell informed Izzet Pasha of his intention of penetrating into the heart of Arabia, but he was told that it was absolutely essential that the Porte should receive an official assurance from His Majesty's Embassy at Constantinople that the Ottoman Government would not be held responsible for any harm that might come to him. Mr. Wavell offered to sign a statement that he would take all the risks upon himself, but the authorities refused to accept it.

Soon after this (at the beginning of May) His Majesty's Embassy was informed by

the Porte that Mr. Wavell's presence at Sanaa was not desirable, and that Izzet Pasha had been authorised to send him to Hodeidah. But the representations made by the Porte did not seem to be of a very serious nature, and the attitude of the Constantinople authorities in general towards Mr. Wavell was one of indifference, so that it appeared as though the matter would not be pressed any further.

However, on the 12th June Mr. Richardson telegraphed that Mr. Wavell, while attempting to leave Sanaa for Mareb, had been seized by a body of Turkish soldiers, led captive through the town with every circumstance of brutality and indignity, and thrown into prison, where he remained for ten days, without being allowed to communicate with the consulate. Finally he was deported by force to Hodeidah.

The vali was present at Sanaa when the outrage took place, and appears to have been not only cognisant of but responsible for the whole incident.

*The Vali of Mecca.*

On the 4th April Kamil Bey, the ex-Vali of Mecca, left for Constantinople. As a vali he does not seem to have been particularly satisfactory, even for a Vali of the Hedjaz, procrastination, obstructiveness, and chicanery being his principal characteristics, while his continued absence from Jeddah caused considerable inconvenience and annoyance to the consuls.

He was replaced on the 14th April by Hazim Bey, a former Vali of Monastir.

*Seizure of an Italian Dhow in the Red Sea.*

After several conferences at Hodeidah between Baron Aliotti and Salih Bey, the Italian and Ottoman commissioners, it was decided (at the end of February) to transfer the scene of enquiry to Midi, where the alleged act of contraband was supposed to have been committed.

However, the investigations there appear to have elicited no definite result, owing to the attitude of the Sheikh of Midi, who flatly refused to furnish any information whatever to either party.

Matters having come to a deadlock, Baron Aliotti returned to Massawa, Salih Bey to Hodeidah.

The latter seemed to think that no further enquiry was necessary, as he was personally convinced that the act of contraband had taken place, and the Italians had failed to prove the contrary, while the former told Mr. Richardson confidentially that the Italian Government intended to make a naval demonstration in the Red Sea. In any case it is possible that His Majesty's Government will be asked to act as arbitrators in the case.

*Hodeidah–Sanaa Railway.*

On the 15th February a party of fourteen engineers, French and Italian, arrived at Hodeidah to begin operations.

According to the *tracé*, the section of the railway between Ras-el-Ketib and Hajjeila, viâ Hodeidah, was about 116 kilom. in length. No decision had been made at Constantinople with regard to the continuation of the line to Sanaa.

The engineer in charge of the construction hoped to complete the section to Hajjeila and the harbour at Ras-el-Ketib within eighteen months. The syndicate with which the Ottoman Ministry have signed the contract is a French one, headed by David Leon Bey, of Paris. It will be reimbursed at the rate of £T. 4,000 per kilometre. This will include the cost of the harbour at Ras-el-Ketib and the other buildings along the line.

*Jeddah–Mecca Railway.*

Thirteen Turkish engineers arrived at Jeddah at the beginning of February to make surveys for the Jeddah–Mecca Railway. Eight of them left Jeddah to survey the region between Jeddah and Mecca on the 5th March.

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*Report on Events in Turkey in Africa for the quarter March 31–June 30, 1911.*

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*Wadai.*

Somewhat garbled accounts have been received of a conflict which seems to have occurred about the middle of March at Arada, near Abeshr, between Sheikh Asil, whose claims were supported by the French, and who was accompanied on this occasion by two French officers, and Doudmourrah, his rival, who not only won a complete victory, but took Asil prisoner, and sent him to Dour. Doudmourrah is then said to have proceeded to Abeshr, whence the French hurriedly made their escape.

*Anti-foreign Agitation.*

At the instigation most probably of agents of the Committee of Union and Progress, the local press has been producing violent articles directed against the Italians, chiefly with a view to setting the population against their increasing influence and enterprise in the country. Other means have also been adopted to achieve this end. On the 27th March a public meeting was convened at Khoms at which the Moslems and Jews who were present—many of them purely by compulsion—were sternly warned against selling any real property to foreigners, especially Italians, and were incited by the speeches of the local notables against foreign influence in the country. It may be remarked that up to the present the inhabitants of Khoms had been noted for their moderate views and for their good relations with the European residents. The anti-Italian agitation was so successfully engineered that it spread to Benghazi, where, on the 12th April, His Majesty's consul received a petition from the inhabitants demanding British protection or annexation to Egypt, apparently in consequence of a sudden panic of an expected attack by Italy. Troops were ordered to Benghazi, but the panic subsided, and the soldiers were dispatched elsewhere, where their presence was more urgently required.

*Extensions of Turkish Authority.*

A military commission was formed at Tripoli to proceed to Tibesti and Borku by way of Fezzan in connection with the question of a Turkish penetration southwards in those parts. The Government will take no decision as to the advisability of adopting such a policy until they receive the report of the commission, which has started on its way, and has, with the consent of the head of the Senussi Order at Kufra, raised the Turkish flag at Dour and Borku.

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[27803] No. 17.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)*

(No. 472.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 7, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 458 of the 3rd July, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Jeddah denying the truth of the report of the fall of Abha (Assyr), and reporting on the proceedings of the Grand Shereef.

I have, &c.

CHARLES M. MARLING.

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Enclosure in No. 17.

*Consul Monahan to Sir G. Louther.*

(No. 26.)

Sir, *Jeddah, June 20, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 24 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to report that, though news somewhat frequently reaches Jeddah from Coonfudah (Assyr), there is no confirmation here of the story which has appeared in English newspapers of the fall of Abha, chief town of Assyr, and the surrender of its large Turkish garrison. It appears that a small Turkish outpost, not far from Abha, was captured about the

middle of May. There always have been some Turkish troops scattered outside and near Abha on the mountain slope (see my despatch No. 6 of the 9th February, 1911).

I may mention that Abdullah Bey, son of the Grand Shereef, who, as I have had the honour to report, has taken part in the recent engagement near Coonfudah, is the Member of Parliament for Mecca. It is reported that he had a horse shot under him in the previous unsuccessful engagement near Gams, five or six hours inland from Coonfudah (see my despatch No. 23 of the 30th ultimo), at which engagement he was also present. The Grand Shereef went out from Coonfudah on or about the 13th instant with all his Bedouins and most of the Turkish regulars that were in Coonfudah. It seems that his Bedouin force melted away a good deal during his march from Mecca to Coonfudah. He does not seem to have ever had more than 2,000 armed Bedouins with him in Coonfudah. I hear that the whole force now remaining in Coonfudah consists of one or two battalions of regulars. The Ottoman steam-ship "Salonik" arrived here on the 16th instant with 630 invalided soldiers from Coonfudah, took water here, and sailed for Constantinople with those soldiers on the 19th instant.

I have, &c.
J. H. MONAHAN.

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[27036] No. 18.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 11.)*

(No. 474.)
Sir, *Therapia, July 7, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 456 of the 3rd instant relative to the situation in the Muntefik country, I have the honour to inform you that His Majesty's consul at Bussorah states, in a telegram received to-day, that there is a report that a truce has been arranged between the Arabs and the Turks, the reason being that the former are short of ammunition and the latter short of coal for their steamers.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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[26743] No. 19.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.*

(No. 269. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July 11, 1911.*

NATIONAL Bank.

Please refer to your despatch No. 460 of the 3rd July.

If Rifaat Pasha mentions the subject you are authorised to state that His Majesty's Government would certainly do nothing to hamper the bank, and are anxious for its success generally.

We should in fact be glad if the bank were successful in obtaining any of the concessions it is working for, and, subject to the concurrence of Russian Government, we would be ready to support it officially as regards Black Sea ports. The bank, however, has not asked us to approach the Russian Government on their behalf in connection with these ports.

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[27807] No. 20.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)*

(No. 478.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 7, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana, reporting on Mohammer Bey, the new Vali of Adana.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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Enclosure in No. 20.

*Vice-Consul Smith to Consul-General Eyres.*

(No. 22.)
Sir, *Adana, July 1, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Mohammer Bey, recently appointed Vali of Adana, arrived here on the 26th June and took charge of his post. The new vali, who is a civilian, is only 35 years of age, and was previously Mutessarif of Kaiserieh for two years. He comes from there with a good reputation, and was much liked by the Christian inhabitants, whom he appears to have governed with impartiality and justice. In Kaiserieh he carried out, as far as he could, some works of public utility, such as building schools, road-making, and drainage of land. His Excellency informed me when I called on him that he was offered the governorship of a province a year ago, but refused, as he wished to complete the work he had begun at Kaiserieh.

In appearance Mohammer Bey is small and slight, and has a very nervous manner, which shows itself by his nervous movements and rapid manner of talking. He seems to be very pleased to be appointed here, and expressed the usual intention of devoting himself to the construction of roads and schools. It is too early yet to venture an opinion as to whether he will be a success here, his rather insignificant presence and nervousness of manner will prejudice him with the Turks, and also the reputation he has amongst them of being an atheist.

During the last few weeks the Greek shops and cafés both at Adana and Mersina have been boycotted. This has been got up by an envoy from Salonica and a local committee, one of the leaders of which is the editor of the chief local newspaper—the "Tejeddud." This picketing of the Greek shops gave an opportunity to some of the rougher elements of the town to walk about the streets in an overbearing manner, and there was a certain amount of uneasiness felt by many of the Christian natives. This was increased two days before the unexpected arrival of the vali by one of the "boycottajis" drawing his revolver at the gate of a Greek café in the European part of the town, and firing five or six shots, wounding one man. The police made no efforts to deal with him, though several were present, and he mounted his horse and galloped away, firing his revolver in the air. When the vali arrived and found that no steps had been taken for his arrest, he gave orders that he was to be shot at sight if he did not surrender within twenty-four hours. This had the desired effect, and the man gave himself up. This appears to show that Mohammer Bey intends to deal firmly with any attempted disorder, and his action has certainly reassured the Christians, who, in Adana, are always ready to expect the worst.

I have, &c.
IAN M. SMITH.

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[27809] No. 21.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)*

(No. 480.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 9, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum reporting on the discontent created in the Bitlis vilayet by the importation of Circassian settlers, and the general attitude of the authorities in regard to the land question.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 21.

*Consul McGregor to Sir G. Louther.*

(No. 45. Confidential.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, June 27, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Excellency copy of a despatch from Mr. Safrastian, acting vice-consul at Bitlis, reporting on the discontent created by the settlement, under Government auspices, of Circassian immigrants on lands belonging in most cases to Armenians and in some instances, it would appear, to Kurds.

In thus reverting to the time-honoured policy of stiffening the "reliable" element on their frontiers by the importation of Muhajirs, the Government appears to be carrying out the programme generally supposed to have been decreed by the Committee of Union and Progress, and similar developments may, accordingly, be looked for in other frontier districts.

The successful realisation of this scheme is, however, quite another matter in view of the resentment universally manifested by the Armenians at the failure of the Government to take any serious steps towards the equitable solution of the land question. It is no secret among the population that the commission of inspection sent last year to enquire into the grievances of the dispossessed Armenians was a mere farce, as, indeed, was evident from the fact that the inspectors confined themselves entirely to collecting such information as the local officials chose to supply. A wholly inadequate and impossible scheme of monetary compensation was flatly rejected by the Armenians, and it would now appear that, instead of making any effort to restore lands unlawfully held by Kurdish interlopers, the Government is about to deprive the Armenians of what they still possess.

If the language held to me by the Governor-General of Erzeroum is any indication of the views entertained at head-quarters, the outlook cannot be considered promising, seeing that his Excellency, while admitting that nothing was being done towards a solution of the problem, remarked that the question was one not so much between Armenians and Kurds as between Kurdish boys and Kurdish tribesmen, the latter having, according to Jellal Bey, much more to complain of than the Armenians.

Although the Kurds are undoubtedly accustomed to high-handed treatment on the part of their chiefs, I am aware of no facts confirmatory of this novel point of view, with the exception of those set forth in the concluding paragraph of Mr. Safrastian's despatch, and in this case the local authorities would appear to have been the real delinquents.

It is unlikely that any attempt will be made to import Circassians into the frontier districts of this province adjoining Russian territory, as the Christian element in these regions was converted to Islamism many years ago, and the country is too poor to attract newcomers.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 21.

*Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor.*

(No. 16.)
Sir, *Bitlis, June 18, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report as follows upon the agrarian policy of the Government as it is being carried out in various districts of this vilayet, which, by its avowed disregard of the rights and ownership of the Armenians and its strongly Pan-Islamic tendencies, is gravely disturbing the relations of good neighbourhood between the Christians and the Mostems, and impairing still worse the mutual understanding of the races, a policy which seems to be quite contrary to the professions of the Young Turk Government.

By my despatch of the 25th July last, I had had the honour to classify the various claims of the Armenians with regard to lands unlawfully seized by the Moslem chiefs and the Circassian immigrants. While eagerly awaiting for a prompt solution of the problem in an administrative manner, the Armenians of this province were confronted this spring with a surprise of far wider importance. Notwithstanding that they claimed the lands, distributed to such immigrants under the old régime, to be restored to them and expected to get them back this year, the Government, in addition to the burning disputes unsolved as yet, has lately been granting to Circassian immigrants new pieces of land belonging to Armenians by title-deeds and in all lawful manner.

Thus some 1,200 "dunums" (4 "dunums" make about an English acre) of land belonging to one Armenian, Avdal, of the village Karakaya, in Melazgerd, was distributed last autumn among thirty families of Circassians. All protests of the proprietor against this high-handed brigandage have not been listened to.

In Yonjalu, Kakarlu, Piran, Rustem-Gedik, &c., Armenian villages in Bulanik, various numbers of Moslem immigrants have been established by the authorities upon lands belonging to the Armenians, the ownership of which can in no way be disputed.





In the case of Yonjalu, I am assured that the villagers won the dispute even at the courts in last autumn, and turned the Circassians out of the village, but this spring, the same Circassians were settled near Yonjalu upon Armenian land by the authorities.

In the villages of Bermerd and Vartenis, in the plain of Mush, the proceedings of the Government were of the most provocative character to the Armenians. In the last-named village, twenty-one new pieces of fertile fields on the outskirts of the village were assigned lately to Moslem immigrants established there some seven years ago, whereas the villagers expected to evict the intruders this year. This last arrangement of the Government incensed the Armenians to the highest pitch. It appears that the authorities, fearing an armed conflict between the two peoples, sent some gendarmes to the village three weeks ago, who literally walked along the plough, while the Moslems were cultivating the Armenian land.

Owing to this one-sided policy of the Government and the Moslem aggression in agrarian disputes, several attacks and quarrels resulting in murders are reported from almost all parts of this vilayet. Three weeks ago one Khosrof Melkonian was killed in Rustem-Gedik, in Melazgerd, and another wounded. Eight Armenians of Khasnig, in Melazgerd, were wounded a fortnight ago, two of whom rather seriously, &c. Such strained relations between the Christians and Moslems may have still deplorable consequences.

The Government is making all moral and material sacrifices to settle and encourage the Moslem immigrants. In addition to the Armenian lands, which are being liberally granted to them, every Circassian family gets £T. 18 for building a house, some cattle, and all sorts of privileges and immunities.

With all this, however, the latter seem to fail in every way, and they are always prone to go back to Russia. But the Government employs sheikhs and other religious influences in order to stop their return.

I, however, must state that the same Government not only does not assist the Christian immigrants who return home after years of peregrination and in many cases find their homes and land occupied by Moslems, but it does even not wish to restore to them the houses and fields that are undoubtedly their property.

Such crying injustices perpetrated on the part of the constitutional Government, added to the political free hand given to the Kurds, seem to be bad signs in no way conducive to the well-being of the country.

Owing to land disputes, frequent quarrels are reported also as happening between Moslems. As you are aware from my telegram of the 10th instant to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, six Circassians were reported at first as killed "by the Armenians" in Melazgerd. Later on, however, it became evident that Kurds and Circassians had quarrelled on a piece of land, and that one Circassian was killed and five others were wounded, and that the first false news of six Circassians being killed "by the Armenians" was officially disseminated with a view to misleading the foreign consuls and counteracting the feeling of indignation which has been created in Armenian circles owing to the recent outrageous murders of Armenians in Khnyt and the troubled state of the vilayets of Bitlis and Van.

I have, &c.
A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

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[27811] No. 22.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 17.)*

(No. 482.)
Sir, *Therapia, July 9, 1914.*

IN reply to your telegram No. 263 of the 8th instant, I have the honour to report that no other firms besides those of Messrs. Pearson and Sons and Sir John Jackson and Co. have submitted tenders for the Hindieh Barrage, and in these circumstances it appears unnecessary for me to take any action with a view to securing the business for either of them.

One of the conditions of the contract is that the contractor shall take over the work already executed, the price thereof to be included in the total of the tender. I am informed that Messrs. Pearson and Co. have inserted a stipulation in their tender that they will not consent to a price higher than 110,000*l.* for such works, in spite of the well-known fact that a much larger sum than this has been expended on them. The difference between their tender (£T. 1,147,624) and that of Sir John Jackson (£T. 1,159,142) is only £T. 11,518, or about 1 per cent., and it seems likely,

in the circumstances, that the adjudication will be in favour of the latter firm. I note also that, by the financial law of this year, the terms of the contract must be approved by Parliament. This will involve a considerable delay—in fact, it is unlikely that the future contractor could take over the works before the end of the year, and during this period the provisional expenses will be accumulating, and the price of the work already executed correspondingly increased.

The result of the adjudication should, according to the official announcement asking for tenders, be made known in a few days, but it is probable that there will be a certain amount of negotiation before a definite agreement is reached.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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[27814] No. 23.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received July* 17.)

(No. 485.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July* 12, 1911.

IT will be within your recollection that one of the chief points of contention in the recent case of the arbitrary arrest of Bahrein natives by the Vali of Bussorah—see Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 385 of the 3rd ultimo and previous correspondence—was the refusal of the local Turkish authorities to admit the attendance of a British dragoman at the trial.

It is therefore satisfactory to learn from His Majesty's acting consul at Bussorah that in a trial there on the 8th instant, when a native of Bahrein was the plaintiff, the president of the court of first instance invited the British consular dragoman to attend. An objection to his presence was raised by the public prosecutor, but this was ruled out or order, and the dragoman subsequently signed the sentence of the court.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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[28292] No. 24.

*Note communicated by Tewfik Pasha, July* 19, 1911.

LA Compagnie anglaise de Pétrole a débarqué en vue de Brim (Baraim), sis sur la côte de l'Ile Abadan (Habadan), une bouée dans le Chatt-el-Arab, et qu'elle en fera autant d'une autre [*sic*].

Ces bouées causeront nombre de difficultés et au point de vue de la navigation et dans les relations internationales avec la Grande-Bretagne.

D'autre part, le premier drogman de l'Ambassade d'Angleterre à Constantinople a informé que les bouées placées aux embouchures du Chatt-el-Arab se trouvaient en dehors des eaux territoriales ottomanes et que les autorités locales ayant l'intention de les enlever, le Gouvernement britannique envoie un bateau pour l'empêcher. Il a ajouté, en même temps, qu' "en dehors des eaux territoriales" signifie "à plus de 3 milles de la terre."

Or, l'article 39 de l'Acte général de Bruxelles a implicitement fixé la zone des eaux territoriales à 5 milles de la côte.

Si c'est le désir de régulariser la navigation du fleuve, il serait loisible au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique de s'entendre avec la Sublime Porte pour faire le nécessaire à cet effet. Autrement, son intervention dans les eaux ottomanes du Chatt-el-Arab, que l'on peut considérer, tout au plus, comme indivis avec le Gouvernement persan, ne saurait se justifier.

*Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,*
*le* 19 *juillet*, 1911.

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[28253] No. 25.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received July* 19.)

(No. 176.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, July* 18, 1911.

AFFAIRS in Arabia.

With reference to the telegram from Reuters agency reporting a serious reverse at Lohéja, the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that the importance of the incident has been exaggerated. His Excellency admitted, however, that they cut off the water supply, and said that water and troops are being sent from Hodeidah by sea to the relief of the garrison.

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[28548] No. 26.

*Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received July* 21.)

(No. 329.)
Sir, *Paris, July* 17, 1911.

I SPOKE to M. de Selves, in the course of my first interview with his Excellency on the 9th instant, of the desirability of Anglo-French co-operation at Constantinople in financial matters. In this he concurred. I told him that several attempts had been made to bring about a combination or a fusion of interests, but they had failed, owing chiefly to the obstructive methods of the Ottoman Bank, which, though nominally an Anglo-French establishment, was in reality a French one. The London board had been quite as obstructive and even more so than the administration of the bank at Paris. The result of the excessive pretensions of the bank in the matter of the Turkish loan had driven the Porte to seek money in Germany. It had obtained it there at a higher price, it was true, than it would have paid for a loan in Paris, but without the political conditions and concessions to the Ottoman Bank which the French Government, at the instance of M. Laurent, a French financial expert whose services had been lent to the Turkish Government as their financial adviser, had been led to insist on. M. Laurent's proceedings had furnished the curious spectacle of an adviser acting in opposition to the wishes of the Government by which he was employed. There had been a divergence of views between the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance. A quotation for a loan by a French group other than the Ottoman Bank was refused by the Ministry of Finance except on conditions which the Porte would not accept. The Ottoman Bank declined to forgo demands which the Porte regarded as excessive, and a loan from France not being negotiable the money was provided by German banks under the auspices of the German Government. German interests had benefited thereby politically and commercially. Germany had posed as the friend in need, and with success.

I further expressed to M. de Selves the opinion that the French Government rather overrated the effect of the power which the Minister of Finance has to withhold his consent to a quotation in the Paris market of loans or undertakings to which he sees political objections, or to the bringing out of undertakings to which he desires to attach political conditions or promises of expenditure of part of the funds in France. The French Government had been for a long time under the impression that by refusing a quotation for a loan for the construction of the Bagdad Railway they would be able to exact from the company terms for French and British participation in the construction and administration of the railway. This refusal of a quotation, though it delayed the construction and was inconvenient to the company, did not prevent French money being invested in the undertaking. The Ottoman Bank, though it was for a long time denied on its part, but was now admitted, had an agreement which still existed by which there was a mutual understanding between it and the Deutsche Bank (*alias* also the Bagdad Railway Company) to give to one another a 30 per cent. option of all enterprises undertaken in Turkey. The Ottoman Bank therefore had an option of 30 per cent. in the Bagdad Railway. As the shares were not quoted on the Bourse they passed in Paris from bank to bank and from hand to hand, for there were French investors who were ready to put their money into the concern, notwithstanding the prohibition of the French Government of a quotation. Shares were also purchased through Swiss and Belgian banks. There was also another and a roundabout way in which French money assisted the construction of the railway, viz., through the purchase

by French investors of shares in German enterprises which the German holders sold in order to invest in the Bagdad Railway.

M. de Selves said that he quite appreciated how shortsighted had been the attitude of giving unlimited support to the Ottoman Bank, and, so far as he was concerned, he would be very glad to see Anglo-French co-operation at Constantinople in financial as well as political questions.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

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[28591] No. 27.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received July 21.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Marquess of Crewe, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India dated the 29th June, relative to the situation on the trucial coast.

*India Office, July* 20, 1911.

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Enclosure in No. 27.

*The Government of India to Lieutenant-Colonel Cox.*

Sir, *Simla, June* 26, 1911.

I AM directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter dated the 30th April, 1911, dealing with the situation at Debai and the trucial coast.

2. The matter is under consideration, and will be shortly submitted for the orders of His Majesty's Government. With reference to the proposed introduction of an order in council for the trucial coast, I am to say that the Government of India, as at present advised, are inclined to think that the question may suitably be postponed pending result of the negotiations between His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government for the adjustment of questions relating to the Persian Gulf. Meanwhile, however, I am to request that, with a view to save time, should it eventually be decided to take the proposed action, you will prepare and submit a draft of an order in council for the consideration of the Government of India.

I have, &c.
E. H. S. CLARKE,
*Deputy-Secretary to the Government of India.*

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[28793] No. 28.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.*

(No. 282.) Confidential.
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July* 21, 1911

HINDIEH barrage.

Please see your despatch No. 482 of the 9th July.

Messrs. Pearsons inform us that French Government are using their influence, at the instance of the French firms of Batignol, to prevent British firm from getting the contract.

You should ascertain whether this report is correct, and, if it is, urge Porte strongly to accept tender of one of the British firms competing for the contract.

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[28882] No. 29.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)*

(No. 498.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July* 18, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 446 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum reporting



[28852] No. 28ª.

*Euphrates and Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received July* 22.)

*3, Salters' Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, July* 22, 1911.

Sir,

WE have the honour to enclose herewith for your information copy of a telegram we have received from our Bagdad agents, under date of the 17th instant, regarding the Bagdad Railway.

We have, &c.
(For Secretary),
T. H. ROBERTS.

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Enclosure in No. 28ª.

*Copy of Telegram from Bagdad, July* 17, 1911.

CHIEF engineer, Bagdad Railway, arrived 7th July. From information received he intends obtain permission from the Sublime Porte to carry merchandise, in addition to railway material, by railway company's steamers and lighters on the River Tigris, and gives accumulation at Bussorah as reason. Bulk of merchandise and all railway material go from Bussorah to Bagdad, and very small proportion of downward cargo, consequently his reason obviously incorrect. The British consul at Bussorah has informed His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople by telegram.

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the energetic military measures taken by the Vali of Bitlis against the Kurds of Khuyt who were implicated in the recent murders of Armenians in that district, and commenting on the state of affairs in the Bitlis vilayet.

His Majesty's vice-consul at Van, in his despatch No. 15 of the 26th June, referred to by Mr. McGregor in his despatch enclosed herewith, reported that Abdul Rezzak Bey, of the powerful Bedr Khan family, had been engaged in a seditious propaganda among the frontier Kurds, and had told them that in the event of their rising against the Government they would have the support of Russia. Thereupon orders were sent to the Ottoman consulate at Urmi for Abdul Rezzak's arrest, but he was said to have taken refuge in the Russian consulate, and with the assistance of Russian cossacks to have made his escape to Tabreez.

The impression produced among the local Turkish authorities by Abdul Rezzak's intrigues is that any agitation in the frontier regions would receive the support of Russia.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING

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Enclosure 1 in No. 29.

*Consul McGregor to Mr. Marling.*

(No. 52.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, July 7*, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 43 of the 17th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Mr. Safrastian, acting vice-consul at Bitlis, in which he reports that the military measures adopted by the Vali of Bitlis in the district of Khuyt have so far resulted in the capture of thirty-six Kurds implicated in recent murders and other crimes, among the prisoners being Hadji Amaré. "Amaré" appears to be the Kurdish form of Omer, who is responsible for the doing to death of eight Armenians under circumstances already known to you.

From information which has reached me from various sources, Ismail Hakk Bey seems to be bent on establishing order in his province; but it is doubtful whether he will be allowed a free hand by the central Government, and, as Mr. Safrastian remarks, the judicial authorities are not likely to assist him in his task unless they realise that strong measures are desired at Constantinople.

Mussa Bey and his relatives appear still to enjoy immunity from Government interference, and as long as this continues to be the case, neither the Armenian population nor the disinterested observer can be expected to believe in the desire or ability of the Government to ensure a more tolerable existence for its Christian subjects.

If the information supplied by His Majesty's vice-consul at Van in his despatch No. 15 of the 26th ultimo regarding the proceedings of Abdurrezzak Bey is well-founded, and if, as Mr. Safrastian reports in his despatch herewith enclosed, Mussa Bey is intriguing with the Hassanli tribe with a view to an anti-Government rising, the apprehension expressed by the Armenians of a Kurdish autonomy under the Bedr Khan clan becomes comprehensible, and one is driven to suspect that as long as the frontier question hangs in the balance nothing serious will be done to alienate Kurdish allegiance.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 29.

*Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor.*

(No. 17.)
Sir, *Bitlis, June 26*, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatches No. 12 of the 6th June and my No. 13 of the 12th June instant, respecting the affairs of Khuyt, I now have the honour to report that the vali has been able in the course of the last week to arrest seventeen Kurdish criminals, including Hadji Amaré and the other murderers of the eight Armenians in Khuyt, without firing a shot, and has sent them here to prison.

After studying the conditions of the district and taking full information as to the whereabouts of Hadji Amaré and his companions, the vali sent a strong military detachment to surround him in a forest, Hadji Amaré seems to have yielded to the promises of

a pardon from the commanding officer, upon which nine others of his companions surrendered themselves to the vali, who at once ordered to lead them handcuffed to the prison at Bitlis under a military escort.

Another gang of seven Kurdish convicts of Khuyt, including one notorious Hadji Sefero, were imprisoned here a few days ago, making the number of the arrested criminals seventeen altogether up to now.

On the 21st instant the vali issued a proclamation in Turkish, Armenian, and Kurdish, declaring some sort of a state of siege in Khuyt: any person bearing any fire-arms would be considered as a criminal; all old and new Kurdish convicts and culprits are called upon to surrender, and those persons who may shelter the former in any way would be severely punished.

Then soldiers were sent to capture one of the notorious chiefs of Modky, Malor Aga, who, though surrounded at first in his village, fought bravely and fled after killing two soldiers.

The ill-reputed Hadji Faris, of Kolossig (see Mr. Heard's despatch No. 8 of the 16th August, 1907, and my despatch No. 12 above referred to), is said also to be a prisoner at the vali's camp at Taghavank, and it is understood that his Excellency will continue to make clearance of all such Kurds as thoroughly as possible.

It remains to be seen whether the corrupt judicial courts of Bitlis, the members of which are persons of doubtful character, will show sufficient good-will to give the criminals the punishment that they have deserved in course of years.

*Alleged Preparations for a Kurdish Rising.*—Before these arrests the notorious Musa Bey, of Khevner, sent his brother Kassim to Bulanik a fortnight ago to negotiate with the Hasananli Hamidié officers there for a general rising of Kurds against the Government. It appears that Kassim Bey was successful to a certain degree to gather round himself some discontented Kurdish chiefs, and preparations were reported as being made with a view to intrenching themselves on the mountain Bilejan (between Bulanik and Mush Plain), just as the Armenian fedais used to do in Sasun under the old régime.

The slight move of the vali in Khuyt, however, seems to have paralysed the Kurdish movement at its inception, and I understand from a good source that the chiefs have dispersed and that Kassim Bey has returned home.

I have, &c.

A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

P.S. *June* 27.—The vali sent nineteen more Kurdish criminals to the prison here, and they reached here this morning.

A. S. S.

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[28884] No. 30.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 24.)*

(No. 500.)

Sir, *Therapia, July* 19, 1911.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 177 of yesterday, I have the honour to report that the negotiations for the public works loan of £ T. 25,000,000 with the Ottoman Bank and the Régie générale have been pushed on very actively of late, and that a final agreement, subject of course to the approval of Parliament, may be reached at an early date. I understand that about four-fifths of the product of the loan, which may be expected to be issued at the price of about 81 net, will be devoted to public works, chiefly railways, the following list of which, taken from the "Jeune Turc" of yesterday, is, so Rifaat Pasha informed me, approximately accurate:—

In Roumelia—

1. Prishtina–Perlepe–Dobra–Mat–St. Jean de Medua.
2. Monastir–Resna–Ochrida–Serfidje–Janina–Tchamlik.
3. Ochrida–Debra.
4. Monastir–Istib–Komanova–Bulgarian frontier.
5. Caraferia–Greek frontier.

In Anatolia—

1. Angora–Sivas.
2. Angora–Cæsarea and the Russian frontier lines Trebizond–Erzeroum–Erzingham.





The agreement provides for a "contrat d'études" for these undertakings with preferential rights for eventual construction. The remainder of the loan, which would amount in round figures to some £ T. 4,000,000, will be left at the disposal of the Turkish Treasury, to cover the deficit on the budget and any other purpose.

As regards the construction of the ports of Trebizond and Samsoun, I learn from a director of the National Bank that the bank had informed the Grand Vizier that they were prepared to offer participation in these works to the French, and Mr. Whittall believed that it was in consequence of this offer, which the Grand Vizier had no doubt communicated to the Ottoman Bank, that the French opposition to the National Bank had been withdrawn, and that Hakki Pasha had been able to promise Sir Henry Babington Smith, on the 17th instant, that he would sign the contract with the National Bank for the harbour works simultaneously with the conclusion of the French agreement.

The contract with the National Bank is, like the French transaction, subject to the assent of Parliament.

I enclose a copy of the draft thereof, which has been kindly furnished me by Sir Henry Babington Smith.*

I have, &c.

CHARLES M. MARLING.

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[29298] No. 31.

*Sir H. Babington Smith to Sir A. Nicolson.—(Received July 25.)*

Dear Sir Arthur, *Constantinople, July* 21, 1911.

MANY thanks for your letter of the 10th July. We are very much obliged for the action you have taken and for the communication which you have made to M. Cambon.

Probably there has not been time yet for the effects to make themselves felt at Constantinople. I saw the Grand Vizier yesterday, and he told me that M. Bompard had been with him that afternoon, and had renewed his representations about the ports of Samsoun and Trebizond, emphasising again the "bad impression" which would be produced in Paris.

In spite of this opposition, the Ottoman Government still adhere to their decision to conclude the matter with us; but Hakki Pasha says that he would like to defer signing our contract until the arrangements with the French regarding the railway projects are also ready for signature. The matter is not entirely concluded, but he expects that it will be finished shortly, and that certain documents will be signed. These documents, I understand, are of a nature of *contrats d'études* and also certain "declarations," the latter, I presume, referring to the financial side of the question.

We have now signed the contract regarding the financial arrangement for the purchase of a warship in England. The final construction contract still remains to be signed, and our financial arrangements are contingent on the signature of this before the end of the present month. The payments are extended over five years, and the Government give us treasury bills. The greater part of these bills are retained by ourselves and the constructing firms, and the remainder have been placed in London.

The Grand Vizier spoke with anxiety about the delay in the British answer to the Bagdad proposals. He said that the 4 per cent. on the customs was becoming a matter of great urgency for them, and he hinted at the possibility of their being obliged to act without waiting for the assent of the Powers.

I leave Constantinople to-morrow, and arrive in London on the 29th instant. I shall be in London for a week or so before going to Scotland, and I hope that I may have the pleasure of seeing you, if you are not away.

I have, &c.

H. BABINGTON SMITH.

P.S.—Since dictating the above, I have learned, on fairly good authority, that the German chargé d'affaires is instructed to tell the Turkish Government that the German assent to the 4 per cent. was not intended to permit enterprises undertaken by one country only. This refers to their desire to have a share in the large French railway schemes.

H. B. S.

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* Not printed.

[24643] No. 32.

*Foreign Office to Lord Denbigh.*

My Lord, *Foreign Office, July 26, 1911.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to state that he has now received the observations of His Majesty's chargé d'affaires at Constantinople upon the scheme for railway construction in Asia Minor which was set forth in the documents enclosed in your letter of the 13th of May last.

I am to observe that the chief difficulty in securing the acceptance by the Turkish Government of this scheme would appear to lie in the fact that, while the scheme in which you are interested has already in its present form been the subject of negotiations between Mr. Glasgow and the Turkish Government in 1909, those negotiations were suspended in favour of the proposals put forward by the group represented by Mr. Chester.

As you are aware, these proposals have been under the consideration of the Turkish Government for some time, and a convention, agreed upon by the Public Works Department and Mr. Chester, has been presented to Parliament and will be discussed early in the forthcoming autumn and winter session. Mr. Chester's proposals for the construction of the railway were, in the first instance, made on conditions more favourable to the Turkish Government than those offered by Mr. Glasgow, and, though the actual terms of the contract are not yet known, it is understood that a number of modifications to the advantage of the Turkish Government have been introduced in the original proposals. It must follow, therefore, that, in the present advanced stage of the negotiations between Mr. Chester and the Government, it would not be possible for your group to put forward Mr. Glasgow's scheme with any reasonable hope of competing successfully with a scheme to which the Turkish Government would seem to some extent to be committed.

I am to add that His Majesty's Government are quite unable, as suggested by Mr. Edwards in his letter of the 13th May, to use a refusal to consent to the possible increase in the Turkish customs duties as a lever for obtaining the acceptance of the scheme by the Turkish Government.

The report in original,[2] which was enclosed in Mr. Edward's letter, is returned herewith.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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[28857] No. 33.

*Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Marling.*

(No. 284.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, July 27, 1911.*

LYNCH'S barges.

Please refer to your despatch No. 348 of the 17th May.

Please communicate with Major Lorimer with regard to report received by Lynch that Vali of Bagdad is endeavouring to cancel the permission for Lynch's second barge.

Messrs. Lynch ask that instructions may be sent to the vali to allow two barges, as, according to them, there are still large accumulations of cargo to be dealt with.

If these statements are borne out by Major Lorimer you should address to the Porte representations as desired.

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[22208] No. 34.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, July 28, 1911.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 7th ultimo, relative to the desire of the Wahabi Amir of Nejd for closer relations with His Majesty's Government, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to state that the suggestion of the Marquess of Crewe that a response might be made to the overtures of Abdul Aziz-bin-Saud as a

[2] Not printed.





[29668] No. 33*.

*India Office to Foreign Office.*—(*Received July 28.*)

Sir, *India Office, July 27, 1911.*

WITH reference to the letters of this Office dated the 17th and 19th June, 1911, communicating copy of papers received from the political resident in the Persian Gulf as to the reply to be made to the German Government's rejoinder in the Abu Musa case, I am directed to say that after perusal of the documents the Secretary of State for India is doubtful whether any useful purpose would be served by his offering comment upon them at the present stage.

He would suggest that, if Secretary Sir E. Grey sees no objection, the reply to the German Government, which will necessarily be chiefly of a legal character, should be drafted in the first instance in the Foreign Office, and then communicated officially for his concurrence. This department will of course be prepared to render in the meantime any informal assistance in its power that may be required.

With regard to the draft note, enclosed in your letter of the 31st March last, proposing a compromise to the German Government, the Marquess of Crewe concurs in its terms as modified by the demi-official letter addressed to Colonel Cox on the 7th April, 1911, and the telegram of the Government of India, dated the 10th May last, subject to such further modifications of wording (if any) as may suggest themselves during the preparation of the detailed reply to the German Government's rejoinder.

Copy of telegraphic correspondence with the Government of India is enclosed.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 33*.

*The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, July 17, 1911.*

ABU MUSA.

Have you any desire to make observations on the report of the resident, Bushire? As regards the reply to Germany, I am in consultation with the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. Reference is to your telegram of the 30th May.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 33*.

*Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.*

(Telegraphic.) P. *July 24, 1911.*

ABU MUSA compromise.

The only observation I desire to make upon the report of the political resident, Bushire, is that it is an admirable answer to the rejoinder made in November 1909 by the German Government. It is, in my opinion, very desirable that the view expressed in the last paragraph of the resident's remark No. 47, regarding the desirability of dealing with the matter as one concerning residency jurisdiction, should be supported.

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means of rendering the position of the Turks on the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf untenable will be borne in mind, but he considers that for the moment it would be advisable to adhere to the present policy of His Majesty's Government in Central Arabia, unless the Government of India propose a departure from it, when the question can again be considered.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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[29928] No. 35.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)*

(No. 205. Secret.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, July 14, 1911.*

HAVING failed to find the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs at home on the receipt of your telegram No. 335 of the 13th instant, I at once addressed an urgent private letter to his Excellency reminding him of the categorical assurances which M. Sazonow had given me with regard to the meaning of the term "Bagdad Railway," and urging on him the necessity of explaining clearly to the German Ambassador that under article 3 of the draft agreement Russia was taking no engagement which could in any way hamper her liberty of action as regarded the proposed 4 per cent. increase in the Turkish customs.

On calling on his Excellency by appointment this afternoon, I was informed by M. Nératof that he had just handed the amended text of the agreement to the German Ambassador. In doing so he had called Count Pourtalès's attention to the words "sacrifices pécuniaires et économiques," and had explained to him quite clearly that Russia was taking no engagement whatsoever on the question of the 4 per cent. customs increase. He had further informed his Excellency that he reserved to himself the right to attach to the term "Bagdad Railway" the interpretation which Russia had placed on it, namely, the railway as far as Bagdad. This, he had said, was to the best of his belief the sense in which M. Sazonow had always interpreted it during the Potsdam conversations, and he would therefore have to assure himself of what had really been in M. Sazonow's *pensée* with regard to it before the moment came for attaching his signature to the agreement.

I had so often in previous conversations pressed M. Nératof respecting these two points without obtaining any definite promise from him, that I was agreeably surprised to find that he had held this language to the German Ambassador. I do not, however, think that there is any likelihood of Germany consenting to sign the agreement if Russia merely engages not to oppose the construction of the railway as far as Bagdad. Such an engagement would not under present circumstances be of the slightest value to Germany, and if therefore M. Nératof insists on adhering to his interpretation of the term "Bagdad Railway" the negotiations are almost certain to break down. In spite of the categorical assurances which M. Sazonow repeatedly gave me that the conversations at Potsdam had only dealt with the Konieh–Bagdad line, his Excellency must, I think, have been entrapped into saying something which gave Germany good grounds for asserting that he had undertaken to withdraw Russia's opposition to the whole railway down to the Gulf. When, after the publication of the draft agreement in the "Evening Times," M. Sazonow informed me that it would in consequence be necessary to remodel the entire draft, I observed that such a revision of the text would afford him the desired opportunity of modifying the term "Bagdad Railway" so as to render the meaning perfectly clear. He, however, at once replied that this was impossible, as Germany would never consent to it. It is therefore very doubtful whether M. Nératof will be more successful in overcoming Germany's opposition to such a change in the text.

The question thus arises whether M. Nératof is prepared to risk a rupture of the negotiations in order to carry this point. I hardly think so, though he might be prepared to go to greater lengths than M. Sazonow if he has really a free hand in the matter, and for two reasons:—

In the first place, he has not the same pressing reasons for wishing to bring the negotiations to a successful termination. He was not responsible for initiating the Potsdam conversations, nor for the pæans raised by the Russian press when M. Sazonow returned from Berlin with the fruits of what he imagined was a great diplomatic success. With M. Sazonow the signature of the agreement in some form or another

was a question of *amour-propre*, as his reputation as a diplomatist was at stake. This is not the case with M. Nératof.

In the second place, I have noticed since I returned to St. Petersburgh that M. Nératof speaks of the eventual termination of the negotiations with a tone of perfect indifference. He does not seem to care if they are indefinitely prolonged or if they are brought to a speedy conclusion, and I cannot help feeling that the manner in which Germany has intervened in the Moroccan question, despite the arrangement with France in 1909, has been an object lesson to him. The value of an understanding with Germany has, I think, much depreciated in his eyes. His language to me, though reserved, leaves but little doubt as to what he thinks of the methods of German diplomacy. In speaking to me yesterday of the negotiations at present proceeding between France and Germany, his Excellency remarked that the Agadir incident would probably be closed by Germany receiving compensation somewhere else than in Morocco. He added, however, that he entirely failed to see any justification for Germany's claim to compensation.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

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[30019] No. 36.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received July* 31.)

(No. 510.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July* 20, 1911.

WITH reference to Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 337 of the 17th May last, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah, reporting that an end has been put to the operations undertaken by the Imperial troops against the Imam Yahya in the Yemen, and that an expedition is about to proceed against Seyyid Mahomed Idrisee of Assyr.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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Enclosure in No. 36.

*Vice-Consul Richardson to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 32/E.)
Sir, *Hodeidah, June* 12, 1911.

SINCE the events leading to the relief of Sana'a early in April last, as reported in my despatch No. 23 E, there have been no military operations in Yemen proper worth recording.

On the 7th April, Lieutenant-Colonel Seyyid Bey who had advanced from Taiz with a force of six infantry battalions, one battery of mountain artillery (quick-firing guns), two mortars, and two Hotchkiss guns, reached Sana'a, meeting with very little opposition *en route*.

Shortly after his entry into Sana'a, *i.e.*, about the 12th April, Izzet Pasha despatched Colonel Riza Bey with twelve battalions of infantry and six guns to the relief of Amran then under siege, and which was reached on the 20th April, the rebels retiring north with the advent of the above big Turkish force. Colonel Riza Bey has since returned to Sana'a.

About the same time, General Mahomed Ali Pasha, the Vali of Yemen and commander of the army corps, was sent with five battalions and four guns to expel the rebels from Irh and Heima, where it is reported they had arrived with the object of again cutting communications between Menekha and Sana'a.

After an absence of nearly a fortnight from the capital, Mahomed Ali Pasha returned, having failed to locate the rebels.

Simultaneously with the above movements, Colonel Ragib Bey was deputed with eight battalions and some guns to reoccupy all the military outposts in the direction of Kaukaban and Taweela and to re-establish order in that part of the vilayet lying to the north-west of Sana'a. This he succeeded in doing, without any fighting of importance.

General Seyyid Pasha, who, as has been already reported, was sent at the end of March last to the relief of El Hajjeh with a force of nine infantry battalions and four





guns, succeeded in reaching the besieged town on or about the 17th April, practically encountering no opposition from the Arabs *en route* owing to the assistance rendered him by Sheikh Ibrahim Cizi, who personally accompanied the general to El Hajjeh.

The local authorities reported some fighting in the vicinity of the latter place shortly after its relief by Seyyid Pasha. According to them, the Arabs who were under Seyyid Abdulla-el-Kholani, Sheikh Mansoor-el-Karah, and Sheikh Shubani, three of Seyyid Yahya's lieutenants and who were responsible for the investment of El Hajjeh, were severely defeated, losing heavily, and in retreating were forced to abandon four guns previously captured from outposts in that kaza.

Although Seyyid Pasha's army saw very little fighting, its ranks were thinned materially through disease. In its advance, almost at the outset, cholera broke out amongst the troops at Kanaoos and accounted for fifty deaths daily. I learn from a reliable source that the total mortality from cholera amongst the above force exceeded 500.

General Seyyid Pasha is now commanding a division up at Sana'a.

Since the last week of April there have been no military operations in the vilayet of Yemen proper, from which time, it might be said, that the revolt in the Yemen highlands, under the Zeidi Imam, collapsed almost as suddenly as it commenced.

Things in this province have since assumed, more or less, their normal aspect.

The generalissimo of the forces, Izzet Pasha, who has some twenty battalions at his disposal in Sana'a, has been very busy receiving various sheikhs and the heads of Arab clans in the mountains, who come in daily to announce their submission.

These sheikhs are being received with great ceremony and are dismissed with lavish presents and sums of money.

It is estimated that since the end of April over 80,000*l.* have been distributed in Sana'a alone in purchasing the submission of the tribesmen.

It is also freely rumoured that Izzet Pasha is in correspondence with the imam, Seyyid Yahya, with a view to securing some permanent arrangement with him and also to inducing him to liberate all Turkish prisoners.

It will thus be seen that operations are at an end in Yemen proper, at least for the present, and that the authorities have succeeded in re-establishing the *status quo* in this vilayet. They apparently do not intend to go further, although a few weeks ago there was some talk about an expedition to Shahara, the imam's stronghold in the mountains.

The results of the recent insurrection in the Yemen may be summed up as follows: It has cost Turkey some 3 or 4 millions of money to bring an army of 30,000 men to this country with a proportionate number of guns and a considerable quantity of stores and ammunition and to maintain that force in the field during the operations of the past four months. She has only succeeded in inflicting slight punishment on the imam's levies and in expelling them from her old positions in the mountains, which she has now again occupied. This result, however, has not been brought about without incurring serious loss of life, due principally to the ravages of cholera and other diseases.

On the other hand, the imam, Seyyid Yahya, who has put the Ottoman Government to very great expense, and has severely taxed its military strength, has himself been very little hit by the operations, and has incurred but small expense in doing so. He can, moreover, boast of having taken a thousand prisoners and added to his arsenal some six or eight guns and a considerable quantity of small arms and ammunition.

In the meantime, affairs in the sanjak of Assyr, which now also comprises the Tehema, north of Geezan, have been going apace.

The garrison at Abha under Suleiman Pasha, the mutessarif, consisting of four or five battalions of infantry and two batteries of artillery, and having a total strength of 3,000, has been besieged since November 1910. Although it has been able to keep the rebels at bay, relief does not appear to be forthcoming.

On the 29rd April, the mobile force of 1,500 men and four guns that accompanied the Grand Shereef from Mecca reached Lith, only to find that the two battalions moved from Yemen to reinforce it, were cholera infected.

During the past month it is said that nine or ten battalions have arrived at Cunfuda from Constantinople to reinforce the shereef's army.

The latter, however, from all accounts, has not been able to make much headway, although it was recently stated by the authorities that the sheikhs and tribesmen in the vicinity of Cunfuda had tendered their submission, and were flocking to the Grand Shereef's banner.

This intelligence is contradicted by later reports received here to the effect that the shereef's army had suffered an important reverse not far from Cunfuda, where in a

single engagement almost a whole battalion was wiped out by the rebels, who were evidently assembled in great strength, waiting to challenge its advance.

On the 1st May news reached Hodeidah that the Turkish "karagol" of Sha'ar, near Mukhahil, three days' march to the north-east of Cumfuda, was forced, after a siege of seven months, to surrender to Seyyid Mahomed-el-Idrisee's followers, led by Seyyid Mustapha, his principal lieutenant.

Two hundred and fifty prisoners were taken by the Arabs and removed to a place called "Ibn-el-Kusheib," that is near Sabyeah, the Idrisee's stronghold. Two mountain guns also fell into their hands, and have since been used against Abha.

About the 28th May it was rumoured here that Abha had actually been captured, but this has since proved to be incorrect, as it is known that Suleiman Pasha has recently been in communication from Abha with the Yemen authorities.

It is generally admitted that severe fighting has been taking place of late between the troops under Suleiman Pasha and the rebels besieging Abha, and that both sides have lost heavily.

The Arabs in the Aboo Arish district and inhabiting the littoral north of Geezan, who profess allegiance to Seyyid Mahomed Idrisee, are now displaying great activity.

Some time ago they captured three dhows laden with stores and provisions destined for the troops in Assyr, and made two officers and seven men accompanying those vessels prisoners and removed them to Sabyeah.

Failing to recover the dhows referred to above, four Ottoman gun-boats bombarded the ports of Birk, Wasm, and Shukeik causing some damage.

After several months of inattention to affairs in the province of Assyr, partly due to preoccupations caused by the revolt in Yemen proper, the Ottoman Government has at last decided to dispatch an expedition on a large scale to relieve Abha on the one hand and to crush the growing influence in that region of the Pretender, Seyyid Mahomed El-Idrisee, on the other.

The Shereef of Mecca's army, it is reported, has already been reinforced by nine or ten battalions of infantry drawn from Aleppo and other places and a battery of quick-firing guns, and will advance on Abha from Cumfuda.

On the 29th ultimo General Nashat Pasha, who recently arrived from Constantinople for service in the Yemen, left here for Cumfuda to command a brigade under the Grand Shereef.

As news from Assyr is very scarce here, it is not known what progress the expedition has made so far, although the local authorities report that it has advanced.

On the 3rd instant General Mahomed Ali Pasha, vali of the Yemen and commander of the local army corps, arrived here from Sana'a *en route* to Geezan.

His Excellency, it would appear, will shortly march with eleven battalions and six guns from Geezan against the Idrisee's stronghold at Sabyeah and thereafter operate in the direction of Abha with the object of effecting a junction with the shereef's army.

As reported to-day in my despatch No. 31, three transports, with four battalions of infantry, six mountain guns, and four maxims, a considerable number of transport animals, and a big quantity of ammunition, stores, provisions, and expeditionary equipment have already left here for Geezan, the base of Mahomed Ali's operations.

On the 7th instant the first battalion of the 115th Regiment, 995 strong, and the 2nd battalion of the 84th Regiment, consisting of 350 men, arrived here from Sana'a.

Yesterday cholera was declared to have broken out amongst the men of the former battalion that is under orders for Geezan, there being about seventy attacks and thirty-four deaths from the disease in twenty-four hours. The latter-mentioned battalion will remain in Hodeidah to do garrison duty, vice the 1st battalion of the 118th Regiment already moved to Geezan.

Mahomed Ali Pasha is still in Hodeidah awaiting the arrival of other troops from Sana'a. He will be accompanied during his operations by a certain Shereef Ahmed El-Mahwish, of Sabyeah, whose hands, it will be remembered, Seyyid Mahomed Idrisee caused to be cut off last year.

With truth and great respect, I have, &c.

G. A. RICHARDSON.

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[30020] No. 37.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received July 31.*)

(No. 511.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 20, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 510 of the 20th July last, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah, reporting on a serious reverse suffered by the Turkish expedition against Seyyid Mahomed-el-Idrisee in Assyr.

I have, &c.

CHARLES M. MARLING.

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Enclosure in No. 37.

*Vice-Consul Richardson to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 31/E.)

Sir, *Hodeidah, June 23, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to confirm my cablegrams Nos. 18 and 19 respectively, reporting a surprise of a Turkish force by Arabs near Geezan, and now beg to furnish the following further details:—

As will be seen from my three preceding despatches, a force to be commanded personally by the vali of the province, Mahomed Ali Pasha, was concentrating at Geezan for operations against Seyyid Mahomed-el-Idrisee in the Aboo Arish district, and thereafter for advance in the direction of Abha.

The above force up to the date of the surprise, viz., the 13th June, consisted of four battalions and one company of regular infantry, with a total strength of 3,000, one battery of gunners, with six mountain guns and two Maxims. Several hundred mules and a considerable quantity of ammunition, provisions, stores, and warlike material had also been collected at Geezan.

The troops had been landed at the latter port between the 30th May and 11th June, and were under Colonel Raghib Bey, who was specially selected by the vali as second in command of the expedition, and had recently arrived from Sana'a.

Mahomed Ali Pasha, who had arrived in Hodeidah on the 3rd instant, was still here awaiting further reinforcements for his army.

On the morning of the 13th four battalions with four guns and two Maxims advanced from Geezan and encamped at a place called Hafuyir, three miles outside that town.

The town of Geezan is supplied with water from wells situated at the latter place, which was held by 400 or 500 Arabs.

Since the mobilization of the troops at Geezan, neither the latter nor the towns-people had been molested while going out to the wells to fetch water.

When the force advanced it drove off the Arabs from the wells by artillery fire and encamped in the vicinity.

A little before midday the same day a force of about 10,000 or 12,000 Arabs that had been concealed behind a rising ground some 10 or 12 miles from Hafuyir advanced quietly, and was unobserved till when within a few hundred yards of the Turkish camp, which they surprised and immediately rushed. It would appear that the Turks had neglected to send out scouts or to establish outposts.

The sudden appearance of the Arabs in force caused a panic amongst the troops, and caused them to rush about in confusion, the Arabs in the meantime attacking and coming in hand to hand combat, and using their daggers freely.

The Turkish troops were too tired, foot-sore, and suffering from the effects of the sun and want of water at the time to offer much resistance, and were completely overpowered. Finding themselves overwhelmed by the Arab hordes, they fled in disorder to Geezan pursued by the enemy.

The gun-boats "Peki Shevket" and "Entebbe" then in port, seeing what had occurred, opened fire both on the town of Geezan, which the rebels had now entered, and on the camp at Hafuyir, where fighting at close quarters was going on.

The bombardment continued for four or five hours punishing both Turks and Arabs alike, but especially the latter, who were in considerable numbers, and who were ultimately forced to retire.

The losses on the Turkish side are estimated at between 1,000 and 1,600 killed, but

nearer the latter figure, 400 wounded and many men missing. The authorities admit that 1,000 men were killed and 400 wounded in the Arab attack.

The rebels also suffered severely, chiefly from the bombardment, and left about 1,000 dead on the field.

Colonel Raghib Bey, who was in command at the time, has since been reported to be missing, and believed by some to have committed suicide and by others to have escaped to Massawa.

The gun-boat "Mahita" brought the news of the disaster on the evening of the 14th. Under orders from General Izzet Pasha, Mahomed Ali Pasha, who is blamed for the incident owing to his dilatoriness, immediately embarked the same night on the above-mentioned warship in company of one, Sherif Ahmed El-Muharish, a notable of Sabyeah, and sailed early the next morning for Loheia.

On the 17th instant, the Ottoman ship "Sabah" arrived here from Geezan with 400 wounded aboard, with whom she sailed again on the 21st canalwards. It is believed that these men will be taken to Beirout for treatment.

Yesterday the Ottoman transport "Bahri Jadid" came here, also from Geezan, transporting 620 sick and wounded, who have since been landed at Djabana for treatment.

It will thus be seen that out of Mahomed Ali Pasha's force of some 3,000 men there have been between 1,400 and 2,000 casualties, while another 600 have become ineffective through disease, leaving between 400 and 600 men at his disposal. These, besides being quite demoralised, are suffering from the heat and from want of water.

The wells outside Geezan are actually in the hands of the Arabs, but who, being within the range of the guns of the Turkish gun-boats in port, can be kept at bay.

It is now expected that the expedition from Geezan must necessarily be abandoned unless big reinforcements can be spared from Sana'a. The severe and trying climate of the Aboo Arish country and the scarcity of water, with rumours of the prevalence of cholera in that locality, are factors militating against the success of an expedition at the present time.

At the same time, the authorities fear a similar attack on Loheia and the cutting off of the water supply of that town, that is served by wells 7 or 8 miles distant. All available troops will be required for the defence of Loheia, where there are only two battalions at present. Two battalions have already left Sana'a for Loheia and Zaidyia respectively, and Izzet Pasha has informed the local authorities that two other battalions are now on their way to Yemen from the Hedjaz.

On the 15th instant, part of the first battalion of the 115th regiment that recently arrived here from Sana'a to take part in the expedition from Geezan, and since found to be cholera infected, with 100 gunners and a few Maxim gun companies, were transported in dhows to Camaran to undergo quarantine. The remainder of the above-mentioned battalion followed in dhows towed by the British ship "Woodcock" on the 24th. Such men as are available for service after convalescence and disinfection will be dispatched to Geezan. The steam-ship "Woodcock" also conveyed to Camaran six mountain guns, four Maxims, and 240 mules.

It is believed that all the mules previously landed at Geezan for the expedition, about 600, have either died or been captured by the rebels.

A few days ago a battalion of infantry was moved from Beit-el-Fakih to Djabana for dispatch to Geezan, but several cases of cholera have since occurred amongst the men.

I have, &c.

G. A. RICHARDSON.

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[30024] No. 38.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)*

(No. 516.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 22, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 510 of the 20th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout enclosing translation of a letter from one of the Turkish officers in the Yemen.

I have, &c.

CHARLES M. MARLING.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 38.

*Consul-General Cumberbatch to Mr. Marling.*

(No. 52. Confidential.)

Sir, *Beirout, July 12, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith translation of a private letter from a major in the Turkish army in the Yemen to a friend in Syria describing the engagement at Koz-el-Shahed and the hopeless position of the garrison of Abha at the end of May.

I have, &c.

H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 38.

*Translation of a Private Letter from a Major in the Turkish Army in the Yemen to a Friend in Syria.*

(Confidential.)

Dear Friend, *Kunfuda, May 10 (23), 1911.*

I AM still in this disturbed country at Kunfuda, port of Asir of the Yemen district, waiting for the gathering of the troops to go to Abha to reinforce Suleiman Pasha, the commander of Asir, who is besieged with its mutessarif and six battalions. Before our arrival to Kunfuda a letter was received by its kaimakam by a messenger, in which Suleiman Pasha states that he is no more able to withstand the siege for more than a month, and asks for reinforcement, or else he says to remember him after death and ask mercy for him from God, and to remember those who send him there with curses. The kaimakam showed the letter to the Emir of Mecca, Hussein Pasha, who is with us with 1,000 men on camels or horses, and with his two sons, Abdullah Bey and Feisel Bey.

A telegram was sent through Jeddah, for no telegraph exists at Kunfuda, the contents of the letter, and after nineteen days an answer was received and a force was arranged of three battalions, of which one was redif nessis, one battalion nizam, which came from Aleppo, and one battalion nizamieh under the command of the Binbashi Zeki Effendi; and the emir sent with them 400 cavalry with his son, Abdullah Bey. They went to Suk-el-Jemaa, started on the 3rd (16th) May about 7 o'clock, *à la turque*, and just before arriving to the village called Koz-el-Shahed, of about three hours, about early in the morning they stopped to take a little rest, then they marched again for half-an-hour and met the enemy, and a fight took place for about three to four hours. The men of the shereef, fearing for their animals, cut off the ropes of the camels, which were carrying the ammunition, and ran away. The soldiers, who were entirely thirsty, were entirely defeated, and dispersed. It is only through the help of God that the enemy did not follow them, for probably he thought that the running away of the soldiers was a preconcerted trick, or else not a soldier would have come back to tell us of the news. The strength of the enemy was only about 600 strong.

Of the battalion of the Yemen 1 yousbashi and 3 mulazems and about 100 soldiers were killed, and others from thirst.

Up to date nine battalions of infantry are at Kunfuda, including the two battalions which arrived yesterday on board steamer the 10th (23rd) May, and one battery mountain gun brought from Aleppo, also one battery mountain gun brought from Hedjaz. Both are slow firing and are to be carried on camels; they are of very little use indeed.

Compare these news with those of your papers concerning the Yemen.

As for food and drink and every other else concerning troops nothing could be said worse. As a whole it is very wretched state. This country needs faithful and trustworthy men.

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[30027] No. 39.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)*

(No. 519.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July 22, 1911.*

WITH reference to Sir G. Lowther's despatch No. 387 of the 6th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general

at Beirut in regard to the proceedings against the persons implicated in the Mosque of Omar incident.

Mr. Cumberbatch has subsequently informed me that he learns that rooms have been engaged for Captain Parker some time in August, and presumes therefore that that gentleman has decided to appear before the court.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the course of conversation on the 17th instant, told me that he believed that a statement recently published in the local papers, to the effect that the commission of enquiry had found nothing had been stolen from the mosque, was correct.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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Enclosure in No. 39.

*Consul-General Cumberbatch to Mr. Marling.*

(No. 53.)
Sir, *Beirut, July* 13, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 44 of the 15th and your telegram of the 24th June, I have the honour to report that, on the 3rd instant (20th June, 1327) *sub* No. 211, the Procureur général of Beirut applied to the Ministry of Justice for instructions as to whether the hearing of the case should be postponed till the attendance of Mr. Parker, against whom, I understand, a summons has been issued by the examining judge and sent to the Ministry of Justice for service.

In the meanwhile an application by the prisoners to be let out on bail has been rejected.

Up to the present no decision has been given by the examining judge specifying the charge against any of the prisoners.

I have, &c.
H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

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[30034] No. 40.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July* 31.)

(No. 526.)
Sir, *Therapia, July* 25, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 474 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to report that, according to information which has reached me from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, it would appear that no fighting has taken place on the Euphrates during the past fortnight.

A mixed and a military commission, appointed to enquire into the recent disturbances in that region, have arrived at Bussorah from Bagdad, and have sent Saadun Pasha, who reached the former place a few days before their arrival, on one of Agha Jaffer's steamers to Bagdad, after a short period of detention on the "Marmaris."

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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[30036] No. 41.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July* 31.)

(No. 528.)
Sir, *Therapia, July* 25, 1911.

WITH reference to your despatch No. 190 of the 10th instant, I have the honour to report that I had some conversation on the 18th instant with the agent of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company respecting their application for permission to run their reserve steamer between Bussorah and Bagdad. Mr. Whittall informed me that towards the end of June he mentioned the subject to the Minister of Public Works, who, as soon as he understood that what the company desire is a permit to run their steamer under the same conditions as those stipulated for in the permit obtained by Agha Jaffar, declared emphatically that the proposal was inacceptable. It was, he said, tantamount to a permanent permission, and would be in contradiction of regulations which the Ministry of Public Works was about to issue for the





regulation of the navigation of the two rivers, which, among other things, provided that the navigation should be reserved entirely for Ottoman companies formed with Ottoman capital and using the Ottoman flag.

Mr. Whittall, seeing the futility of this proposal, changed his ground, and said that the Minister was reaching conclusions too hastily, that the proposal he wished to submit to his Excellency was simply a business transaction in the interests of commerce, which was suffering severely from the congestion of transport owing to the inadequate number of steamers. Even this did not at first lull Houloussi Bey's suspicions, but eventually he said that if the company would agree to sign an undertaking to remove the fourth steamer as soon as the accumulation of cargo at Bussorah was worked off he would see what could be done, and he telegraphed in Mr. Whittall's presence to the Vali of Bussorah to learn his views as to the proposal. The vali, however, in spite of reminders, had not yet replied.

Mr. Whittall meantime reported the situation to Mr. Lynch, and expressed the opinion that it would be extremely impolitic to make any proposals to the Turks concealing any ulterior object besides the avowed one, such as he understood was Mr. Lynch's wish, as the Turks would certainly divine the manœuvre, and stated his conviction that the only policy that would pay would be one of absolute straightforward dealing.

Mr. Lynch replied, in a letter which was shown me with his sanction, demurring strongly to giving the undertaking required by Houloussi Bey, as he feared that by doing so the company would be precluded in future from expanding its operations concurrently with the expansion of the transport trade in private hands. He said, however, that if the embassy took a different view, and thought that the signature of the agreement would not prejudice the company's prospects of continuing to run the fourth steamer, he would be inclined to waive his objections. He also suggested that the embassy might endeavour to persuade the Porte not to issue the navigation regulations above alluded to.

After discussing the question in all its bearings with Mr. Whittall, I agreed that in view of the very decided language and obvious suspicions of Houloussi Bey, it would be impolitic to attempt Mr. Lynch's policy of trying to gain an inch and expand it to an ell, and that a perfectly straightforward policy would probably produce better results, and I asked Mr. Whittall if he wished me to take any action at the Porte. He replied, as I think with good reason, that he feared that, if the embassy showed an active interest in the question, the Turks would see in it some political motives, and that therefore for the present he would prefer to try to treat the question as a purely business transaction with Houloussi Bey without any assistance from the embassy.

I also told Mr. Whittall that it seemed to me that Mr. Lynch wished to lay on the embassy the onus of taking a decision whether the company should or should not give the undertaking required by Houloussi Bey, but that was a responsibility which I could not accept, and I also said in reply to his question that if the company gave the undertaking it would be impossible for the embassy to support them if they subsequently tried to avoid complying with it. It seemed to me, however, that on the whole it was to the advantage of the company, if they could, to get the permit even if they had to give the undertaking that Mr. Lynch finds so objectionable, as to have succeeded in running the fourth steamer, even if only temporarily, was a considerable step in advance.

I also drew Mr. Whittall's attention to a misstatement in Mr. Lynch's letter, to the effect that His Majesty's Ambassador had succeeded in "removing the restrictions" hitherto placed by the Turks on the towing of a second barge by the company's steamers, and pointed out that unfortunately the concession obtained from the Porte did not go so far as Mr. Lynch's language would imply, and that what had been obtained was only a temporary permission to use a second barge until the existing accumulation of cargo, amounting to some 4,500 tons, should be worked off. Mr. Whittall said that he would call Mr. Lynch's attention to this point.

On the same day I received a telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad, reporting that the German engineer of the Bagdad Railway had mentioned to him privately that the company aimed at getting permission for the vessels which they are entitled to put on the river in virtue of article 9 of the convention to carry general cargo as well as their own material, but a few days later Mr. Lorimer reported that the German engineer had approached the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company's local agent with a suggestion for an arrangement for the transport of the railway's material up the river, and had hinted that he might be able to bring influence to bear

in the proper quarter to obtain permission for the running of the fourth steamer. Mr. Lorimer added that the agent had referred the proposal to London.

I informed Mr. Whittall of these messages, and he thinks that the change of attitude of the German engineer is due to the consideration that the railway company is very anxious to press forward the work of construction as fast as possible, and does not wish to incur the delay of at least eighteen months, which would be caused by building and bringing out the special vessels suitable for work on the Tigris.

As the regulations for the navigation of the Mesopotamian rivers have not yet appeared, it is impossible to say yet whether they would bar the railway company from using its steamers, should it place any on the river, as common carriers, but it seems possible that in view of its status as an Ottoman company the railway could be brought within the scope of the regulations.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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[30037] No. 42.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)*

(No. 529.)
Sir, *Therapia, July 25, 1911.*

IN reply to your telegram No. 282 of the 21st instant, I have the honour to report that I have been making enquiries as to the action of the Société de Batignolles in regard to the contracts for the execution of Sir W. Willcocks' plans for the Mesopotamian irrigation works, but I have so far been unable to ascertain precisely what has occurred. Messrs. Stock and Moir, Messrs. Pearson's agents here, have informed Mr. Weakley that the Société de Batignolles have officially addressed the Ministry of Public Works offering to take over the contract on better terms than those submitted by either Messrs. Pearson or Messrs. Jackson, and that in doing so they were assured of the support of the French Embassy. As against this, M. Révoil, the Director of the Imperial Ottoman Bank, which has undertaken the financial part of Messrs. Pearson's contract, has informed those gentlemen that he does not attach much importance to the Société de Batignolles, as no French house would care to work in Mesopotamia. On the other hand, he is not, so Messrs. Stock and Moir assert, showing so much interest in assisting Messrs. Pearson as might be expected considering the relations between that firm and the bank, and from this it might be inferred that M. Révoil, though he is not supporting the Société de Batignolles, would not be unwilling to see them obtain the contract through the influence of the French Embassy, whose wishes it would, moreover, be naturally difficult for him to oppose in the interests of a foreign house.

M. Révoil's statements, however, are to a certain extent confirmed by what the director of the National Bank, who are to finance Messrs. Sir John Jackson and Company, has told me, namely, that the Société de Batignolles have made no offer to the Government, but have obtained accurate information of the details of the tenders submitted by the two British firms, and have advised the Ministry of Public Works that they are extravagantly high, hinting, of course, that there has been no real competition as there is collusion between them as the only two tenderers. Sir H. Babington-Smith also told me that he believed that the Ministry of Public Works does not wish to accept either tender, but to allow the works to be carried on "en régie" by Messrs. Jackson as at present. If this is the case, it would be difficult for the embassy to raise any objections as the Government, in asking for tenders, specially states that it does not bind itself to accept the lowest or any tender. On the other hand, it would be manifestly unfair that the lower offer of the Société de Batignolles, if one has really been made by them, should be accepted, since they have not been at the expense of sending an engineer, so I am told, to study the conditions and frame estimates on the spot, but have made their offer on information improperly gained of the tenders of the British firms.

Enquiries made at the Ministry of Public Works have yielded no results as to the action of the Société de Batignolles, but I learn that the committee appointed to examine the tenders reported that neither Sir John Jackson's nor Messrs. Pearson's tenders are drawn up according to the conditions of the Cahier des Charges, and recommended that no adjudication should be made, while Franghia Effendi, the Director of Public Works, has informed Mr. Weakley that for the present the works will be carried on by Messrs. Jackson "en régie" until the credits voted by Parliament, of which some £ T. 60,000 remained unexpended, are exhausted. He



hinted also that he himself would like to see that system continued, although on somewhat modified terms.

In the circumstances I venture to think that for the moment it will be difficult for the embassy to make any further representation to the Porte. The enquiries made at the Ministry of Public Works are sufficient to show our interest in securing fair treatment for British contractors, whereas I fear that if we pressed for an adjudication on the two tenders sent in, our action would be regarded by Sir J. Jackson as prejudicial to his interests, and incompatible with impartiality as between his firm and Messrs. Pearson. Messrs. Stock and Moir, to whom this point has been explained by Mr. Weakley, expressed themselves as satisfied.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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[30040] No. 43.

*Mr. Marling to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received July 31.)*

(No. 532.)
Sir, *Constantinople, July 26, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 526 of the 25th July, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, reporting details of the disturbances in the Muntafik country.

I have, &c.
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 43.

*Acting Consul Matthews to Mr. Marling.*

(No. 34.)
Sir, *Bussorah, June 30, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 17th May the armoured river steamer "Frat" and the armoured launch "Birinji" were dispatched up the Euphrates with three guns and about 100 troops to operate against the Muntafik Arab tribes, who had revolted against the domination of Saadun Pasha. The names of these tribes are said to be: Al-Bedur, Al-Bu-Saad, Beni-Zeid, Al-Ghazi, Al-Abudah, Al-Azeirij, and Al-Gharaghul. Saadun Pasha was reported besieged in his stronghold at Maiah, from which he succeeded in retiring to Khamisieh and thence to Nasirieh, which was forthwith blockaded by the Arabs. Major Ali Effendi, who is in charge of the expedition sent up the Euphrates by the "Frat," was instructed by the vali to protect Nasirieh and the stronghold of Maiah, where some members of Saadun's family had remained. The "Frat," after going aground near Madinah, had arrived a short distance above Suk-us-Shuyukh, when she was fired upon by Arabs of the Bedur tribe. It is stated that seven tribesmen were killed, and that two soldiers were killed and seven wounded in this encounter. On arrival at Maiah, the "Frat" was able to land provisions for Saadun's people. On the 6th instant, the armoured river steamer "Rosafa" departed for Nasirieh, with four guns and about 100 troops. On the 11th idem the "Marmaris" proceeded up the river to Madinah, fired off her guns, and returned here on the following day.

According to reports from Suk-us-Shuyukh, a fight was in progress at Maiah on the 13th instant between the armoured steamers and the Arabs. Reports of the 19th instant from Nasirieh describe the siege of that town as being prosecuted with vigour by the Arabs. Saadun Pasha was reported to have fled from Nasirieh to his cousin, Mezyed Pasha, who resides in the neighbourhood of Nasirieh.

On the 27th instant a report reached Bussorah that the tribes of Al-Azeirij and Al-Ibrahim had returned to their allegiance to Saadun Pasha, and that serious inter-tribal fighting might be expected. Saadun is now reported to be with the Azeirij tribe between Nasirieh and Shattra. Both these reports require confirmation.

I have the honour to transmit herewith a petition, dated the 26th May, which was drawn up by the chiefmen and sheikhs of the Muntafik tribes, and presented to the vali on their behalf by Agha Jaffer.

The policy of the vali has been to give Saadun Pasha all the support in his power. There is, however, a lack of harmony between the civil and the military authorities. Orders appear to have been sent by the military authorities of Bagdad to the

commandant at Nasirieh not to provoke the Arabs, but to effect a pacification. To judge from the course of events, there is little likelihood of a pacification so long as the civil authorities continue to champion Saadun.

Navigation on the Euphrates in the Muntafik country is dangerous, and has been more or less interrupted during the past two months. Early in May Agha Jaffer's steamer, the "Mesudi," was fired on by Arabs between Nasirieh and Suk-us-Shuyukh in consequence of a report that some of Saadun Pasha's relatives were on board. About the 6th instant the steamer "Shat-ul-Arab" was fired on while proceeding to Samawah, a letter of explanation being afterwards sent to Agha Jaffer that his steamer had been mistaken for a Turkish Government steamer.

The immediate cause of the present disturbances is said to be as follows: About five months ago, Saadun Pasha arrested and put to death nine of the leading sheikhs of the Bedur tribe who had come to congratulate him on the occasion of the Bairam feast. Saadun's agent in Bussorah, the notorious Muhammed El-Asaimi, gained the vali's ear, and represented the sheikhs whom Saadun had murdered as seditious and evilly disposed to the Government. The Arab tribes, finding that their explanations were not considered by the vali, decided to take the law into their own hands and avenge Saadun's treachery in accordance with their own customs and traditions.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

P.S.—I have the honour to transmit herewith a map of the Muntafik country, showing the present position of some of the tribes referred to.*

W. D. W. M.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 43.

*Petition, dated May 26, 1911.*

WE are the chiefs of the tribes residing between Ad-Durraji and Al-Huseinat for a distance of about twenty hours on each side of the Euphrates. We are Arabs and farmers, and represent at least 12,000 houses. We are Ottoman subjects, but owing to the extortions of the Turkish Government officials at Nasirieh during the last twenty-five years we have become slaves. Our necks, souls, property, families, and cattle were possessed by Saadun without any crime or fault on our part. In the first place, it was stated that we were the adherents of Saadun, who began to commit robbery and brigandage, setting at naught the officials of the Government; secondly, Saadun created mischief among us, whereby blood was shed and many of us perished; thirdly, Saadun prevented our communicating with the Government, so that we were unable to pay taxes or submit to the Government.

Saadun and his son Ajaimi, supported by the Government, have received from us all that is due to the Government yearly, viz., tithes, alms, &c.; but yet they were not satisfied, but plundered and cruelly ill-treated us. We endured all this tyranny, fearing the power of the Government, because when any leader appeared among us Saadun slew him. Five years ago he slew Mindi-el-Habib, the Sheikh of El-Ghizi, together with his son and five other men. He next assassinated the chiefs of Ash-Shurifat, Naamash, and Majid, and then Sakhi Az-Zabin. At the beginning of Moharrem he killed twelve of the notables of the tribes of El-Bedur, casting their bodies into the River Euphrates. On seeing these actions of Saadun and his son Ajaimi, we understood that he would not allow a notable from our tribes to live, but only ignorant peasants. Saadun now claims independence, but our feelings as Arabs prevent us from acknowledging this claim. Our religion does not permit us to follow this cruel sheikh, and we have declared a holy war against this person of evil character, in the hope to driving him away from Maiah. Through the action of the Government officials at Nasirieh we were obliged to protect ourselves against this man. Relying on your sense of justice, we beg you to save us from this cruel tyrant. We undertake to pay all taxes due to the Treasury, and to protect all the roads, and not to interfere with the property of merchants. We have already made this offer to the authorities of Nasirieh, who refused it, being prompted thereto by self-interest and being under the influence of Soyyid Zaidan. The Government, by sending stores and ammunition to the fortress of Maiah, has strengthened them, and forced us to

* Not reproduced.





rise. We are to-day present in the telegraph offices of Khidlar and Ad-Durraji, awaiting your clemency, to avoid bloodshed and to save us from the fortress of Maiah, the cause of cruelty. This fortress should either be made a Government barracks for Ottoman soldiers, or should be demolished, to prevent cause of complaint. It is for you to decide; we wish to remain loyal servants of the Government. If you approve of Saadun remaining at Maiah you will be the cause of bloodshed, and we shall be obliged to remain in revolt on account of Saadun and his son Ajaimi. This is left to your justice.

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[27814] No. 44.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.*

(No. 214.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, July 31, 1911.*

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch No. 305 of the 24th May last, in which you reported your conversation with Rifaat Pasha on the subject of the arrest and detention by the Vali of Bussorah of three natives of Bahrein, I have to request that you will address to the Porte a written communication requesting that you may be informed whether the vali has been reprimanded for his action, as was desired by His Majesty's Government in your Excellency's note of the 8th April last, asking for an assurance that no difficulties will be raised in future in regard to Bahrein passports, and further demanding that a small compensation be accorded to the Bahreinis for their illegal detention.

In requesting your Excellency to make this communication to the Porte, I would explain that the complaint of His Majesty's Government is not that the Vali of Bussorah brought "a" charge against the Bahreinis, but that he brought "the" charge against them of not taking out Turkish passports, which is equivalent to claiming Bahrein as Turkish, and it is for this reason that the action of the vali must be disowned by the central authorities.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[30356] No. 45.

*Memorandum communicated to French/Russian/German Ambassador, July 31, 1911.*

HIS Majesty's Government have now communicated to the Ottoman Ambassador a memorandum dealing with the proposals made to them by the Sublime Porte on the subject of the proposed increase in the Turkish customs duties.

Sir E. Grey considers it desirable that the French/Russian/German Government should forthwith be acquainted with the reply of His Majesty's Government in regard to the Bagdad Railway, which is as follows:—

"On various occasions His Majesty's Government have indicated the conditions under which they would favour the participation of British capital in this enterprise; and, while it is not now proposed to recapitulate the earlier stages of this question, it may be recalled that in July 1910, as a result of prolonged discussions with the Ottoman Minister of Finance, who was then in London, it was intimated that an arrangement securing to British interests a representation of 55 per cent. of the whole in regard to the Gulf sections of the line might be regarded as a satisfactory solution,—and, having regard to the great preponderance of certain interests in other sections of the line, such a proportion cannot well be looked upon as excessive, especially if the great extent of British trade in those regions and the vast tonnage of British shipping are borne in mind.

"Since the arrangement laid before Djavid they represented a large measure of concession on the part of His Majesty's Government, they have received the suggestions now made by the Ottoman Government with some surprise.

"The Turkish proposals for the final portions of the railway are that a new company should be formed, and that the capital should be divided between the Ottoman Government, who would receive 40 per cent. of the whole, and British, French, and German groups, who would each receive 20 per cent. The details of the financial arrangements are left for subsequent settlement between the parties interested.

"His Majesty's Government regret that they are unable to accept these proposals. If a new company is formed for the construction and working of the railway south of Bagdad, and if it is to be constituted upon an international basis, His Majesty's Government can only accede to such an arrangement provided that British interests are represented in a degree at least equal to that of any

other Power including Turkey; and, in order to effect this and with a view to emphasising the international and commercial character of the undertaking, they would suggest that Russia should be admitted to participation and that the percentage allotted to each country should be 20 per cent.

"Assuming that this distribution is adopted, His Majesty's Government consider that a Convention should be concluded by the Powers concerned providing for the exclusion of differential rates on any railways in Asiatic Turkey, and for equality of treatment in regard to transport facilities and cognate matters; for the alignment of the railway south of Bagdad and the conditions under which it is to be constructed; for the introduction of approved financial arrangements tending to foster the development of traffic; and for guaranteeing that the interest in the enterprise of the several parties concerned shall be of lasting duration and not subject to termination on the expiry of the Bagdad Railway Concession.

"It would furthermore be necessary for the Ottoman Government to undertake formally not to impose river dues on British shipping or cargoes without the assent of His Majesty's Government.

"There remains the question of the terminal port: having regard to the fact that important commercial interests are already established at Bussorah, His Majesty's Government cannot but feel that substantial advantages would accrue from the establishment of the terminus at that point; and they consider that the port should be constructed and controlled by the proposed new company in the interests of the unrestricted commerce of all nations. But if such an arrangement is adopted, they must stipulate that, in the event of the railway ever being prolonged to the Persian Gulf, it must be brought to Koweit under conditions to be settled by agreement between Great Britain and Turkey alone, and a clause to this effect must be embodied in a convention dealing with these matters."

The reply of His Majesty's Government deals in addition with a suggestion of the Ottoman Government that it is desirable to define the respective interests of the two Powers in the region of the Persian Gulf; and it makes certain proposals which it is hoped will lead to a satisfactory settlement: the memorandum concludes in the following terms:—

"If the Ottoman Government are prepared to enter upon a negotiation on these lines, and to collect, as already stipulated, in a removal of the existing veto on the borrowing powers of Egypt,—a measure which is called for in the interests of financial reform in Egypt,—His Majesty's Government will make it their first aim to contribute to an agreement likely to remove all causes of friction between the two Powers; and they will not only consent, subject to the concurrence of other Powers and to the due observance of such agreement, to the further increase of the Turkish customs for a fixed period, but they will likewise agree to the continued levy of the 3 per cent. customs increase, which had only been sanctioned provisionally till the year 1914."

*Foreign Office,*
*July* 31, 1911.

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[30499] No. 46.

*Enclosures in India Office Letter.—(Received at Foreign Office, August* 1.)

(1.)

*Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to the Government of India.*

(Confidential.) *Bushire, June* 25, 1911.

WITH reference to Foreign Department telegram, dated May 22nd, intimating the nature of the advice to be given to the Sheikh of Koweit in regard to the attitude which he should adopt towards the German firm and consul at Bussorah, I have the honour to submit, for the information of Government, a copy of the political agent's letter reporting the action taken by him to give effect to his instructions.

(2.)

*Captain Shakespear to Lieutenant-Colonel Cox.*

(Confidential.) *Koweit, June* 14, 1911.

IN acknowledging the receipt of your second assistant's endorsement, dated the 6th June, 1911, I have the honour to report that I communicated to Sheikh Mubarak, in the course of an interview, the sense of the first part of Foreign Department telegram, dated the 22nd May, 1911.

2. The sheikh said that he had received no further communication from the German consul at Bussorah, nor had he seen him during his last visit to Failieh. He would bear in mind the advice given and, should he be again addressed, would return an answer in the terms suggested.

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[30321] No. 47.

*Messrs. F. C. Strick and Co. to Foreign Office.—(Received August* 1.)

*Baltic House, Leadenhall Street, London,*
*July* 31, 1911.

Sir,

WE beg to inform you that the following is a copy of letter we received from our Bunder Abbas agent, dated the 1st June last:—

"The 'Naseri' has also gone to Abu Musa to load a quantity of oxide there. This was done under the direct supervision of the British consular agent at Lingah. The steamer remained there from the 21st to the 24th May, and took up altogether 298 tons in 6,975 bags. These were also shipped to Bombay by Hajji Hassan-bin-Ali Samaiya of Lingah as before."

On receipt of the foregoing, we telegraphed to our Bushire agents as follows:—

"300 tons Abu Musa oxide shipped India. What does it mean?"

On the 27th instant we received their reply to the above message, which reads:—

"Shippers 'Naseri,' Abu Musa oxide; Robert Wönckhaus and Co. There is reason to believe Robert Wönckhaus and Co. trying obtain permission ship more. Most strongly advise you to meet British Foreign Office. Either do not give permission or you must have permission also. Telegraph us result."

We have, &c.
(For Frank C. Strick and Co., Limited),
FRANK C. STRICK.

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[28852] No. 48.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 218.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 1, 1911.

THE Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company have transmitted to this Office copy of a telegram from their agents at Bagdad stating that the chief engineer of the Bagdad Railway, who arrived at that town on the 7th instant, intends to obtain permission from the Turkish Government to carry merchandise, in addition to railway material, by the railway company's steamers and lighters on the Tigris, and gives as a reason for this action the accumulation of cargo at Bussorah.

I have to request your Excellency to furnish me with a report on the subject, as to which I understand you have already received a telegram from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[30449] No. 49.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August* 2.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Marquess of Crewe, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 28th July, relative to the situation on the Trucial Coast.

Copy has been sent to the Admiralty.

*India Office, August* 1, 1911.

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Enclosure in No. 49.

*Viceroy of India to the Marquess of Crewe.*

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 28, 1911.

TRUCIAL Coast situation. See letter from naval commander-in-chief of the 26th April and that from the resident, Bushire, of the 30th April, which were enclosed in the weekly letter dated the 18th May from the Secretary, Foreign Department.

The resident's proposal as to Zora, for which there appears to be much to be said, has the concurrence of the naval commander-in-chief. If you concur, I propose that instructions to work out scheme in detail should be given to resident. In the meantime, pending negotiations with Turkey, it appears to us advisable to hold our hands in respect of an order in council, although we feel with the commander-in-chief and the resident that it is desirable to tighten up our control over the Trucial chiefs. The resident has, however, received our instructions to prepare an order, the question of publication being left for settlement hereafter.

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[30747] No. 50.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 4.)*

Sir, *India Office, August* 3, 1911.

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for India to forward, for the consideration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram that has been received from the Government of India, in which it is proposed to enter into certain arrangements with the chiefs of El Katr for the prevention of the import of arms.

As Sir E. Grey is aware, the Katr Peninsula is a weak point in our chain of defences against the arms traffic in the Persian Gulf, and has recently been attracting the imports to a greater extent than formerly. Although the commander-in-chief, East Indies station, is of opinion that these imports are not re-exported to Persia, but are absorbed in Central Arabia, and are consequently a danger to Turkey rather than to ourselves, it cannot be denied that the arming of the Arab tribes in the hinterland may have consequences to the tribes on the coast under our protection in which we may ourselves become involved. And apart from that consideration it is of immediate importance to make the trade as unprofitable as possible to the European exporters by blocking all its outlets.

The conclusion of agreements for the purpose now proposed does not seem to be open to the objections taken by the Government of India, and shared by His Majesty's Government, to the wider agreements with the Katr shaikhs which have been from time to time under consideration (see, for example, this Office letter of the 9th December, 1910). Nor does the possibility that the Turks may raise the question of their suzerainty over Katr appear to be a serious objection, since they as well as the Persians have a direct interest in the control of the traffic in arms. Moreover, should the question of sovereignty be raised, it may be hoped that it will have been disposed of in another manner in the near future; and in any case His Majesty's Government could not, it is presumed, acquiesce in the Turkish claims.

Subject, therefore, to Sir E. Grey's concurrence, Lord Crewe proposes to approve the Government of India's recommendations.

I am &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

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Enclosure in No. 50.

*Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.*

(Telegraphic.) P. *July* 24, 1911.

KATR coast:

See letter from resident, Bushire, dated the 25th June last, which was enclosed in the weekly letter from the Foreign Secretary of the 6th July.

Having communicated further with the resident, we consider that it is desirable that the question of coming to an arrangement with the Katr chiefs for the prevention





of the arms traffic on the Katr coast should be proceeded with. For the present we would hold in abeyance the resident's proposal regarding the tract between that coast and Ojair.

Our proposals are:—

1. That the resident be authorised to make an attempt to induce the Katr family to issue a notification prohibiting the import of arms into their territories by sea.

2. That annual subsidies be offered, viz., of 1,000 rupees to Sheikh Abdullah, Sheikh Jasim's eldest son, who rules at Doha, and of 500 rupees to Abdul Rahman, the sheikh's youngest son, who rules at Wakra. In addition we would offer, if necessary, 1,000 rupees to Sheikh Jasim, the head of the Thani family. He, however, is practically a recluse, and is nearly 90 years of age.

3. That payment to Sheikh Abdullah by the resident of a sum not exceeding 5,000 rupees be authorised if the latter finds a present necessary in order to secure his coming to terms. An excellent opportunity for taking up this question is now afforded. In connection with the incident reported in correspondence ending with the telegram of the 18th April last to the resident, Bushire (enclosed in Secretary's letter of the 20th April), regarding the destruction in March last of a dhow that had been captured by the armed launch "Miner," the Katr owner of the dhow has gone to Bushire bearing a letter from Sheikh Abdullah of Doha, in which it is represented that the employment of the dhow for purpose of arms traffic was a deliberate act of disobedience on the nakhoda's part. The sheikh, who states that the Katr owner is a near relative, appeals to us to afford some relief. In our opinion, this opportunity should not be lost. We propose, therefore, while maintaining that our action with regard to the guilty dhow is entirely justifiable, to authorise the payment by the resident, through Sheikh Abdullah, of 5,000 rupees as a compassionate grant to the Katr owner of the dhow, the condition being required that the prohibition we desire shall be issued by the sheikh.

With regard to these proposals we shall be glad to receive your instructions at the earliest possible date.

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[30980] No. 51.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)*

(No. 538.)

Sir, *Therapia, July* 28, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that the commission appointed to enquire into the disturbances on the Euphrates (see my despatch No. 526 of the 25th instant) left Bussorah for Nasirieh on the 26th July. Orders were telegraphed to Nasirieh on the 21st July for the arrest of Ajaimi, the son of Saadun Pasha.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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[30981] No. 52.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)*

(No. 530.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July* 29, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum reporting on the state of the Bitlis vilayet.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 52.

*Consul McGregor to Mr. Marling.*

(No. 55.)

Sir, *Erzeroum, July* 17, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Mr. Safrastian, acting vice-consul at Bitlis, reporting on the unsatisfactory condition of affairs in that province.

I have, &c.

P. J. C. McGREGOR.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 52.

*Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor.*

(No. 19.)

Sir, *Bitlis, July* 9, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report as follows upon the general situation prevailing at present in this vilayet, which, since the beginning of the present year especially, has been quite far from being satisfactory.

*In Khuyt.*—As I had the honour to state in my despatch No. 17 of the 26th June last, the vali continues to arrest the old and new murderers in Khuyt. Within the last fortnight some forty other Kurdish convicts have been captured and imprisoned here, making the number of the arrested up to now about seventy altogether, though only Hadji Amaré and two others of these were involved in the murder of the eight Armenians in Khuyt five weeks ago. His Excellency seems now to encounter some difficulty in arresting further fugitives who have fled to mountains. In order to be able to hunt down such Kurds in the mountains military force must be employed, which he is apparently not allowed to do. In order to meet Field-Marshal Osman Pasha, Ismail Hakki Bey came here a week ago, and in an interview he again repeated to me that the central Government would not allow him to act in accordance with the requirements of the place.

(Confidential.)

His Excellency talked rather in an unvarnished language, stating that the reactionary influences were much prevalent at the Porte, and that his hands were tied down by the Government at a moment when a splendid opportunity came by itself.

*In Khizan.*—The recent outrages in Khuyt caused attentions to be turned from Khizan, where five Armenians were killed by one Mervan Aga in February last (my despatch No. 6 of the 15th March). Though the murderer was arrested in time, but since then all influential officials and Kurds in Khizan headed by the notorious Sheikh Seyyid Ali have exerted themselves to prove by false witnesses that Mervan was of minor age, and therefore could not be held responsible for the crime he committed. From my despatch No. 9 of the 15th April last you are aware that the Armenians of Khizan applied to the vali with the request to remove Tahir Aga, the murderer's father, from the borders of the district. All their efforts, however, remained without any result, and they returned home disappointed. Then the notorious Sheikh of Khizan, further encouraged by the inaction displayed by the authorities, has been treating the Armenians inhumanly, and in the course of the last two months this scoundrel is openly compelling the defenceless Armenians at Khizan to transfer to his name the lands of Bast, Segh, Ov, &c., villages in Khizan. His armed servants have been forbidding the Armenians to plough their lands; the villagers of the Nahié of Nouran (Khizan) have even been prevented from grazing their cattle in their own fields, and from gathering winter provisions for themselves and for their live-stock. I was assured by these poor peasants a few days ago that even some of their cattle were dead from the thirst, as the armed guards of the sheikh would not allow them to approach to the water. Most fiendish schemes are being devised by the sheikh to hasten the occupation and the legalisation of the lands of whole Armenian villages. Those notables of Khizan who are resisting his plans have been threatened with murder, and one Armenian shahen, headman of the village Bast, was lately imprisoned on a charge of bribery, as having tried to bribe some officials.





I humbly venture to state that even under the worst days of Hamidian despotism, such an absolute anarchy had not prevailed in Khizan, and the rule of the sheikh had never been allowed to become as arbitrary and despotic as now. And it is a lamentable fact that these poor peasants cannot make the story of their miseries and martrydom heard in the outside world. Mervan Agn, the murderer, is still in the prison at Karasu (centre of "Khizan"), and nothing is known about the date and character of his trial.

*In Mush.*—The Agrarian disputes throughout the Sanjak of Mush, including the kazas of Bulanik and Melazgerd, are daily becoming very acute. The aggressive proceedings shown by several Moslem Beys and Agas against the Christian proprietors are becoming too common and the authorities are furthering the interracial feuds by their one-sided and undignified policy. Quoting one example amongst others, some three weeks ago a quarrel arose between the Armenians and Kurds of Postakiant, village in the north of the Mush Plain, upon a piece of land. Four of the former were slightly wounded and the authorities of Mush arrested the wounded Armenians instead of the Kurdish aggressors and led them to prison in Mush, where they since remain. Lately, I have often heard from various parts of this vilayet, from Mush as well from Sairt, that there has been cases of arbitrary imprisonment of Christians, when the latter have complained against Moslems, that Kurds are going round the country armed with modern weapons undisturbed, whereas, the Christians are even robbed of their revolvers by the police.

In the course of the last month, two Armenian women have been reported as abducted by Kurds in the Sanjak of Guenj; and the authorities behaving in a discreditable manner as usual, have tried only to vindicate the infamous proceedings of such brutal Kurds.

In submitting this report to you, I humbly venture to remark that most of these allegations brought against the authorities of this province from different corners correspond so surprisingly that it is impossible to regard them as quite unfounded.

Viewing, moreover, the outlook just as it is, one can readily see how difficult the policy of the Young Turks has made the situation, and that the period of hope at the beginning of the new régime having been followed by successive disillusionments, has resulted in general disappointment. And in view of the fact that the political free hand obviously granted to the Kurds is being daily emphasised, it is not difficult to foresee the deplorable consequences of the present policy which may follow in future.

I have, &c

A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

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[30988] No. 53.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8, 1911.)*

(No. 547.)

Sir, *Constantinople, July* 31, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 387 of the 6th June, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Jerusalem, reporting on the visit of Khaja Hassan Nizamy to Jerusalem in connection with the Mosque of Omar incidents.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure in No. 53.

*Consul Satow to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 56.)

Sir, *Jerusalem, July* 22, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 36 of the 26th May, reporting as to incidents arising out of the excavations carried on under the Mosque of Omar by Captain Parker and his associates, I have the honour to report that a certain Khaja Hassan Nizamy, who is described on his card as being secretary of the All India Sufi Conference, Delhi, called upon me to-day and stated that, as a consequence of the dismay aroused in Moslem circles in India by the reports received as to an alleged sacrilege in the mosque, he had been deputed to visit Jerusalem and ascertain the truth of the matter.

He stated that the reports of the incident sent to Indian Moslems, which were

such as to give ground for the belief that the enterprise was under the auspices of the British Government, had greatly affected them, and above all the lower and more ignorant classes, the reason being that there is a tradition that whoever obtains possession of the holy relics, which, it is alleged, had been removed, will gain complete dominion over Islam. He also said that, although he had been three weeks in Jerusalem, he had purposely refrained from calling upon me until to-day in order that it might not be said that he had in any way been influenced in forming his conclusions. He had, however, had an interview with Professor Dalman of the German Archæological School, had been taken under the "Dome of the Rock" by the governor, and had gathered information from every possible source, with the result that he had convinced himself that nothing had been carried away, and that the enterprise was a purely private one.

I informed him that his conclusions were absolutely correct, and that not only was the British Government in no way connected with the enterprise, but that Captain Parker had never been to this consulate, and that I had never even spoken to him.

I have, &c.
H. E. SATOW.

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[30989] No. 54.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)*

(No. 548.)

Sir, *Therapia, August 2, 1911.*

WITH reference to Mr. Marling's despatch No. 524 of the 25th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the convention between the Régie générale des Chemins de Fer and the Ottoman Minister of Public Works, respecting the construction of railways in Roumelia and Anatolia, was signed on Saturday, the 29th ultimo.

As regards the former system, the general *tracés* of which were correctly given in the above-mentioned despatch, the Régie undertakes to make the surveys and draw up estimates of the cost of construction, and, in the event of the estimates being approved by the Ottoman Government and Legislature, concessions for the lines will be granted to the Régie. If, however, the estimates are deemed to be excessive, the Government will buy the plans, &c., from the French company and put the works up for tender, the Régie having not only the right to tender, but also preferential rights, on equal terms, as against other tenderers.

In the case of the Anatolian railways the contract is a definitive one, and not merely a "contrat d'études," the Régie undertaking to build the lines for and on behalf of the Ottoman Government. The lines in question are—

1. Samsoun–Sivas;
2. Sivas–Erzindjan–Erzeroum; and
3. Trebizond–Erzeroum.

The Régie further agrees to survey two other lines, *i.e.*, Sivas–Divrik–Kharput and Kharput–Erzeroum, on behalf of the Government.

The Imperial Ottoman Bank is a party to this arrangement, and further, by a separate convention, undertakes to provide the money required for these undertakings and, I understand, also an additional considerable sum which will be utilised to cover the anticipated budgetary deficits during the next four or five years. The total to be advanced by the Bank to the Porte under this arrangement cannot, of course, be definitely fixed until the surveys and estimates for both the Albanian and Anatolian railways have been completed; but it is believed that the whole amount will be something like £T. 36,000,000 nominal, of which £T. 25,000,000 will be devoted to these railways and to other undertakings, such as irrigation works, leaving £T. 11,000,000 at the disposal of the Minister of Finance.

I have not yet been able to ascertain what guarantees are to be given for the service of this large loan. The traffic receipts of the Anatolian lines, which are to be administered as well as constructed by the Régie générale, are stated to have been agreed on, but it is asserted that the Imperial Ottoman Bank is also demanding the customs receipts of the Black Sea ports. Whether the French Government intends, through the Imperial Ottoman Bank, to take this opportunity of again insisting on any of the conditions which they attached to the grant of the "côte" on the Paris Bourse in connection with the loan negotiations a year ago or not I do not know, but it is significant that there has, so far, been no mention of any such stipulations; on the contrary, the French Government, so far from raising any difficulties, appear to be anxious to facilitate the transaction, and, according to the Turkish press, are ready, if the bargain is concluded, to give their assent to the 4 per cent. increase of the customs and to the application of the new Tenettu law to French citizens.





The Germans, of course, have not failed to ask for compensation for this considerable extension of French interests, and have obtained, I understand, for the Anatolian railways promises of the concession for branch lines from Angora to Sivas and from Angora to Kasarieh, in addition to the Ada Bazaar–Bolu Railway, which has already been sanctioned by the Chamber of Deputies. They are, however, feeling the way towards further concessions, and I have been informed that they are sending an engineer to report on the possibilities of a branch line to Arghana, where is situated the well-known copper mine which was to be specially included in the Chester concession. From this it may be concluded that, in German opinion, the French agreements have put a nail in the coffin of the Chester scheme, and it might, therefore, perhaps be worth while for Mr. D'Arcy to renew his application for the concession for the petroleum field in eastern Anatolia. Mr. D'Arcy's agent is absent from Constantinople.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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[30991] No. 55.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)*

(No. 550.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August 2, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Bussorah reporting on recent events in the Bussorah vilayet.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure in No. 55.

*Acting Consul Mathews to Mr. Marling.*

(No. 35.)

Sir, *Bussorah, July 8, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that on the 24th June the "Marmariss" departed for a cruise in the Gulf, and has not yet returned here. It is stated that she has gone to Katif. I am informed that, on her arrival at the bar, the "Marmariss" replaced the Turkish inner buoy, which had drifted some miles out of position.

On the 3rd instant, Seyyid Talib, the local deputy, arrived here from Constantinople. The military commandant had a guard of honour of thirty soldiers stationed at the landing place.

It is reported that a truce has been agreed to by the Muntafik Arabs, and that the siege of Nasirieh has been raised. The Turks are said to be short of coal for their steamers, and the Arabs of ammunition.

An Englishman, who recently travelled through the disturbed districts, states that the Arabs fear that the execution of the irrigation scheme will dry up the Euphrates. He found the Arabs exceedingly hostile to the irrigation scheme.

On the 5th instant, public criers summoned a meeting of Moslems for the following day, to discuss measures for the protection of Islam from Greek attacks.

During the night of the 5th and 6th instant, there was much rifle firing in the neighbourhood of the town, particularly on the left bank of the Shat-el-Arab.

Printed announcements of the meeting were issued by a body styling itself "The Public Meeting Committee." On the morning of the 6th instant, several thousand villagers from Ab-ul-Khasib, Salhieh, and Chebasi entered the town, some carrying drawn swords and others clubs. They cleared the streets through which they passed, carriages being stopped and pushed to one side, but no one appears to have been seriously injured. The majority of those present at the meeting had no clear idea of its object. Fiery speeches were made by Sheikh Abdullah Bashayan and certain mullas, and there was much fervent shouting of "Ya Allah," "Ya Muhammed," and "Ya Ali." It is worthy of remark that contrary to general expectation neither the kadi (the leading

Sunni), nor Seyyid Nasir, the head of the local Shiahs, attended the meeting. A resolution was declared to have been passed, that the Moslems of Bussorah were ready to lay down their lives for their co-religionists in Crete. The attendance at the meeting was probably between four and five thousand.

While the meeting was in progress, a German who chanced to be passing on horseback was removed from his horse and roughly handled by the crowd. Early in the day the carriages of two Englishmen were held up by the contingent from the villages. No injury was done to the Englishmen, who were able to proceed when the villagers had passed.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

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[31875] No. 56.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 14.)*

(No. 551. Confidential.)
Sir, *Therapia, August 2, 1911.*

M. BOMPARD spoke to me to-day on the subject of the recent arrangement regarding the construction of railways which has formed the subject of despatches Nos. 524 and 548 of the 25th July and 2nd August respectively, from this embassy.

His Excellency said that it had not been carried through without considerable difficulties, as he had had the whole of German influence outside the German Embassy, but including the Turkish army arrayed against him, and, moreover, had been much annoyed at encountering the opposition of the National Bank which had tried to obtain the concession of the ports of Trebizond and Samsoun, but this matter was not yet decided.

In reply to my enquiry as to why he considered that the National Bank was not entitled to enter into competition, his Excellency said that when the arrangement was made last year by the Ottoman Government with the German Company for the extension of the Bagdad line, the French Embassy had enquired whether the Ottoman Government wished to exclude French capital from all participation in railway enterprise in this country, for if so, they would know how to shape their future policy. They had received an assurance to which I alluded in my despatch No. 186 of the 22nd March, 1911, to the effect that the Porte were prepared to grant similar advantages to France as those given to Germany. The French Government had then asked the Government of this country to define the railway development that they contemplated granting to them, and this had included the ports of Samsoun and Trebizond. I said this was new to me, and if it was so, I could not understand why he should have had any difficulty in the matter. M. Bompard replied that the Grand Vizier having objected, he had been obliged to remind him of a verbal engagement given to him by Djavid Bey, but His Highness had taken no account of this. M. Bompard, speaking with some warmth, said that it was very unfortunate that French and British interests should appear to be in competition, for this would be playing into the hands of the Grand Vizier who, being thoroughly German in his sympathies, only looked to dividing us.

M. Bompard went to say that his idea was that we should work in entirely different spheres, and not interfere with each other, and he was not prepared to support any French action in what he considered to be British preserves. I admitted the advantage of this, and asked him what they proposed to leave us beyond the development of Mesopotamian irrigation and a still undefined share in the extension of the Bagdad line to the Persian Gulf. His Excellency was vague in his reply, and only quoted the Meander Valley, adding that as regards the share in the Bagdad extension to the Persian Gulf, the French Government had declared that they would be prepared to abandon any participation, but his Excellency did not say to whom this declaration had been made. I reminded his Excellency that even as regards the Mesopotamian irrigation schemes we were not free from French competition, as the "Société des Batignolles" had recently entered the ranks as competitors with Messrs. Jackson and Pearson (see Mr. Marling's despatch No. 529 of the 25th July). This his Excellency said he ignored, but that in any case he had not supported any French group, and I must be well aware that no group would have any chance of obtaining a concession without the support of its embassy. This evoked from me the enquiry as to whether the Grand Vizier had told him that His Majesty's embassy had pressed for the grant





of the ports of Samsoun and Trebizond. I had naturally done what I could to support the interests of the National Bank generally, but in this instance that institution had not asked me for any assistance. I added that in my opinion the National Bank, far from being desirous as he maintained of blocking the Ottoman Bank at every turn, had even offered to that institution a share in certain ventures which the latter had refused. M. Bompard said the Ottoman Bank was quite prepared to participate with the National Bank in general commercial enterprises, and, indeed, he believed they were on the point of coming to terms with regard to the financing of the new Mahsousse Company, but they wished to preserve their own sphere of interest in the railway development of the country.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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[31335] No. 57.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 8.)*

(No. 555.)
Sir, *Therapia, August 5, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that His Majesty's consul at Bussorah telegraphed to me on the 3rd instant that he had been told by the vali that 600 Persian brigands had crossed into Ottoman territory and had got as far as Ezra's Tomb, on the Tigris.

On the 4th instant Mr. Matthews reported that the brigands in question, under a certain Abdul Kerim, were crowding the marshes from Hawizeh; that they had attacked a grain lighter, which arrived at Bussorah on that night, and severely wounded one of the crew; and, moreover, that seventeen lighters belonging to a British firm are unable to leave Ezra's Tomb.

I am calling the attention of the Sublime Porte to this lamentable state of affairs.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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[31323] No. 58.

*Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received August 8.)*

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Admiralty, August 5, 1911.*

WITH reference to Admiralty letter of the 20th May, and to your letter of the 3rd June, respecting the buoys and lights in the Shatt-el-Arab, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to acquaint you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that they concur in the opinion expressed by the Commander-in-chief, East Indies, in his letter of the 11th May, that if an acetylene inner bar buoy be placed, the British buoys will be sufficient, and the lighting of the bar will be satisfactory for the present purposes of navigation.

2. It appears from the report from His Majesty's ship "Odin," dated the 5th May, copy of which was enclosed with Admiralty letter of the 20th June, that a British inner bar buoy has been laid opposite the Turkish inner bar buoy.

3. The British buoy is on the eastern or Persian side of the channel, and it is suggested that it should now be replaced by an acetylene lighted buoy. This would be preferable to placing the acetylene buoy in the position now occupied by the Turkish buoy, as the removal of this buoy would probably lead to international difficulties.

4. The proposal to moor a light-ship 4 or 5 miles to seaward of the gas outer buoy was previously made by the commander-in-chief in his letter of the 25th February, addressed to the Government of India, but action on it is suspended pending the receipt of detailed estimates (*vide* India Office letter of the 5th ultimo, forwarding copy of a telegram from the Government of India dated the 27th June). My Lords consider that a second light-vessel in the position proposed would still be desirable, even if the Turkish light-vessel takes the place of the outer bar buoy.

5. A similar letter has been sent to the India Office.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

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[30037] No. 59.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 216.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 8, 1911.*

I HAVE received Mr. Marling's despatch No. 520 of the 25th ultimo reporting on the tender made by the French Société des Batignolles for the Mesopotamian irrigation works contract.

I approve the action taken by Mr. Marling in this matter, and I concur in his view that further representations to the Porte at this stage on behalf of the British contractors concerned are undesirable.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[30321] No. 60.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 8, 1911.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence relative to the shipment of red oxide from Abu Musa, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copy of a letter from Messrs. Frank C. Strick and Co.,* relative to the reported removal by Hajji Hassan-bin-Ali Samaiya of 298 tons destined for Bombay, and the alleged desire of Messrs. Robert Wönckhaus and Co. to obtain permission to take more of the mineral.

I am to state that no record of the shipment said to have been made last May appears to exist at this Office, and that Sir E. Grey would be glad to learn whether the Marquess of Crewe is in possession of any information on the subject.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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[31523] No. 61.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 10.)*

Sir, *India Office, August 10, 1911.*

WITH reference to your letter dated the 8th instant, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a telegram, dated the 29th July, 1911, from the Government of India reporting the further shipment of oxide from Abu Musa, and to make the following observations in regard to it.

In his note of the 26th July, 1910 (paragraph 1), enclosed in your letter dated the 2nd August, 1910, the German Ambassador represented that Messrs. Wönckhaus and Co. desired "to ship a further 400 to 500 tons of the oxide," and this was agreed to in Secretary Sir E. Grey's reply of the 22nd August, 1910. It now appears that the amount actually shipped (so recently as May last) under this authorisation was 300 tons only, and that Messrs. Wönckhaus are desirous of shipping the whole of the oxide remaining over from the heap from which the 300 tons were taken, which they estimate at between 300 and 400 tons. Although this quantity exceeds 200 tons,† the maximum that they would strictly be entitled to remove under the permission accorded in Sir E. Grey's note of the 22nd August, 1910 (paragraph 7), His Majesty's Government need not, in the Marquess of Crewe's opinion, object to its removal.

As regards, however, the application made by the German consul for permission to transport an additional quantity of 500 tons from the pit head to the shore, I am to

* No. 47.

† Maximum quantity mentioned in German note of July 26, 1910 (paragraph 1) .. 500
Shipped in May 1911 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 300
Remainder .. .. .. .. .. .. 200



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observe that the request is of the kind which the penultimate paragraph* of the note of the 22nd August, 1910, was intended to forestall.

I am, therefore, to suggest that, if Sir E. Grey sees no objection, the facts stated in Colonel Cox's telegram should be brought to the notice of the German Government, and that they should be informed that, while His Majesty's Government have consented to the removal of the rest of the heap (though estimated at between 300 and 400 tons), they trust that the application to transport to the shore another 500 tons is not made with the support of the German Government.

A draft of a telegram in this sense is enclosed, which, subject to Sir E. Grey's concurrence, it is proposed to address to the Government of India.

The favour of a very early reply is requested.

I am, &c.
LIONEL ABRAHAMS.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 61.

*The Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.*

(Telegraphic.) P. *July 29, 1911.*

ABU MUSA oxide.

Please refer to your telegram dated the 18th August and to note dated the 22nd August from Sir E. Grey to German Ambassador.

Telegram to following effect, dated the 25th July, received from resident, Persian Gulf:—

"300 tons were shipped to India in May last, the remainder of heap being left on the sea-shore; no shipment was made prior to that date. German consul has made application for leave for Wönckhaus to ship balance of said heap, which is estimated by him at 300–400 tons, as soon as possible. Leave to transport further quantity of 500 tons from pit head to sea-shore is also applied for by consul. The latter does not state whether shipment is for Europe on Wönckhaus's account, or for India on that of Hassan."

This point need not be discussed, in opinion of resident, if we can take the line suggested in the last paragraph but one of Sir E. Grey's note. Resident's view has my concurrence, and instructions as to reply to be given to German consul are solicited at an early date. In a separate telegram resident reports receipt from Messrs. Strick's Bushire agent of a letter from the latter's principals, in which complaint is made of permission to ship 300 tons being accorded to Germans.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 61.

*Draft Telegram from the Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.*

(Secret.)

YOUR telegram of the 29th ultimo: Abu Musa.

German Government are being informed that, while His Majesty's Government have consented to removal of the balance estimated at between 300 and 400 tons of the heap referred to in first part of Cox's telegram, they trust that application to transport the 500 tons to the shore is not made with the support of the German Government.

Please instruct Cox to reply to consul that balance of heap may be removed, but that reference is being made to the German Government as to transporting the 500 tons.

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* I venture, however, to express the hope that, in view of the explanations now given, the German Government will abstain from supporting any further requests of this nature which Messrs. Wönckhaus may make.

[31561] No. 62.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)*

(No. 179.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, August* 10, 1911.

RUSSO-GERMAN negotiations. My despatch No. 201 of the 12th July.

(Secret.)

M. Nératof has been informed by the German Ambassador, who returned to St. Petersburgh last night from Berlin, that the amended text of the draft agreement is accepted by the German Government.

It is only with regard to article 4 that there will be any modification of the text, while it is probable that a fifth article will be added. This additional article will stipulate that, in the event of the Russian Government informing Germany, two years after the line from Sadijeh has reached Khanikin, that they renounce all idea of constructing the line from Khanikin to Tehran, either on their own account or through the agency of a syndicate of foreign financiers, then Germany will be at liberty to obtain the concession for that line from the Persian Government.

Count Pourtalès told M. Nératof that Russia was recognised by his Government as possessing full liberty of action with regard to the 4 per cent. customs increase, but that the German Government could only accept the term "Bagdad Railway" as applying to the whole railway, this being the interpretation which they had always understood those words to bear.

I asked M. Nératof whether he still intended to adhere to the reserve on this point which he had made verbally. He replied that the interpretation was still open to question, but added that, now that Germany recognised Russia's right to withhold her consent to the customs increase, the question of the interpretation of the words was no longer a matter of great importance.

From our conversation I gathered that M. Nératof would not insist any further, and that the signature of the agreement might be expected at an early date. His Excellency has promised that, before signing the agreement, he will communicate the text to me.

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[31523] No. 63.

*Sir Edward Grey to Count Metternich.*

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, August* 12, 1911.

WITH reference to my note of the 22nd August, 1910, relative to the shipment of red oxide from Abu Musa, I have the honour to state that, according to a telegraphic report from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, the German consul at that port has applied, on behalf of Messrs. Robert Wönckhaus and Co., for permission to ship as soon as possible the balance of the mineral remaining on the shore of the island, which the consul estimates at between 300 and 400 tons. The consul has also applied for permission to transport a further quantity of 500 tons from the pithead to the shore.

As regards the first of these demands, I have the honour to observe that your Excellency, in the first paragraph of your note of the 26th July, 1910, stated that Messrs. Wönckhaus proposed to ship a further 400 or 500 tons of oxide, and that permission to remove this amount was accorded in my note of the 22nd August.

Reports received from Lieutenant-Colonel Cox show that the firm have already shipped as much as 300 tons, that amount having been removed in May last, so that the maximum additional amount which they are strictly entitled to remove, in virtue of the permission given in my note above referred to, is 200 tons only.

Not wishing, however, to interpret too literally the terms of the permission in question, I refrain from raising objections to Messrs. Wönckhaus's request, and have the honour to inform your Excellency that a telegram will be addressed to Colonel Cox stating that His Majesty's Government have consented to the shipment of the balance of the heap.

As regards the second application of the German consul at Bushire—that for permission to transport a further 500 tons of oxide from the pithead to the shore—I have the honour to recall your Excellency's attention to the penultimate paragraph of





my note of the 22nd August, and to express the hope that this demand is not made with the support of the German Government.

I would venture to add that the facts adduced in paragraph 5 of the same note appear to prove that Messrs. Wönckhaus have no ground for asking that such an application may be made.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

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[31523] No. 64.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 12, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th instant, relative to the shipment of red oxide from Abu Musa by Messrs. Robert Wönckhaus and Co.

I am to state in reply that Sir E. Grey concurs in the terms of the telegram which the Marquess of Crewe proposes to address to the Government of India relative to the recent applications made by the German consul at Bushire on behalf of th firm, and to transmit to you herewith, for his Lordship's information, copy of a note which he has addressed to the German Ambassador at this court in the sense of the penultimate paragraph of your letter.*

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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[31931] No. 65.

*Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 14.)*

(No. 80. Confidential.)
Sir, *Ramleh, August* 5, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copies of reports from the Intelligence Department regarding recent events in the Yemen and Asir.

It is impossible to guarantee the accuracy of this news, which is obtained from Arab sources, but it may be of assistance in appreciating the situation.

Copy of this despatch is being sent to Constantinople.

I have, &c.
MILNE CHEETHAM.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 65.

*Extract from a letter dated Hodeida, July* 6, 1911, *respecting Affairs in the Yemen.*

(Secret.)

THE tribes attacked a force of 500 Turkish soldiers whilst on the march from Sana to Ibheiya, but the Sheikh of El Zaidia assisted the latter and convoyed them through. About 120 of the rebels were arrested and sent in chains to Hodeida for punishment. The Sheikh El Zaidia came in to be rewarded.

The army of the Shereef of Mecca entered El Oeza, where it was attacked by 2,000 of El Idrisi's followers, but repulsed them, killing 200 of the rebels and taking many prisoners, who were removed to Taif. The Shereef devastated the country, and is now at Mahagil. Some of Idrisi's followers and of the independent tribesmen surrendered to the Turkish Government.

Mahmud Bey El Nadim, who is attempting to act as mediator on behalf of the Turkish Government, has presented El Imam Yehia with a decoration, and a rumour (probably groundless) is current that he wishes to make peace with the Government.

The Syrian road is cut off by the Ghraith and Zaradik Arabs, who have plundered a caravan and cut the telegraph wires.

* No. 63.

Loheiya is reported to be very strongly held, and to be proof against the assaults of the investing Arabs. The Shereef of Mecca and the vali are marching to its relief.

*Later.*—It is reported that the son of the Shereef of Mecca (who commanded his army) has been killed. If true, this would appear to mean that the army marching to the relief of Loheiya has suffered a reverse. His death would probably greatly encourage the rebels.

*Intelligence Department, War Office, Cairo,*
*July* 30, 1911.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 65.

*News regarding the Yemen and Asir obtained indirectly from one of the followers of Shereef "Nouway," son of the Shereef of Mecca, who has recently arrived secretly in Cairo.*

(Secret.)

THE Shereef of Mecca sent thirty-six of his family (Ashraf) to collect taxes from the people of Kaid Ibn Khershan. On arrival they found that El Idrisi had already collected the taxes, and in the ensuing dispute they and their followers were all killed.

The occurrence is thought by the Arabs to be very grave, and an indication that feeling even among the hitherto neutral tribes is growing very strong against the Shereef, as it was not long since the murder of such a number of "Ashraf" would have been impossible.

The rumour that the Shereef Abdulla, son of the Shereef of Mecca, has been killed in battle is repeated, but not confirmed.

For some time the country round Sanaa has been absolutely peaceful, and the vali (Mohammed Ali Pasha) withdrew his troops from the fertile district on which they had been quartered and gradually pushed towards Loheiya, and thence towards Gezan.

While *en route* he was opposed by El Idrisi's forces, who held an important watering place in such strength that he has been unable to carry it, and matters are now at an *impasse*.

The vali is said to have telegraphed viâ Sanaa to Constantinople for five or six "tawabir" (about 50,000 men), without which he cannot carry on!

He is said to be on the point of reopening negotiations with El Idrisi, who will not accept anything less than his former terms.

El Imam Yehia has deemed the moment ripe for opening the question of arbitration by a non-interested European Power.

Their previous experience of such, when the Italian Government, through Signor Salvatore Raggi, succeeded in obtaining the release and repatriation of sixty-five Yemen notables who had been confined in Rhodes, was very happy; but they do not wish to employ Italy again, neither will they consider Germany, but would be glad of England's good offices.

In return they would offer the mediating Power (it is as well to notice that they presuppose that the award would place them in a position sufficiently independent to do so) as a reward, either of two alternatives:—

(*a.*) A concession of the mineral rights, which they claim are very valuable.

(*b.*) A monopoly of trade, always excepting spirituous liquors, tobacco, and drugs, which would be absolutely prohibited.

*Intelligence Department, War Office, Cairo,*
*July* 31, 1911.

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[31881] No. 66.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August* 14.)

(No. 559. Confidential.)

Sir, *Therapia, August* 8, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that His Majesty's acting consul at Aleppo telegraphed on the 5th instant to say that he had heard confidentially that Baron Oppenheim, who came to this country in the spring, and whose movements I instructed His Majesty's consul at Aleppo to watch, was at Tel Helif, where he was trying to secure a large tract of country for purposes of colonisation.

Mr. Young added that he gave this report with all reserve.

The attitude of the Turkish Government at present is that such colonists will not be accepted unless they adopt Ottoman nationality.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.



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[31882] No. 67.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August* 14.)

(No. 560.)

Sir, *Therapia, August* 7, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith a translation of an article which appeared in the "Tanin" of the 4th August in regard to the agrarian question in Anatolia.

The apathy displayed by the Government and their apparent inclination to humour the Kurdish element has been referred to in the quarterly reports from this embassy on the Anatolian provinces, the last of which was forwarded in Mr. Marling's No. 463 of the 4th ultimo.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure in No. 67.

*Extract from the "Stamboul," August* 5, 1911.

LA QUESTION DES TERRES DES ARMÉNIENS.

NOUS signalons à l'attention des Arméniens et de tous les hommes de bonne foi l'article suivant du "Tanine." Et nous félicitons notre confrère d'avoir osé dire ce qu'il pense, avec cette loyauté :—

"L'ancienne médecine avait un système de traitement qui consistait à qualifier de ces 'douteux' le malade dont elle ne pouvait reconnaître l'affection, à le laisser longtemps sans soins, à vouloir constater 'le cours et les symptômes bien caractérisés' pour formuler un diagnostic.

"En effet, quelque temps après, les symptômes attendus se manifestaient et l'on savait enfin à quelle maladie on avait affaire. Le malheur, c'est qu'alors les remèdes étaient sans effet et que le malade rendait l'âme.

"Personne ne peut nous taxer d'injustice si nous prétendons que le Gouvernement entend solutionner ainsi la question des terres dans le provinces de l'Anatolie orientale. C'est une de nos vieilles habitudes de chercher à éteindre l'incendie quand le feu s'est partout déclaré, habitude dont les partisans ne manquent malheureusement pas encore de nos jours. On sait que la question des terres est liée aux 'hautes classes spoliatrices.' Ces bandits ont volé les terres des pauvres classes obscures et, profitant de l'anarchie locale, ont fait à leur guise acte de propriétaires.

"Le proverbe qui dit 'On retrouve des biens, on ne retrouve pas la vie,' n'est guère vrai là-bas. Au contraire, ce qui est patent et certain dans ces régions, c'est qu' 'on retrouve la vie, on ne retrouve pas de biens.' Mais, ce qu'il faut reconnaître aussi c'est que ceux qui s'adressaient dernièrement au Gouvernement pour se plaindre des spoliateurs ayant été tués en route, la seconde forme du proverbe ne peut leur être appliquée.

"Donc, il est plus juste de dire que là 'on ne retrouve ni biens ni vie.'

"Un pays où il n'y a ni biens ni vie est en état d'anarchie. Et le Gouvernement doit s'empresser d'enrayer le mal sans attendre que les symptômes s'aggravent.

"Il existe des milliers, peut-être des centaines de mille de personnes plongées dans la misère et privées de leurs droits. Sous l'ère d'Abd-ul-Hamid, elles se taisaient et paraissaient avoir renoncé à ce qu'on leur avait pris. Aujourd'hui, c'est avec raison qu'elles espèrent davantage de la justice constitutionnelle et de la bienveillance gouvernementale. Leur mal devrait être soigné à temps et nous estimions qu'il était de l'intérêt du Gouvernement de commencer le traitement le plus tôt possible, avant que

la maladie soit devenue incurable. Au contraire, nous ne pouvons nous empêcher de constater qu'en continuant à priver de droit et de justice les Arméniens, ce peuple si loyal et si fidèle, le Gouvernement lésera la patrie.

"Il faut avant tout savoir en quoi consiste la question des terres dans les provinces de l'Anatolie orientale où résident les Arméniens et préciser aussi comment et quand ces terrains leur ont été ravis. C'est ensuite qu'on devra se hâter de régler la question, qui est tout simplement un acte de justice et de restitution. Nous ne prétendons pas que tout le droit est du côté des Arméniens, ni que ceux qu'on traite de spoliateurs ont absolument tort.

"Il est certains terrains qui, par la négligence du Gouvernement, sont tombés dans telles ou telles mains. C'est au Gouvernement à confirmer les droits et la possession justifiée. En un mot, après avoir diagnostiqué le mal, il importe au salut de la patrie et de l'Etat que le Gouvernement le traite sérieusement et le guérisse pour toujours."

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[31883] No. 68.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 14.)*

(No. 561.)

Sir, *Therapia, August 8, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 560 of the 7th instant, I have the honour to forward to you herewith an article which appeared in the "Turquie" of the 3rd instant, containing a translation of a speech delivered by Marshal Osman Pasha to a deputation of Armenians at Hasskeuy near Mush in regard to the agrarian question.

You will observe that his Excellency gave vent to the most violent pro-Kurdish sentiments, and his utterances have caused considerable alarm in Armenian circles.

I have the honour to transmit a translation of a "takrir" which was presented to the Ministry of Justice on the 17th ultimo by the Armenian Patriarchate, pointing out the dangerous situation created by this speech, and demanding the marshal's recall and the institution of judicial proceedings against him.

At a general meeting of the Armenian National Assembly, held subsequently in the presence of M. Mangouni, the *locum tenens* of the Armenian Patriarch, a motion was unanimously passed expressing regret at the marshal's speech which had rendered the position of Armenians in Asia Minor critical, and confidence that the Government would take the necessary measures to punish him and to reassure the population.

I understand that the antecedents of this officer give every reason to believe that the reported account of his speech is a correct one. The Government have stated that they are instituting enquiries.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 68.

*Extract from the "Turquie" of August 3, 1911.*

PAROLES DE HAINE.

DANS la première quinzaine du mois de juillet, le Maréchal Osman Pacha, inspecteur général du IVe Corps d'Armée, passait par Haskeuy, gros bourg des environs de Mouche. Un maréchal d'Empire est un très haut et très puissant personnage. Les habitants d'Haskeuy s'empressèrent de dépêcher à sa rencontre, pour lui offrir leurs humbles hommages, une délégation composée, dit-on, de trois prêtres, du mudir et de cinq autres notables du pays.

Osman Pacha accueillit ces députés du bourg et il les harangua. Il les harangua avec la farouche sincérité d'un soldat qui sait mal cacher les sentiments. Malheureusement les sentiments d'Osman Pacha sont détestables, et ses paroles furent indignes. Entre autres choses, le maréchal inspecteur général en exercice, dit à cette délégation composée d'Arméniens, tremblante devant sa violence :—

(Traduction.)

"Vous autres Arméniens, durant ces trois années de constitution, cramponnés solidement à la question agraire, vous avez provoqué de sérieux troubles dans le pays,



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en enlevant aux Kurdes leurs moyens d'existence. Vous, Arméniens, vous êtes des hommes intelligents, sociables et civilisés, et partant vous pouvez atteindre votre but par votre éloquence ou par votre plume. Mais la race kurde, qui est encore à demi barbare et ignorante, absolument étrangère à la civilisation, ne dispose d'autres moyens de défense que la force et les armes. Oui, je reconnais que ces terres vous ont appartenu jadis. Mais, cependant, nous autres Osmanlis, nous sommes venus ici quelques centaines et avons conquis tout cela au prix de notre sang.

"Or, travaillez-vous aussi à nous reprendre ces terres? Nous savons bien que tous vos mouvements révolutionnaires avaient pour but, non le rétablissement de la constitution, mais l'obtention de l'indépendance comme l'on fait les Serbes, les Bulgares, les Monténégrins, &c. Ces derniers étant en Europe occidentale ont pu réussir. Il n'en sera pas ainsi pour les Arméniens."

Tel fut, assurent les correspondants des journaux arméniens, le langage que tint aux délégués de Haskeuy le Maréchal Osman Pacha. Nous nous refusions à croire à l'authenticité de telles paroles. Voilà pourquoi nous nous étions abstenus de les commenter. Nous attendions du Gouvernement le seul commentaire qui pût s'appliquer à cette inqualifiable sortie : ou un démenti catégorique; ou un formel désaveu suivi de la punition du coupable. Rien n'est venu. Voilà cependant huit jours au moins que le fait est livré à la publicité. Le silence du Gouvernement sur cette affaire devient inexplicable, à son tour. Il serait sans aucun doute, souverainement injuste de prétendre que ce silence est par lui-même une approbation. Cependant, d'aucuns pourraient s'empresser de faire cette hypothèse. En réalité, le Gouvernement a prescrit une enquête qui sera confiée, affirme-t-on, à une commission militaire. Il eût été bien préférable de calmer la légitime colère que suscitent parmi les Arméniens les propos d'Osman Pacha, en rappelant immédiatement ce singulier inspecteur d'armée, ou en l'obligeant à démentir d'urgence, si elles n'ont pas été prononcées, les paroles de haine qu'on lui prête.

A tout propos, on traduit devant la cour martiale des journalistes accusés d'avoir écrit "des articles susceptibles de semer la division parmi les éléments." Et on les tance d'importance, si on ne les condamne pas. Que devra-t-on alors faire de maréchaux qui tiennent des discours comme celui d'Osman Pacha?

De telles harangues font plus de mal que cent articles de journaux, aussi violents qu'on les suppose.

Il faut, d'autre part, considérer qu'Osman Pacha s'adressait à un élément qui, depuis le début de la constitution, n'a cessé de témoigner du loyalisme le plus absolu. Les Arméniens, comme l'a reconnu Osman Pacha, sont intelligents, cultivés, habiles à manier la parole et la plume. Or, ces qualités ne les ont-ils pas mises au service de la patrie ottomane?

N'ont-ils pas oublié tous les maux dont ils avaient été accablés sous l'ancien régime, pour se consacrer généreusement à la tâche de rénovation que la Jeune-Turquie avait entreprise!

En vérité, le langage de ce maréchal, qui doit sans doute ce grade à Abd-ul-Hamid, est d'une criante injustice et d'une prodigieuse maladresse. Les sceptiques rééditeront, à ce propos, le mot connu : "C'est plus qu'un crime, c'est une faute." Les autres diront simplement que c'est l'un et l'autre.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 68.

*Extract from the "Stamboul" of August 5, 1911.*

EN ASIE-MINEURE: LE TAKRIR DU PATRIARCAT ARMÉNIEN.

LE takrir remis par le Patriarcat arménien au Ministère de la Justice, rédigé par le conseil mixte, et relatif aux paroles adressées par le Maréchal Osman Pacha à la délégation arménienne venue pour recevoir, est ainsi conçu :—

(Traduction.)

"Une lettre, en date du 29 juin, 1327, adressée par la délégation arménienne de Mouche, nous informe que, le mercredi, 22 juin dernier (v. s.), le Maréchal Osman Pacha, inspecteur du IVe Corps, se rendant dans cette ville, visita en passant le village de Haskeuy, où il adressa publiquement et à haute voix, en présence des Kurdes et des gendarmes, aux prêtres et notables venus pour lui souhaiter la bienvenue, des

paroles de surexcitation dont, en raison de leur importance, nous vous faisons part, avec la traduction de la lettre elle-même.

"En ces temps critiques, où le Gouvernement fait tant d'actives enquêtes sur les oppressions, les exactions, les crimes dont ont été victimes les Arméniens dans toutes les parties de l'Anatolie, ainsi que sur les spoliations des terres et de propriétés exercées contre eux; dans cette région de Mouche, où de sang innocent répandu n'est pas encore séché, il est indubitable que les audacieux et injurieux blâmes adressés par un inspecteur d'armée chargé de la tranquillité et de l'ordre des vilayets de Turquie d'Asie, toucheront et navreront, non seulement la nation arménienne, mais tous les Ottomans. Il est inutile de dire aussi le mauvais effet que peuvent avoir ces observations d'un haut fonctionnaire sur les oppresseurs et les malfaiteurs d'Anatolie, ni les regrettables événements qui pourront en être la conséquence.

"En outre, il résulte d'un télégramme en date du 14 juillet, 1327, adressé par la délégation arménienne de Bitlis, que les troupes ottomanes de Heyout partent sans avoir rempli leur mission et contrairement aux ordres du vali. C'est un devoir des plus impérieux pour le Gouvernement constitutionnel d'effacer cette mauvaise impression, de prendre et d'appliquer d'urgentes mesures pour préserver de tout arrêt les poursuites entreprises. D'un autre côté, c'est une obligation pour la justice et la constitution de ne pas se contenter de déplacer et de révoquer le fonctionnaire qui a formulé des apostrophes pernicieuses de nature à semer la zizanie et la discorde entre les éléments, mais de prendre contre lui les dispositions judiciaires qui s'imposent afin de servir d'efficace exemple.

"Nous vous prions avec instance de recourir aux moyens propres à empêcher le retour de tragédies telles que celles d'Adana.

"*Le 17 juillet*, 1327."

En recevant ce takrir, le Ministre de la Justice a exprimé ses regrets—dit simplement l'"Ikdam."

L'Assemblée nationale arménienne a tenu hier séance dans son local à Galata, en présence de Mgr. Mangonni, *locum tenens*. Après la discussion de certaines questions administratives, des débats assez importants ont eu lieu à propos du discours prononcé à Eskouy (Mouche) par le Maréchal Osman Pacha et contre lequel le patriarcat a déjà protesté auprès du Gouvernement dans le takrir publié plus haut.

La proposition du président de délibérer à huis clos au sujet de cette affaire, a été rejetée. Les représentants de la nation ont déclaré à l'unanimité que la nation arménienne connue depuis des siècles pour son dévouement au trône et au Gouvernement ottomans, ne doit pas parler de ses peines dans le secret. Il faut que le Gouvernement ait connaissance des doléances de la nation.

Deux motions ont été soumises à l'Assemblée, dont une émanant de Mgr. Hémayak, prélicateur de l'éphorie arménienne de Péra, et l'autre de M. Aramiantz, publiciste, tous les deux représentants de la nation.

Elles demandaient de tenter des démarches énergiques tant auprès du Gouvernement qu'auprès du Général Mahmoud Chevket Pacha, pour provoquer la révocation de cet officier général, qui par son discours aurait encouragé la population ignorante de Asie-Mineure à reprendre les hostilités contre les Arméniens.

L'avocat Hosrovian Effendi, en un éloquent discours, a expliqué la nécessité d'agir auprès du Gouvernement avec énergie.

Car on ne doit pas oublier qu'il s'agit d'une question vitale pour toute la nation arménienne. C'est un maréchal de l'armée ottomane, chargée particulièrement de défendre toute la population de l'Asie-Mineure, et particulièrement des Arméniens habitant ces provinces, qui met en doute le loyalisme d'une partie de cette même population et dont les paroles peuvent déchaîner la ruine des Arméniens. Hosrovian Effendi a déclaré en terminant que l'Assemblée nationale fera son devoir en réclamant au Gouvernement prompte justice contre un fonctionnaire tel qu'Osman Pacha, qui par ses agissements peut susciter de grands dangers.

Mgr. Papken, en exprimant ses profonds regrets d'entendre s'élever ainsi un haut dignitaire contre la nation arménienne, a protesté principalement contre le passage du discours d'Osman Pacha qui mettait en doute le loyalisme des Arméniens à l'égard de la constitution et les accusait de poursuivre des visées séparatistes.

Un autre député, en parlant des reproches d'Osman Pacha à propos de la demande des Arméniens pour la suppression des régiments hamidié, a déclaré que les Arméniens réclamaient de cette façon toute simplement l'égalité pour tous les Ottomans.





Pourquoi, en effet, le Kürde fait-il son service militaire dans sa ville natale alors que les Turcs et les Arméniens peuvent être expédiés soit au Yémen, soit en Albanie ou sur d'autres points de la Turquie? Après de longues discussions une motion a été adoptée à l'unanimité par laquelle la nation arménienne croit devoir exprimer ses plus profonds regrets à l'égard du discours d'Osman Pacha, discours qui rend excessivement dangereuse la situation des Arméniens en Asie. Elle exprime aussi la confiance que le Gouvernement constitutionnel ottoman prendra les mesures requises en l'occurrence et punira cet officier général incriminé et prendra les dispositions voulues pour rassurer la population.

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[32371] No. 69.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 15, 1911.*

A REQUEST has been made by the Turkish Ambassador, under instructions from his Government, that he may be furnished with copies of the agreements with the Trucial chiefs and the Sheikhs of Bahrein and Koweit, to which reference is made in the memorandum communicated to his Excellency on the 29th ultimo.

As the agreements with the Trucial chiefs and the Sheikh of Bahrein have already been published, Sir Edward Grey assumes that there would be no objection to communicating them to the Ottoman Government, and, if this is so, I am to request that your department will be so good as to furnish, for this purpose, copies of the documents in question in a convenient form.

With regard to the agreements with the Sheikh of Koweit, Sir E. Grey would be glad to know the views of Lord Crewe as to what portions of them should be communicated to the Turkish Government. He presumes that it would not be convenient to divulge, *e.g.*, the annual payment on account of the lease of land to His Majesty's Government.

It is also a matter for consideration whether it would not be more advantageous to defer communicating to the Turkish Government the agreements with the Sheikh of Koweit until they have intimated whether, apart from the terms of those agreements, they are prepared in principle to accept the proposals contained in the memorandum of the 29th July.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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[32470] No. 70.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 17.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Marquess of Crewe, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram from the Viceroy, dated the 15th August, 1911, relative to the Turks and the trucial chiefs.

*India Office, August 16, 1911.*

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Enclosure in No. 70.

*Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.*

(Telegraphic.) P. *August 15, 1911.*

IN telegram, dated the 11th August, resident, Persian Gulf, reported that he had addressed senior naval officer to following effect:—

"Endeavour to tempt Sheikh of Debai to intrigue with Turks through Turkish consul-here has been made by an inhabitant of Lingah, who is in close relations with Turkish consulate here and aspires to become Turkish agent at Lingah, and who is very hostile to us. Overtures have, according to my information, been altogether rejected by sheikh. But vice-consul now reports that Turkish consul is said to be

proceeding to trucial coast from Lingah, whither he went recently, and that he will intrigue on trucial coast, as he has been doing at Lingah, and will attempt to fly his flag there. I request that ship may be sent to Lingah if possible, and may be sent in advance in event of Turk proceeding to trucial coast, to warn the sheikh that Turk is coming and that permission to land should be refused him. Until Turk is off the premises ship should remain there."

Resident's action has my approval.

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[32483] No. 71.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 17.)*

Sir, *India Office, August 17, 1911.*

WITH reference to correspondence ending with the letter of this Office dated the 15th May last regarding the settlement at Kasr-as-Subaih* of the Al Bu Ainain tribe, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose copy of a telegram from the Government of India as to a proposed visit to the place mentioned by the political resident in the Persian Gulf.

As explained in Captain Shakespear's letter of the 2nd May, 1910, paragraph 6, the Sheikh of Koweit claims jurisdiction over Kasr-as-Subaih, but the Turks have a station at Musallamiyah Island which is more to the north, and it is doubtful whether the sheikh's claims could be sustained.†

Subject to the concurrence of Secretary Sir E. Grey, the Marquess of Crewe would propose to address to the Government of India the telegram of which a draft is enclosed.

I am, &c.
EDWIN S. MONTAGU.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 71.

*Draft of Telegram from the Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.*

(Secret.)

YOUR telegram of 12th instant.

Proposal that Cox should visit Kasr-as-Subaih, while careful not to disturb *status quo*, is approved.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 71.

*Government of India to the Marquess of Crewe.*

(Telegraphic.) P. *August 12, 1911.*

FOLLOWING received from Resident, Persian Gulf:—

"Please refer to my letter dated the 16th April last.

"News has reached Sheikh Mubarak, he states, of recent dispatch to the place of a Turkish flagstaff; sheikh does not know whether its erection has yet taken place. It is necessary to be vigilant, although report may be exaggerated, owing to proximity of place to pearl banks. I propose that arrangements should be made for 'Lawrence' to visit the place; but in case general negotiations are in progress with Turkish Government, I think it best to make a reference before this is done."

While negotiations are still pending with Turkish Government, it is important that there should be no disturbance of *status quo*. Subject to your concurrence, I propose to approve visit to Kasr-as-Subaih proposed by resident.

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* F 6 on Persian Gulf Gazetteer Map.
† See Sir R. Ritchie's letter of the 8th April, 1911, as to the limits of Koweit.





[32539] No. 72.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 18.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Marquess of Crewe, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 27th July, 1911, relative to the proposed colonisation of Zora on the trucial coast.

*India Office, August 17, 1911.*

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Enclosure in No. 72.

*Naval Commander-in-chief to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) *Digatalawa, July 22, 1911.*

HIS Majesty's ship "Fox" has now reported Zora as suitable site for a wireless station. The Khor has a sandy bar with 2 feet of water on it at low water and 10 to 6 feet of water inside. This in all probability could possibly be improved in order to render it available for lighters. The place could then, for the distribution of merchandise, be converted into a free port and thus concentrate all the coastal trade. This telegram is with reference to marine department telegram dated the 6th June, 1911.

(Repeated to the Political Resident, Persian Gulf.)

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[32601] No. 73.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 18.)*

(Confidential.)

Sir, *India Office, August 18, 1911.*

WITH reference to the correspondence marginally quoted,* I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to address you regarding the request made in the telegram of the Government of India, dated the 8th June, for instructions regarding the inclusion of certain areas in the survey that is shortly to be made in the Persian Gulf.

The areas in question are, as stated in their letter to the naval commander-in-chief, dated the 5th June, (1) the waters of the Khor Abdallah and Khor Assabieh, and (2) all the territorial waters which are south of the Zakhael Munifa (a locality presumably identical with or in the neighbourhood of Jabal Manifah.†)

As regards (2), the Marquess of Crewe is not clear whether a survey of the territorial waters of El Katif is permissible in view of the fact that His Majesty's Government have recognised Turkish claims to that coast. But, on the other hand, it may fairly be argued that the protectorate which His Majesty's Government claim over Bahrein extends to its waters, at all events so far as to entitle them to survey the approaches to the island. His Lordship will be glad to have Sir E. Grey's views on this point.

As regards (1), I am to observe that the waters of the two khors adjoin the islands of Warba and Bubian, to which Turkish claims have never been admitted, and the result of a survey there would be to show the Turkish Government, as explained by the Government of India, that His Majesty's Government do not intend to neglect their own claims in the Gulf. The fact that a reply is now being awaited from the Turkish Government to the British note regarding the general situation does not, so far as Lord Crewe can judge, constitute any sufficient ground for delaying this part of the survey.

* India Office to Foreign Office, June 12; ditto July 10, 1911.
† K. 5 on the Persian Gulf Gazetteer map.

He would therefore propose, if Sir E. Grey shares these views, to address to the Government of India the telegram of which a draft is sent herewith.

The favour of an early reply is requested.

I am, &c.
E. MONTAGU.

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[32648] No. 74.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 18.)*

(No. 183. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, August 18, 1911.*

MY telegram No. 179, Secret, of the 10th August: Russo-German agreement.

The agreement will be signed to-morrow, and I have just received the text from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

In the preamble the word "political" is now omitted after "special," but in other respects the summary given in my despatch No. 201 of the 12th July corresponds with the text now communicated in so far as the preamble, article 1, and the first sentence of article 3 are concerned.

In article 2 also the only change of any importance is in the last sentence, which now reads as follows:—

From "if at the end of two years" to "will remain in force" was sent in cypher R.

The provisions of the second sentence of article 3 with regard to Germany's engagements not to construct railways to the north of Khanikin (as given in my despatch No. 201) are now omitted altogether. It seems probable that these provisions may be embodied in an exchange of secret notes, but I must await my interview with M. Nératof to-morrow before I can get any trustworthy information on this point.

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[32716] No. 75.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.*

(No. 130.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August 18, 1911.*

THE Italian Ambassador told me to-day that he was instructed to enquire as to our consent to the 4 per cent. increase in the Turkish customs dues.

I told him that we had stipulated for terms about the Bagdad Railway to the south of Bagdad, and for a general understanding about the Persian Gulf that would be satisfactory to British interests.

The Ambassador pressed me very strongly as to whether there were not some other conditions.

I said that I remembered only one other; it was connected with the borrowing powers of Egypt.

The Ambassador said that he was quite familiar with this question.

Eventually, I found that what he had in mind was the ordering of ships by Turkey. It was thought that the visit of the Turkish Minister of Marine was connected with this, and that we had stipulated for the placing of orders in this country in return for our consent to the 4 per cent. increase.

I assured him that we had made no condition of any sort on this point. The order for a ship had been given before we sent in our conditions as to the increase of customs dues, and the two questions were not connected in any way.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[32796] No. 76.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)*

(No. 186. Secret.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *St. Petersburgh, August 19, 1911.*

RUSSO-GERMAN agreement.

Please see my telegram No. 183 of the 18th August.

I was informed to-day by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs that verbal assurances of the most categorical character had been given by the German Government that the only railways which they would construct to the north of Khanikin would be those to which the Bagdad Railway concession gave them a right.

I remarked that in that case they could only claim the Diarbekir-Kharput line. M. Nératof replied that, in addition to this line, Germany's right to construct a short line from the Diala river, as well as a line from Mosul to Arbil, had been admitted. The objections formerly raised by the military authorites to these lines had now been waived, and as Russia alone was interested she had not insisted and had given this satisfaction to German *amour-propre*.

I observed that, in my opinion, it would have been a wiser course to have insisted on assurances in writing, and I thought the Russian Government had already given enough satisfaction to German *amour-propre* by pledging themselves not to oppose the entire Bagdad Railway scheme. M. Nératof answered that even pledges in writing were not invariably kept, and that the Imperial Government could still co-operate with His Majesty's Government as regarded the Gulf section, as, although its construction could not be actively opposed by Russia, she had not engaged herself to facilitate its construction.

His Excellency added that the semi-official "Rossia" would publish to-morrow an article on the subject of the Triple *Entente* and the 4 per cent. increase in the Turkish customs simultaneously with the publication of the text of the Russo-German agreement.

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[32812] No. 77.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)*

(No. 565. Confidential.)
Sir, *Therapia, August 10, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 551, Confidential, of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to report that M. Bompard yesterday again referred to my observation that a French firm had entered into competition with Messrs. Jackson and Messrs. Pearson as regards Mesopotamian irrigation schemes, and his Excellency said that enquiries which he had made had convinced him that all that the "Société des Batignolles" had done was to ask at the Ministry of Finance for the "cahier des charges" and make some observations on it.

It may be quite true that the French Embassy has not given the French company any support, but the letter addressed by the latter to the Ministry of Public Works, copy of which is enclosed herewith, indicates very clearly that it went further than M. Bompard states.

M. Cugnin, the person named in the letter, was in the employ of the Civil List in 1906, and was engaged in works round about Hilleh, on the Euphrates. In 1907 he was taken on by the Ministry of Public Works, and was employed in drawing up plans and a scheme for the new Hindieh barrage. His plans were accepted, and the work was estimated to cost about 180,000*l.*

Tenders were asked for, and Messrs. Pearson were induced to look into the matter, and sent an engineer out.

On the engagement of Sir W. Willcocks these plans were set aside, but M. Cugnin was employed by Sir W. Willcocks, and was put in charge of the repairs to the Hindieh barrage. After the repairs had been made, a portion of the older structure of the barrage gave way, and it was said at the time that the accident was due to Sir W. Willcocks's instructions not being carried out. M. Cugnin has probably entered the service of the company with a view to getting his original scheme, which was set aside by Sir W. Willcocks, adopted by the Turkish Government.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 77.

*"Société des Batignolles" to Ottoman Minister of Public Works.*

Excellence, *Paris, le 10 juin*, 1911.

NOTRE société, qui s'intéresse à toutes sortes de grandes entreprises de travaux publics, a étudié tout récemment le dossier préparé par les soins du Gouvernement ottoman pour l'exécution du barrage d'Hindié.

Grâce aux renseignements recueillis et aux études faites sur place pendant plusieurs années par M. Cugnin, ingénieur de notre société, nous avons pu nous rendre un compte très exacte du problème qu'il s'agit de résoudre.

Grâce aux impressions apportées par M. Cugnin de son séjour en Mésopotamie, aux sondages qu'il a exécutés, notre service technique est arrivé à se convaincre que le projet officiel donne lieu à de sérieuses critiques et est exposé à de graves et coûteux mécomptes. Tel qu'il est conçu, le projet officiel consiste à exécuter à sec, sur la rive gauche du fleuve, et en amont du barrage actuel, dont la précarité et le délabrement n'est ignoré de personne, le futur barrage, puis, par des travaux de terrassements très importants, qui ne donneront lieu à des mouvements de terre considérables, à détourner le fleuve en faisant suivre à ses eaux une double sinuosité très accentuée, et à boucher par une digue, qui devra être extrêmement résistante et étanche, l'ancien lit du fleuve.

Il semble que l'auteur du projet ait voulu fermer volontairement les yeux sur la possibilité d'exécuter le barrage dans le lit même du fleuve et, par parti pris, d'éviter tout travail à l'air comprimé, ait cherché une solution compliquée, coûteuse, et ne donnant pas, pour l'avenir, une sécurité absolue.

Il n'est pas démontré, en effet, que l'exécution en terre ferme des piles et des radiers du barrage prévu ne donneront pas lieu à des infiltrations et à des épuisements considérables et qu'on ne sera pas obligé de revenir en cours d'exécution aux procédés par l'air comprimé. On se demande, si cette éventualité se présente, à quoi aura servi de détourner le fleuve, de modifier son cours et son régime, et de faire, à grands frais, les terrassements considérables qui résultent forcément du choix de l'emplacement du nouveau barrage, alors qu'il est plus simple d'exécuter de suite, par l'air comprimé, les piles et les radiers dans le lit même du fleuve, sans risquer de modifier son régime et sans avoir à déplacer cette énorme masse de terre.

L'exécution de la digue destinée à fermer l'ancien lit du fleuve donnera toujours lieu à de gros aléas, car, quelque soit le soin avec lequel on l'exécutera, il paraît bien difficile d'éviter des infiltrations, des fuites, des coupures de la digue.

La coupure qui s'est produite récemment dans le barrage actuel, où des masses considérables de maçonnerie ont été disloquées et rompues, et où les eaux se sont percé un chemin donnant lieu à des affouillements de près de 20 mètres de profondeur, justifient nos craintes d'une façon inquiétante.

Nous ne citons que pour mémoire le grave inconvénient pour la navigation d'établir les écluses, l'une sur la rive gauche au futur barrage, l'autre sur la rive droite du barrage actuel. Cette disposition obligera les bateaux à couper diagonalement le courant du fleuve à un endroit où il forme une sorte de rapide, et où la moindre erreur de manœuvre amènera les embarcations à être entraînées par le courant et brisées dans les tourbillons du barrage actuel. Enfin, le projet prévoit que le niveau d'eau en amont du nouveau barrage sera de 32·50 mètres, et en aval de celui-ci de 27·50 mètres, et en aval du barrage actuel de 26 mètres. Cela correspond à admettre que la retenue d'eau réellement produite par le barrage actuel est de 1·50 mètres. Or, l'état précaire, pour ne pas dire plus, du barrage actuel, les coupures qui s'y sont produites, les affouillements incessants que chaque crue y provoque, prouvent qu'il est impossible de compter sur le barrage actuel pour produire une retenue efficace de quelque importance; mais alors les niveaux prévus pour le seuil du nouveau barrage sont trop élevés, les vannes insuffisantes.

Dans ces conditions, il ne paraît pas possible à un constructeur sérieux d'assumer la responsabilité de l'exécution d'un semblable travail, et nous croyons par devoir adresser à votre Excellence des offres à cet sujet.

Toutefois, désireux de prouver au Gouvernement ottoman notre désir de lui être agréables et de nous intéresser aux grandes entreprises dans l'Empire, nous avons étudié pour le barrage de Hindié un autre projet, dont nous vous demandons la permission de vous exposer les grandes lignes.





Notre projet consiste (voir dessins Nos. 1 et 2*) à exécuter dans le lit même du fleuve, soit par l'air comprimé, soit par épuisement pour certaines parties du travail, les piles et les radiers intermédiaires. Ceux-ci seront établis à un niveau, tel que, si le barrage actuel venait à manquer complètement, le nouveau barrage ait les dimensions et la puissance nécessaires pour produire à lui seul la retenue demandée. Les radiers seraient établis de manière que les maçonneries soient efficacement protégés contre les érosions provoquées par la chute des eaux passant par-dessus les vannes de retenue, et à éviter les avaries et affouillements qui se sont produits dans certains barrages du Nil. Les piles seraient réunies entre elles par deux passerelles, l'une métallique, servant à manœuvrer les vannes, l'autre servant à contreventer les piles entre elles et pouvant servir de passage d'une rive à l'autre du fleuve.

Pour la navigation, afin d'éviter les dangers et les inconvénients que nous signalons, nous prévoyons sur la rive droite l'exécution d'un canal latéral au fleuve, allant depuis l'amont de la rive droite du barrage projeté jusqu'à l'aval du barrage actuel. Le canal serait muni à l'amont de portes de retenue, permettant d'effectuer le curage du canal, et à l'aval d'une double écluse pour franchir la différence de niveau entre les deux biefs.

En ce qui concerne le barrage de la branche Hillé, nous n'avons aucune observation à formuler.

Voici en quelques mots les grandes lignes de notre projet; il serait, nous en sommes convaincus, sensiblement moins coûteux que le projet officiel, et offrirait des avantages considérables au point de vue de la simplicité, de la sécurité et de commodité. Si l'adjudication du 24 juin ne donne pas de résultats, ou si le projet que nous avons exposé, et dont nous déclarons nous réserver la propriété, vous paraît de nature à intéresser le Gouvernement ottoman, nous sommes à votre disposition pour compléter nos études et chercher la combinaison financière qui en permettrait la réalisation.

Veuillez, &c.

Le Président du Conseil d'Administration,

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[32813] No. 78.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)*

(No. 506.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August 11*, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 458 of the 3rd July, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch, from His Majesty's consul at Jeddah reporting further on the operations in Assyr.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure in No. 78.

*Consul Monahan to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 30.)

Sir, *Jeddah, July 20*, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 24 of the 10th ultimo, reporting that the 32nd Nishanji Battalion, destined for Coonfudah had been disembarked here from the disabled transport "Koniah," I have the honour to report that this battalion left for Coonfudah on the 10th instant in the steam-ship "Nasori" of the Bombay and Persian Company.

On the 10th instant the Ottoman hired transport, the steam-ship "Kara Deniz," arrived here from Constantinople with troops for Hodeidah, of whom she landed here 190 recruits, and then proceeded to Hodeidah.

A telegram from the grand Shereef dated the 24th June, was received in Mecca stating that he had arrived with his forces at a place three days' journey from Abha, having killed of the Idrisee insurgents many and taken many prisoners, and having lost only 5 killed and 16 wounded, and having received the submission of many tribes in the

* Not reproduced.

Barik district. Nothing further has been heard of his movements, and the above does not inspire much confidence. He is said to have now with him thirteen battalions of regulars with at least ten light guns, and about 1,500 Bedouins.

I have, &c.
J. H. MONAHAN.

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[32822] No. 79.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)*

(No. 575.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August 15, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's acting consul at Bussorah, reporting on a proposal made by the vali of Bussorah to the agent of the British India Steam Navigation Company in regard to the Bussorah–Hasa postal service.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure in No. 79.

*Acting Consul Matthews to Mr. Marling.*

(No. 37.)
Sir, *Bussorah, July 17, 1911.*

WITH reference to Mr. Crow's despatch No. 59 of the 12th October, 1910, I have the honour to report that the agent of the British India Steam Navigation Company informs me that on the 15th instant the vali sent his dragoman to him with a request that the British India Steam Navigation Company should contract to convey the Turkish mail destined for the Hasa district (Ojair, Katif, &c.) to Bahrein. The agent states that he replied that he was unable to move in the matter without first consulting his head office.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

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[32825] No. 80.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)*

(No. 578.)
Sir, *Therapia, August 16, 1911.*

REFERRING to my despatch No. 555 of the 5th instant, concerning the presence of Persian brigands near Ezra's tomb on the Tigris, I have the honour to state that, according to subsequent telegrams from the acting British consul at Bussorah, Abdulkerim is a Turkish subject, and that his followers are mostly Arabs of doubtful nationality. His action is intended as a protest against the refusal of the authorities to farm out certain lands to him as in the past. The authorities appear to have taken prompt action, and troops were sent up the Tigris on the 5th August in a launch placed at the disposal of the Government by Messrs. Lynch. The Turkish gunboat "Marmaris" was also sent up the river on the 7th August. The "Marmaris" returned almost immediately without effecting anything, but the general result of the action taken appears to have been to check the activity of the Arabs, who had already destroyed two grain lighters and caused traffic on the river to be suspended for several days after the 3rd August. On the 9th August Mr. Matthews reported that Abdulkerim had 2,000 well-armed men and appeared to be master of the situation, but he added that plundering was not the brigands' object, that Abdulkerim was negotiating with the authorities, and that traffic had been resumed on the Tigris.

I have heard nothing further from Mr. Matthews since the 9th August. In the meantime, the Ministry of War has published a communiqué to the effect that Abdulkerim has dispersed his followers as a result of the admonitions addressed to him by the authorities, that the river is open, and that there is no further need for military





operations. The Ministry of the Interior also declares positively that order has been restored. However optimistic these statements may be, it appears to be a fact that the river has been reopened to navigation, and I propose to make no further representations unless disquieting reports from Mr. Matthews should necessitate them.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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[32838] No. 81.

*Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)*

(No. 229.)
Sir, *Berlin, August 16, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the following statement appeared in the "Vossische Zeitung" of the 14th instant, in regard to the Bagdad Railway:—

"According to recent information from Constantinople, negotiations are now in progress between England and the Porte relative to the Gulf portion of the Bagdad Railway. Although no objection can be raised to such negotiations, at the same time no settlement of the question can be reached merely by means of an Anglo-Turkish agreement. The Bagdad Railway is not an Anglo-Turkish undertaking. The matter can only be definitely settled if the British proposals, which form the basis of the negotiations, are found acceptable by the German parties interested in the Bagdad Railway. It is well known that the consent of Germany to the 4 per cent. increase of the Turkish customs has not yet been granted."

The "Vossische Zeitung" is controlled by a group of financiers with which Herr Gwinner, president of the Deutsche Bank, is connected, and it is accordingly presumed that it represents the views of the Bagdad Railway Company.

The "Kölnische Zeitung," which is frequently the channel for semi-official announcements, to-day quotes an article from the "Westminster Gazette," in which it was stated, in reply to the "Vossische Zeitung," that England did not claim to be able to settle the question of the last portion of the Bagdad Railway by negotiations with Turkey alone, and that all that England could hope was that when she had found a scheme acceptable to Turkey, such scheme would not be unacceptable to Germany. An editorial comment on this article expresses complete agreement with this view, and states that should Turkey and England come to an agreement which is acceptable to Germany there would be no reason why the latter should not associate herself with it, on condition, naturally, that German interests were safeguarded in a satisfactory manner.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

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[30988] No. 82.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 21, 1911.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, for the information of His Majesty's Secretary of State for India, copy of a despatch and its enclosure from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople* relative to the arrival in Jerusalem of an Indian gentleman, described as the secretary of the All India Sufi Conference at Delhi, in connection with the incidents which have arisen at Jerusalem owing to the excavations carried on under the Mosque of Omar by Captain Parker, a British subject, and his associates.

A full account of these incidents will be found in the Asiatic Turkey Confidential Print Sections, copies of which are supplied to your department.

Sir E. Grey considers it advisable that the Marquess of Crewe's attention should be called to Khaja Hassan Nizamy's proceedings at Jerusalem, in case his Lordship should

* No. 53.

wish to make it known in prominent Mahommedan circles in India that Captain Parker's expedition was a purely private one, that he received absolutely no assistance from His Majesty's Government in obtaining the permission of the Turkish authorities to carry out the excavations, and that His Majesty's Government have heard on good authority that the enquiry held by the Turkish Government in the matter has shown that nothing of value was removed from the Mosque of Omar or its precincts.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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[33119] No. 83.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received August 22.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India present his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Marquess of Crewe, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 14th August, relative to Abu Musa.

*India Office, August* 21, 1911.

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Enclosure in No. 83.

*The Marquess of Crewe to the Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, August* 14, 1911.

ABU MUSA. See your telegram dated the 29th July.

Intimation has been made to German Government that, while removal of balance (estimated at 300 to 400 tons) of the heap referred to in first part of telegram from resident has been agreed to by His Majesty's Government, the latter trust that German Government do not support the application which is being made to transport the 500 tons to the shore. Resident should be instructed to reply to consul that, as regards transporting the 500 tons, reference has been made to the German Government, but that balance of heap may be removed.

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[33284] No. 84.

*Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received August* 23.)

3, *Salters' Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, August* 23, 1911.

Sir,

REFERRING to our letter of the 23rd May last on the subject of the accumulation of cargo at Bussorah, I have the honour to inform you that, acting on the permission granted to us through the good offices of His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, we are again running a second barge in connection with our steamers on the Tigris. We understand that the authorities in Constantinople have imposed no time limit on the use of the second barge, and we presume that we shall be permitted to utilise the additional barge until the accumulation has been removed. Our agent in Bussorah, however, reports that the local authorities are now enquiring whether we have yet dealt with the transport of 4,000 tons. These authorities evidently have it in mind to order the withdrawal of the second barge as soon as this amount of tonnage has been removed.

In view of the large quantity of cargo now awaiting shipment to Bagdad, which, according to information just received by cable, amounts to 8,100 tons—Turkish company 4,500, Euphrates and Tigris Company 3,600 tons—in addition to 4,500 tons estimated as in transit to the Gulf by ocean steamers, it is manifest that any decrease of the river transport for some months to come will cause great loss and inconvenience to owners, more especially to British traders, who deal with 90 per cent. of the traffic. The situation is further complicated by the decrease in volume of water in the river at this time of the year, and the consequent decrease in carrying capacity of the steamers and barges. We hope, therefore, that His Majesty's Ambassador will bring





these facts to the notice of the authorities in Constantinople, and cause such definite orders to be sent to the Valis of Bagdad and Bussorah as may prevent any interference on their part with the second barge.

In order to keep abreast of the increased volume of traffic to the Gulf, we recently applied, through our representative in Constantinople, for permission to run our reserve steamer. On the 26th July we received a telegram from Constantinople to the following effect:—

"Minister of Public Works telegraphed the Vali of Bagdad approving running of reserve steamer two months provided no political objection exists."

No effect has yet been given to these instructions owing apparently to the opposition of the Vali of Bussorah. The recently appointed Vali of Bagdad, Djemal Bey, will, it is believed, shortly arrive to take up his post, and we are in hopes that he will deal with the question immediately after his arrival and permit of the running of the fourth steamer for the period mentioned. We have instructed our representative in Constantinople, although this matter has hitherto been entirely dealt with as a business proposition, to keep His Majesty's Ambassador informed, and we trust that His Majesty's Ambassador will, if any future delay should take place in giving effect to the telegram of the Minister of Public Works assist us by urging on the authorities in Constantinople the importance of dealing with the congestion at Bussorah by utilising our reserve steamer.

I have, &c.
(For Secretary),
THOS. H. ROBERTS.

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[30747] No. 85.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 23, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd instant enclosing copy of a telegram received from the Government of India proposing that certain arrangements should be entered into with the chiefs of El Katr for the prevention of the import of arms.

I am to state that Sir E. Grey concurs in the Marquess of Crewe's proposal to approve the recommendations of the Government of India in regard to this matter.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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[32483] No. 86.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 23, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 17th instant relative to the proposed visit to Kasr-as-Subaih of the political resident in the Persian Gulf.

In view of the fact that the place in question appears to lie outside the limits of the territory which His Majesty's Government consider to be covered by their guarantee to the Sheikh of Koweit, it is not clear to Sir E. Grey that they would have good grounds for protesting to the Turkish Government should it be found that a Turkish flagstaff had been erected there, and it therefore appears to him that Lieutenant-Colonel Cox's visit to the spot should be made for the sole purpose of examining the situation and reporting on it.

I am to state that, subject to this condition, Sir E. Grey concurs in the terms of the draft telegram enclosed in your letter.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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[32825] No. 87.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 234.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, August 26, 1911.*

I HAVE received your despatch No. 578 relative to the presence of Persian brigands near Ezra's tomb on the Tigris.

I approve your suggestion to make no further representations unless further disquieting reports are received from the British acting consul at Bussorah.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[33710] No. 88.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)*

(No. 580.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August 17, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 498 of the 18th July, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum reporting on the unsatisfactory termination of the military expedition undertaken by the vali of Bitlis against the Kurds of Khuyt.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 88.

*Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 57.)

Sir, *Erzeroum, August 7, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 52 of the 7th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Mr. Safrastian, acting vice-consul at Bitlis, reporting that the military expedition undertaken by the vali of Bitlis against the Kurds of Khuyt has terminated in practical failure.

That this should be the case is no matter for surprise, and it is indeed rumoured that the Mushir, Osman Pasha, during his recent visit to Mush, roundly abused the Armenian notables of that district for venturing to question the proprietary rights of Moslems, whose ancestors, said his Excellency, had acquired these regions at the price of their blood. Whether this be a true tale or not, it is a faithful expression of the spirit animating, not only the Mushir, but the entire Mahommedan population, and there is no indication that the Central Government is either able or willing to act contrary to the views of the local authorities who, in the district of Mush, appear to be Mussa Bey and the Sheikh of Khizan.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 88.

*Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor.*

(No. 21.)

Sir, *Bitlis, July 29, 1911.*

IN continuation of my preceding despatches in respect of the state of things prevailing in this vilayet, especially since the recent rebellion of Kurds in Khuyt, I have the honour to report that Ismail Hakki Bey, the vali here, who was appointed to command the troops at Khuyt, has finally returned here. Jevdet Bey, the new mutessarif of Mush, having replaced him in Khuyt.

The return of the vali from Khuyt is understood to mean that things have come to a point where the Government must either satisfy itself with what has been effected up to now, or it has still to employ force in order to capture the real murderers, who seem to have fled to the peaks of the mountains in Khuyt. The Government, apparently hard pressed in the Yemen and Albania, seems to be quite disinclined to adopt the latter course.





Reviewing the events which have occurred since June last, when in consequence of an agrarian question eight Armenians of Taghavank were killed by Kurds, I humbly venture to remark that the despatch of three infantry battalions and artillery performed scarcely sufficient to save the face of things, by arresting some seventy-five Kurdish brigands, including but two important scoundrels, such as Haji Amare and Haji Sefere, whereas the real culprits are at large still, and there is no hope of arresting them under present circumstances.

I regret to humbly state that the moral authority and prestige of the constitutional Government, at least in the eyes of the common people, had never suffered such a humiliating defeat since its proclamation, and it remains to see to what degree and in which manner it will affect the Kurdish unrest already in ferment throughout this region.

I have, &c.
A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

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[33711] No. 89.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)*

(No. 581.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August 17, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum, reporting on Djavid Bey's visit to Erzeroum.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure in No. 89.

*Consul McGregor to Mr. Marling.*

(No. 58.)

Sir, *Erzeroum, August 7, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Djavid Bey, ex-Minister of Finance, accompanied by Omer Najji Bey, another active member of the Committee of Union and Progress, arrived at Erzeroum from Trebizond on the 30th ultimo, and was received with a considerable display of enthusiasm by the vali, the civil authorities, the Union and Progress Club, and the Tashnakist Society. The municipality had organised a deputation of merchants, and the children of the Turkish schools had also been mustered; but the population in general was apathetic, and only two military officers —one of them a leading spirit in the local Union and Progress Club—took part in the reception.

Djavid Bey was the guest of the municipality during his stay, and, as he was entertained not only by the various bodies already enumerated, but also by the Army Corps and by the deputies of Erzeroum, his visit had all the appearance of being a success, and his gift of oratory stood him in good stead in the two public meetings which he addressed, the latter taking place on Friday, near the Government House, after he had attended the usual mid-day prayers in the principal mosque.

As far as I have been able to ascertain, Djavid Bey's public utterances were, as was to be foreseen, chiefly remarkable for rhetorical skill, deft manipulation of intractable facts, and successful appeals to the sympathies or prejudices of his audience. He flattered the inhabitants of Erzeroum on the leading part they had taken in the downfall of the old régime; mildly upbraided them for the scant advantage they had taken of new conditions in order to remedy the backward state of the country; and then proceeded to refute the unfounded reproach of barrenness so frequently levelled against the present administration, whose first duty had been, and still was, the reorganisation of the army and navy. He continued in this strain for two hours and a-half, punctuating his periods with frequent allusions to the "hostile neighbours whom he would not name," and finally concluded by assuring his hearers that the agrarian question would be settled next session, and that in two years there would be roads for motor-cars throughout the province.

The meeting was then addressed by Durak Bey, a member of the deputation sent to greet the Sultan at Kossovo, who publicly presented flags from Kossovo to the municipality and to the Union and Progress Club, expressing the hope that these emblems would unite the manhood of the country in the defence of their common fatherland.

As the main purpose of Djavid Bey's tour is supposed to be an inspection of the local committee organisation, in view of the approaching congress at Salonica, it is improbable that the tenor of his conversations with the local leaders will become known in the immediate future, nor is it likely that the impression produced on the public mind will crystallise into opinions for some time; but for the moment he has undoubtedly scored a success.

Among the persons interviewed by Djavid and Najji Beys was the notorious Kurdish chief Hussein Pasha, of Patnotz, who, although an outlaw in Persia less than a year ago, is now to be seen in uniform in the streets of Erzeroum. This circumstance is not unnaturally interpreted as foreshadowing a still greater intimacy between the Government and the Kurds, and its significance is heightened by the rumour that the hamidiés in Khinis are being summoned to join the colours.

Djavid Bey devoted Sunday, the 6th instant, to an excursion to Hassan Kalé, and on the following day left Erzeroum for Khinis, where it is understood he will be met by Kuli Khan and other influential Kurds.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

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[33712] No. 90.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)*

(No. 582.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August 18, 1911.*

WITH reference to Mr. Marling's despatch No. 480 of the 9th July, I have the honour to forward herewith copies of two despatches from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum in regard to the agrarian question in the province of Erzeroum.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 90.

*Consul McGregor to Mr. Marling.*

(No. 53. Confidential.)

Sir, *Erzeroum, July 7, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Armenian Gregorian Bishop of Erzeroum called on me two days ago for the purpose of expressing to me the apprehensions caused among his community by the present attitude of the Ottoman authorities throughout Kurdistan with respect to the land question.

His Eminence declared to me that, whereas the various schemes proposed for restoring the lands taken from the Armenians under the old régime had ended in talk, the Government was now deliberately continuing the Hamidian policy of ousting the Armenians from the lands they still possessed in order to settle Kurds and Circassians thereon. He assured me that this process had never ceased since the formal restoration of the constitution, and, in support of his assertion, offered to give me a list of the lands thus misappropriated. This list I shall have the honour of forwarding to you on the first opportunity. The policy of spoliation had, however, recently assumed a more active development, and was now general throughout the vilayets of Erzeroum, Sivas, Bitlis, Van, Diarbekir, and Mamuret-ul-Aziz, being pursued on the largest scale in the vilayets of Van and Bitlis, as well as in the sanjak of Bayazid. The effect produced among the Armenians generally was deplorable, and, although both the Patriarchate and the individual bishops had protested in writing, there seemed to be but small prospect of their representations achieving any favourable result. His Eminence finally informed me that he proposed to start on a tour of inspection in a few days, and that he would, on his return, communicate to me the data he hoped to collect.

Several instances of spoliation in the vilayet of Bitlis have already been brought to your notice in my despatch No. 45, Confidential, of the 27th ultimo, and I have since then been informed that at Lessonk, in the province of Erzeroum, a number of Sheikhbezenli Kurds have taken possession of land for which title-deeds are held by various Armenians who have in vain protested to the authorities of Baiburt, the only answer vouchsafed to them being that a commission would have to examine their claims on the spot, but that the travelling expenses of the members must be defrayed by the petitioners.





On my mentioning this case to the Vali of Erzeroum, his Excellency declared that the report was a "lie," and that the Kurds in question were merely nomads who had perhaps spent a few days in the vicinity of Lessonk and had probably left by that time. He, however, went on to say that nobody had a right to complain if Kurds or others settled on vacant lands, and I understand that, as a matter of fact, such is the gist of the formal instructions issued to the authorities, although none but Moslems seem hitherto to have benefited thereby.

With regard to the tenor of the bishop's statements, I must remark that, as far as this province is concerned, they appear to me exaggerated, and he was unable to vouch for any case of spoliation except that of Lessonk. On the other hand, I am aware that quite recently the vali personally intervened to insist on the restoration to their lawful owners of certain lands near Amavich in the kaza of Plümer.

At the same time I think there can be little doubt that the frequency of outrages in the vilayets of Bitlis and Van is due mainly to the causes mentioned by the bishop, the Kurds being persuaded that the Government has no intention of curbing their predatory instincts.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 90.

*Consul McGregor to Mr. Marling.*

(No. 59. Confidential.)

Sir, *Erzeroum, August 9, 1911.*

IN my despatch No. 53, Confidential, of the 7th ultimo I had the honour to inform you that in the course of his visit to me in connection with the agrarian question, the Armenian Gregorian Bishop of Erzeroum, who was then about to undertake a tour in his diocese, promised to provide me with a complete list of the Armenian lands illegally appropriated by Moslems since the beginning of the constitutional era. After a lapse of more than three weeks I have received the promised list, of which a translation is enclosed herewith; but you will perceive that, contrary to what might have been expected from his Eminence's language, it is a comparatively meagre document, stating only a few cases of spoliation of very recent date and omitting all mention of other cases which had been reported by the local Tashnakist journal as having been brought to the bishop's notice.

Assuming, however, that the six cases of spoliation vouched for by the bishop have been truthfully stated, the conclusion to be drawn is that when a Kurd desires either to regain possession of Armenian lands or to appropriate a new plot belonging to an Armenian, he is assured of complete impunity as far as the Government is concerned; whereas Moslem interlopers established on Armenian lands are provided with gendarmes in order to prevent reprisals on the part of the rightful owners (see Mr. Safrastian's despatch No. 16 of the 18th June, 1911).

However, quite apart from the bishop's statements, there is reason to assume that land-grabbing continues to occur, at least sporadically, throughout Kurdistan, and that the introduction of Moslem squatters is being furtively effected either under official auspices or with official connivance. More than one instance in the vilayet of Bitlis has already been reported by Mr. Safrastian (see my despatch No. 45, Confidential, of the 27th June), and the following notes supplied to me by a traveller well acquainted with rural conditions in Turkey, who has just spent a month in various districts between Erzeroum and Van, throw additional light on the subject:—

"At Kozlu (kaza of Khinis) the villagers complain that some of their land for which they hold title-deeds was given three or four years ago to Circassian settlers who prevent them from cultivating these lands. The villagers have made many appeals to the authorities at Khinis, but without any result.

"At Kara Choban (kaza of Khinis) the villagers complain that the attitude of the Kurds is becoming more threatening. From an independent source I learned that, in the opinion of the Mudir of Kara Choban (an Armenian), the Armenians were behaving very tactlessly as regards the agrarian question, and were inclined to provoke the Kurds.

"At Kara Kaya (kaza of Melasgerd) the villagers made the same complaint as at Kozlu. I saw three of four of the title-deeds of 1887, concerning which the authorities wrote last year that the boundaries indicated in the title-deeds were too vague to turn off the Circassian settlers of whom the Armenians complained.

"At Patnotz (kaza of Tuttak) the villagers complained that the Kurds were beginning to prevent them from cultivating some of their lands. Hussein Pasha was all-powerful, and the Mudir and his secretary were entirely under his influence.

"At Van I heard the same story as regards the agrarian question. As regards orphans left after the massacre of 1896, I learned from an absolutely trustworthy source that so far only about one-fifth had been reinstated on their lands, for which many hold title-deeds. This was especially the case in the kaza Arjish."

By way of comment on the foregoing notes, I should like to remark that the provocative attitude of the Armenians of Kara Choban towards their Moslem neighbours is by no means an isolated instance. The Armenians seem to possess in an eminent degree the art of making enemies, and competent observers are of opinion that a notable demoralisation of the national character in these regions was produced by the lavish distribution of relief after the massacres of 1896. This decadence has been still further accentuated since the restoration of the constitution, and mainly by the pernicious influence of the Tashnakists and the Armenian refugees from the Caucasus. Immorality and drunkenness prevail among the Armenians of this district to an extent which would surprise the readers of British pro-Armenian literature, and even in the principal Armenian school of Erzeroum, which is under the chairmanship of the bishop, the doctrines of socialism and "free-love" are openly taught. The outcome of this state of things is, on the one hand, a growing insolence on the part of the Armenians which is remarked on by all travellers, and is assuredly not unnoticed by the Moslems irritated as the latter already are by the efforts of the Tashnakists to acclimatise the tenets and outward manifestations of Western socialism; and on the other hand, a distaste for work. As an instance of which I may mention that the French engineers engaged in repairing the Trebizond–Erzeroum road have just imported 500 Turks from the Caucasus, the Armenian labourers having proved useless owing to their insobriety, laziness, and turbulence.

As regards the statement made by the authorities of Melasgerd concerning the vagueness of certain Armenian title-deeds, this is merely a subterfuge worthy of Hamidian traditions, seeing that practically no title-deeds in this country are drawn up with anything approaching precision, and I understand that in Melasgerd a great proportion of the land has been held for generations without any title-deeds whatever.

The Hussein Pasha mentioned as being the ruling influence at Patnotz is the Kurdish chief whose name has frequently figured in despatches from this consulate during the past eighteen months, and whom the authorities still endeavour to represent as having loyally resigned himself to acquiescence in the new reign of law and order. Hussein Pasha lives at Van, where I understand he is on the most intimate terms with the vali, and his son Ado Bey (see my despatch No. 33 of the 8th May) resides at Patnotz, where he continues to uphold the family traditions of violence and rapacity.

It will not have escaped your notice that the allegations quoted above rest entirely on Armenian testimony, and in this connection I have been fortunate enough to hear the opinion of another traveller, a foreigner of unimpeachable good faith, and intimately acquainted for many years with the district in question. This gentleman has just returned from the districts of Khinis and Bitlis, and, having visited several of the villages where complaints were made to my first informant, assures me that not only did he hear no complaints, but that he was enabled to satisfy himself that the Armenians were in the enjoyment of greater well-being than at any period during the last thirteen years. He informs me that fields are now being cultivated which their owners previously did not venture to approach, and that the Armenians themselves admitted the improvement in their condition.

The impression I have for the present formed is that, while abuses undoubtedly exist, and the hands of the authorities are far from clean, the present agitation is largely artificial, and I am the more inclined to this opinion by the fact that, whereas I understand the Constantinople newspapers to be full of highly coloured tales of oppression supplied by the Armenian clergy and the Tashnak clubs, no complaint of any sort has been brought to the notice of any of the consular-representatives here, a departure from usage which it is difficult to explain otherwise than by a reluctance to invite personal investigation into alleged grievances.

I have, &c.

P. J. C. McGREGOR.

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Enclosure 3 in No. 90.

*List of Armenian Lands recently seized by Kurds in the Province of Erzeroum.*

I.—*Village of Hachkein, in the Kaza of Terjan.*

(Translation.)

THE son of a certain Hassan Agha, Ali Haidar, and Yussuf Mustafa, with fifteen armed retainers, arrived this spring with their oxen and forcibly sowed a field belonging to the priest Antonius. They beat the priest's wife, and also thrashed an Armenian called Krikor till he was quite senseless, shouting out the while: "Long live the Chareki tribe!"

The case was duly reported to the authorities, but without result.

2. The Mehmed above mentioned also took forcible possession of a field and meadow belonging to Boghos Tamighian.

The case was duly reported to the authorities, but without any result.

3. The Kurds of Gevrenjé have seized lands belonging to the village of Hachkeni, and lying between that village and Kalajik.

The case was duly reported to the authorities, but without any result.

4. Yussuf Agha, nephew of Hassan Agha; Yussuf and Mustafa, sons of Timur Agha, the sons of Ali Usta, the notorious brigands Ali and Hussien, and Mairli Ahmet of Kilissa Kom, together with four armed retainers of the latter and twenty Kurds from the village of Maghara, came and forcibly mowed the meadows belonging to Andon Mimossian and Manuk Hamboyan.

The case was duly reported to the authorities, but without any result.

II.—*Village of Aghater, in the Kaza of Terjan.*

Yussuf, a Chareki Kurd of Khuzichan, having seized the two fields, houses, and garden (*sic*) belonging to Marinos Torossian, daughter of the late priest Arsen, she complained to the authorities, who restored the property to her. The same Yussuf has, however, again taken possession of her property.

III.—*Village of Gobal, Khinis.*

Mehmed Sadik, a Hassanauli Kurd of Karaguvej has seized the lands belonging to the Armenian inhabitants.

The case has been duly reported to the authorities, but without any result.

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[33713] No. 91.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received August* 28.)

(No. 583.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August* 18, 1911.

THE Grand Vizier spoke to me yesterday on the subject of the reply of His Majesty's Government to the proposals regarding the Bagdad Railway and the Persian Gulf questions, which reply was communicated to the Turkish Ambassador in London on the 29th July. His Highness, while stating that there were many points which would require very careful examination which he had not yet had time to give to them, said that on one or two of these he was prepared to offer some observations. He did not understand why Russia "had been dragged in" to participate in the new company which it was proposed to form. Russia did not as a rule furnish capital for railway enterprise, and he saw no necessity for her having a share in the new company. I observed that she had a commercial interest through the Persian trade, and that her being allotted a share would further mark the international character of the company. His Highness said he resented very much the fashion of linking Turkey with Germany in the Bagdad Railway, and of its being taken for granted that Turkey would follow German dictation. He declared with some vigour that Turkey was neither German, French, nor English in this question, and he hoped that one day, when this country, through the development of its resources, had become rich, all the shares would be held by Turkish subjects.

It would be easy to readjust the proportions to be allotted to the different Powers, but he did not suggest what they should be.

Turning to the question of the necessity of providing against the differential rates, his Highness said he had never been able to understand the anxiety of His Majesty's Government on that score. He had not heard that there had been any complaints, and he had called for M. Huguenin, the managing director of the line, who had declared to him that such differential rates could not be imposed. His Highness said that to show how sure he was of this he was prepared to take the opinion of the British Chamber of Commerce. Moreover, the line being an Ottoman one, and it being obviously to the interest of this country to see it carrying as many passengers and as much merchandise as possible, the Turkish controllers would be careful not to allow anything of the kind. I said that it was not what had occurred, but what might occur in the future, that appealed to His Majesty's Government.

I understand that were the British Chamber of Commerce to be appealed to in the manner his Highness suggested they would not endorse his view.

His Highness then proceeded to speak of the question of our interests in the Persian Gulf, and said he would be quite prepared that the present position should be placed upon a clearer basis. He did not anticipate any difficulty regarding Bahrein, El Katr, &c., but Koweit was in a somewhat different position. The former were as it were detached from the main possessions of the Empire, while Koweit ate right into it. Reference was made in the memorandum to certain arrangements between the Sheikh of Koweit and His Majesty's Government. These were unknown to the Ottoman Government, and he presumed they would be duly communicated to it, for it was obviously impossible for this Government to negotiate in ignorance of the contents of the arrangements. The memorandum seemed to provide for an enlargement of the dominions of the Sheikh of Koweit. This could not be viewed favourably by this Government. Presumably the arrangements made with the sheikh were arrived at with a view to obstructing the acquisition of that place by any other Power. His Highness hoped that we would be assured that Turkey would never alienate any place on the Persian Gulf to any other Power. They did not desire to see any other Power but England in those waters. What was most important for this Government (and for this provision must be made in any arrangements regarding Koweit) was that it should not become a *foyer de sédition*, or that it should continue to be, as it was now, a depôt for the distribution of arms to the rebels against the Sultan.

These were the only points in the memorandum on which his Highness touched, and as he said the Cabinet had not yet had an opportunity of examining it, I did not conceive it necessary to argue any of the points with him.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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[33716]

No. 92.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)*

(No. 586.)

Sir, *Therapia, August 21, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a translation of an article which has appeared in the "Sabah," on the subject of the negotiations with Great Britain regarding the Bagdad Railway.

The Government so far appear to have observed a wise discretion in withholding any communication from the press of the British counter-proposals, but the tone of this article, which is eminently conciliatory I think, indicates that the author must have been influenced by Government circles.

The editor is an Armenian, and is said to have some connection with a member of the Cabinet.

The annexed leading article in the "Tanin," from the pen of Hussein Djahid, has clearly been written after communication with the Grand Vizier, some of the language used being almost identical with that of the Grand Vizier, as reported in my despatch No. 583 of the 18th instant.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 92.

*Extract from the "Sabah" of August 19, 1911.*

(Traduction.)

LE "Sabah" parle aujourd'hui dans un long article de fond des pourparlers qui ont lieu actuellement entre le Cabinet de St. James et la Sublime Porte concernant la ligne Bagdad-Bassora, et, après avoir relaté que les plus grands et les plus habiles diplomates en Angleterre ont trouvé depuis un siècle l'existence d'une Turquie puissante conforme à leur intérêt, continue ainsi :—

Pour que les délibérations actuelles qui ont pour but de résoudre une des causes principales qui mettent obstacles au développement naturel des relations anglo-turques, puissent assurer le résultat voulu, il faut accomplir les trois conditions suivantes :

1. Résoudre la question du chemin de fer par une entente sincère ;

2. Résoudre la question de Koweït de sorte qu'aucun côté obscur n'existe plus en ce qui concerne la situation réciproque des deux Gouvernements dans le Golfe Persique ;

3. Facilités économiques à accorder par le Gouvernement anglais au Gouvernement ottoman, surtout son consentement à la majoration de 4 pour cent des droits de douane. Nous ne croyons pas qu'il y ait de grandes difficultés pour les conditions de la construction de la ligne du chemin de fer, car nous espérons fermement que le Cabinet de St. James prendra en considération notre situation dans cette affaire.

Sous l'ancien régime une convention avait été conclue avec les Allemands. En supposant même que les conditions nous fussent préjudiciables, il était impossible de nous sauver des clauses d'une convention qui était signée au nom du Gouvernement ottoman. La Sublime Porte, ayant apprécié qu'une entente seule entre les parties intéressées pourrait mettre fin à cette question, a tâché de faire une entente avec la société allemande pour la section de la ligne jusqu'à Bagdad : cette entente est de nature à faciliter les délibérations qui ont lieu avec l'Angleterre. Donc la première question a été résolue avec la société allemande ; actuellement on commence à délibérer avec l'Angleterre sur la deuxième et la dernière question ; mais il faut, dans les délibérations actuelles, prendre en considération un point, c'est-à-dire que nous sommes liés jusqu'à un certain point par des engagements qui avaient été pris sous l'ancien régime. L'amitié que l'Angleterre va montrer à notre égard ou plutôt pour ses intérêts, consiste à ne pas demander de nous des sacrifices en dehors de notre pouvoir. Les intérêts des deux parties demandent non pas de tomber en désespoir devant les impossibilités, mais de trouver un terrain d'entente dans la mesure du possible. Il est évident que la Sublime Porte, pour réussir à conclure l'entente, fera tout le sacrifice qui serait en harmonie avec les intérêts ottomans, mais nous espérons aussi que, de l'autre côté, le Cabinet de Londres appréciera que nous ne possédons pas complètement notre liberté d'action, mais que, au contraire, nous nous trouvons liés par certaines conditions. Cependant, l'entente qui sera faite exclusivement concernant l'intérêt économique de la ligne du chemin de fer, la manière de la formation de la société et l'administration de la ligne, ne suffit pas pour assurer le but. Il est nécessaire, au point de vue de la sûreté de l'affaire et pour la sauvegarde des intérêts ottomans, que l'administration sur le point terminus du Golfe Persique de ce chemin de fer ottoman soit entre les mains des fonctionnaires ottomans. Par conséquent, il faut que la phrase "l'état actuel de Koweït" employée dans les documents officiels anglais soit clairement expliquée. Si le but du "*statu quo* de Koweït" vise l'administration civile actuelle de Koweït et l'autorité donnée à son cheikh, l'entente pourra se faire facilement, car nous ne voyons aucune raison pouvant montrer la nécessité d'un changement complet dans l'administration de Koweït. Mais cet état de choses à Koweït n'empêche non plus d'accomplir toutes les affaires relatives au chemin de fer, ainsi qu'aux affaires de douanes, &c., par l'entremise des fonctionnaires qui seront envoyés du centre. A Koweït, qui fait partie du territoire ottoman, Moubarak-us-Sabah possède un titre et une autorité au nom de Sa Majesté le Sultan ; il n'y a pas de difficulté pour le maintien de ce titre et de cette autorité et aussi pour la continuation de certaines immunités et concessions qui ont été considérées comme traditionnelles à sa famille. Par conséquent, les affaires administratives concernant la ligne et les grandes transactions commerciales qui proviendront de cette ligne n'entrent pas dans cette catégorie. Il est nécessaire d'administrer ces affaires par l'entremise du centre et, par conséquent, de prendre les mesures nécessaires afin que les délégués de la Douane et du chemin de fer qui se trouveront à Koweït puissent faire leur devoir en pleine sûreté.

Le consentement du Cabinet de Londres à la majoration de 4 pour cent du droit de douane pendant la résolution de ces questions importantes, serait la conséquence naturelle des nouvelles relations entre les deux parties. Et si les pourparlers prennent fin jusqu'à l'ouverture de la Chambre, le Cabinet Ibrahim Hakki Pacha aura salué les représentants de la nation d'une bonne nouvelle importante.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 92.

*Extract from the "Tanin" of August 24, 1911.*

(Translation.)

THE BUSSORAH–PERSIAN GULF RAILWAY.

AMONGST the important political negotiations in which the Ottoman Government is at this moment engaged those connected with the Bussorah–Gulf line occupy a place of importance. If this question, which acts as a delicate touchstone for the friendly relations of England and Young Turkey and paves the way for suspicions and misunderstandings between the two countries, be settled justly in such a way as to please both parties, it will be possible to draw a deep breath of thankfulness and repose.

There are a number of questions between Turkey and the Great Powers of Europe which have been left in abeyance, and although these cannot at this moment be regarded as forming a difference, their doing so taken all together is undeniable. We have hitherto been in favour of the solution of such pending questions by entering at the moment into sincere and friendly conference rather than waiting until the difference becomes acute, and in the articles we have written up to now about the Bussorah–Gulf railway and Koweit we have always defended this point of view.

Indeed, we showed at the time our approval of the Imperial Government's considering proposals for reaching a settlement with England about the Bussorah–Gulf line, and pointed out the need of proceeding to deeds in the policy of fostering friendly relations with all States and not confining it to words.

The English Government has recently replied to the proposals the Sublime Porte put forward months before, and the standpoint of Great Britain as regards the Bussorah–Persian Gulf line has been explained in the answer.

Sir Edward Grey refrained from replying to a question about the nature of England's counter-proposals, and stated that it was desirable that this should be kept secret until the end of the negotiations. The Sublime Porte too naturally prefers to be silent. Hence it is not possible to determine the nature of the Anglo-Ottoman deliberations about the Bussorah–Persian Gulf line and Koweit.

To secure the best results in such important political negotiations, the first measure consists beyond a doubt in leaving the Cabinets concerned to exchange their views in peace and tranquillity. Hence we find it very natural and pardonable that neither the Sublime Porte nor the British Cabinet should be inclined to give explanations. Only it is the duty of the press at this moment when the official negotiations are actually going on to make a résumé of previous discussions and the news appearing in the press, to oppose the points of view of both parties, see whether they are irreconcilable or not, and prepare a ground of agreement in public opinion.

The demands up to now in the English papers about the Bagdad–Gulf Railway can be summed up in one main point: that the control of the line should be in English hands! That Sir Edward Grey should now repeat this claim which the papers have so often brought forward is very probable.

The word "control" has naturally offended Ottoman ears. This has arisen partially from misunderstanding the word.

For the meaning that we are accustomed to give to the word "control" which we have taken from the French and that which the English attach to it are not identical. Upon paying heed to this distinction one sees that what the English want is that the larger part of the capital for the construction of the line should be in English hands or in those of England's friends.

Previously, when this aspect of the matter was discussed in the papers, it was said that the Ottoman Government desired an important part of the capital to be in Ottoman hands, and the partition of the remainder equally between England, France, and Germany. This proposal, which was as agreeable to Ottoman interests as it was just, did not please the English papers. For as it did not suit them to see Turkey





incline towards Germany, they bethought themselves that upon the German and Ottoman shares being joined those of England and France would be in the minority.

This is a very mistaken standpoint, which a moment's just thought can correct. The Ottoman Government is not inclined to the German policy, nor is it to that of England or France. It is clear that Turkey will incline to that side where her interest lies. Accordingly it is in the hands of the English and French to prevent the German and the Turkish capitals being united. Unless the former exercise pressure, the Turkish capital is always independent and always equally well-disposed to all. Since the Ottoman policy turns on independence and the keeping of the equilibrium, to say that it is favourable to Germany, and act upon that is like considering a thing that has never happened as a manifest truth, which an intelligent politician does not do.

Whence arises England's desire to obtain the largest part of the capital of the railway? We would like to seek for the answer to this question in the commercial benefits of England in Irak and the Persian Gulf. The tariffs might be so drawn up as to hinder British imports and commerce and encourage those of Germany. This is irreconcilable with the fundamental foreign policy of Turkey. If the wish of England to obtain control of the railway is to avoid this, owing to the desires of the Sublime Porte and England being the same as regards the avoidance thereof, another remedy can be found. Or is it right to wish the last word about a line to be constructed in our country to be taken from us? It cannot be. For how can this be consented to?

If these questions are solved we hope that the Persian Gulf and Koweit harbour matters will be settled more easily. For, in spite of the claims of some English papers, the British Government has ever denied the sovereign rights of Turkey over Koweit. There having been no opposition over this fundamental point, all sorts of assurances can be given to England that the establishment of Turkish influence upon a solid basis in the Persian Gulf will not menace their Indian possessions. Turkey is is very far from pursuing a policy of aggression.—HUSSEIN DJAHID.

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[33717] No. 93.

*Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)*

(No. 587.)

*Therapia, August 23, 1911.*

Sir,

A PRELIMINARY agreement concerning the construction of railways in Anatolia and Albania appears to have been reached between the Porte and the Régie générale des Chemins de Fer at an earlier date than the embassy had hitherto had reason to suppose, for, on the 28th June last, a "déclaration" was signed by the Minister of Finance, the director of the Imperial Ottoman Bank and by MM. Dehaumy and Sallandrouze de Lamornaix, representing the above-mentioned company, which practically secured these undertakings to the French group. The "déclaration," of which a copy is enclosed, states that an understanding had been reached by the parties for the purpose of entrusting the construction of the Anatolian system (Samsoun–Sivas, Sivas–Kharput, Erzinghian–Erzeroum–Trebizond) to the Régie générale, and that the Ottoman Government has approached the Imperial Ottoman Bank for the purpose of obtaining the necessary loans to carry out the works; and it lays down in five articles the general conditions which are to govern the construction contracts for the Anatolian and the "contrats d'études" for the Albanian system.

Contracts for some, and probably for all, the railways comprised in these two systems were signed, as reported in the despatch from this embassy No. 548 of the 2nd August on the 29th ultimo, but up to the present I have only been able to obtain possession of the text of one of them, viz., that for that portion of the Danube-Adriatic Railway that lies within Turkey, i.e., the Mordaro–Prizrend–Dibre–San Giovanni di Medua line. From the copy, which I have the honour to transmit to you herewith, it will be seen that the contract is not with the Régie générale des Chemins de Fer, but with the Salonica–Constantinople Junction Railway Company, who are, I understand, to make the contract over to the Régie générale in consideration of a sum of 1,000,000 fr. The reason for this arrangement seems to be merely that the Salonica–Constantinople Junction Company were the first in the field in 1908 to apply for the concession, and that it was in their favour that the Servian Government withdrew its own application in June 1910. The whole of the negotiations for this contract were carried on by the Régie générale, without any reference whatever to the

Salonica–Constantinople Junction Company, whose directors only learnt the terms of it after it was actually signed. I may remind you that the working of this line was ceded to the Régie générale in December 1895 for twenty years (see "Young," vol. iv, p. 103).

Presuming that the contracts for all the other lines, both Albanian and Anatolian, were signed on or about the 29th July, there still remains the contract with the Imperial Ottoman Bank for the requisite financial arrangements. This cannot be definitely drawn up until the estimates for the railways have been prepared, but according to the "déclaration" the time is limited to one year from the date of this "déclaration," *i.e.*, the 28th June last.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 93.

*Declaration.*

UNE entente de principe s'est établie entre le Gouvernement ottoman et MM. S. de Lamormaix et F. Delaunay, agissant au nom et pour compte d'un groupe comprenant notamment la Régie générale des Chemins de Fer et Travaux publics, entente ayant pour objet de confier audit groupe la construction pour le compte du Gouvernement et l'exploitation aux clauses et conditions à déterminer ultérieurement, des lignes de chemins de fer suivantes: Samsoun–Sivas, Sivas–Kharput–Erzinghian–Erzeroum–Trébizonde, le tout constituant le réseau dit "A."

Dans le même but, le Gouvernement ottoman a entamé des pourparlers avec la Banque Impériale ottomane en vue d'assurer par voie d'emprunt les ressources nécessaires à la construction des lignes ci-dessus indiquées.

L'exécution des contrats de construction et d'exploitation des lignes ci-dessus mentionnées (réseau "A"), ainsi que des contrats d'études relatifs aux lignes de l'Albanie, est soumise à l'accomplissement des conditions ci-après:—

1. Le groupe précité prend l'engagement de s'employer auprès de la Banque Impériale ottomane à faire aboutir dans un délai maximum d'un an, à compter de la date de la présente déclaration, l'opération financière qui doit fournir les sommes nécessaires à la construction des lignes du réseau "A."

De son côté la Banque Impériale ottomane étudiera, de concert avec le Ministère des Finances, cette opération financière, de manière à pouvoir la faire aboutir en temps utile, si avant l'expiration du délai d'une année ci-dessus les ententes définitives sont intervenues avec le groupe précité pour la construction et exploitation des lignes du réseau "A."

2. Les contrats à intervenir entre le Gouvernement ottoman et le groupe précité pour l'exploitation du réseau "A" ne deviendront définitifs qu'après l'achèvement complet du réseau et la réception provisoire des lignes de ce réseau par le Gouvernement ottoman.

Si le groupe précité ne construit pas ce réseau dans les délais et aux conditions prévus par les conventions qui seront conclues ultérieurement, sauf, bien entendu, le fait des circonstances indépendantes de sa volonté, ledit groupe perdra ses droits à la construction des tronçons non exécutés, et le Gouvernement ottoman reprendra son entière liberté d'action en ce qui concerne l'exploitation de la totalité du réseau.

3. Dans le cas où l'opération financière indiquée plus haut n'aboutirait pas, les conventions à conclure pour le réseau "A," ainsi que les contrats d'études relatifs aux lignes de l'Albanie, seront considérés comme nuls et non avenus, et le Gouvernement ne sera tenu d'indemniser le groupe précité ni à titre de frais d'étude, ni à quelque titre que ce soit; il est cependant entendu que les études et projets dressés par le groupe précité pour les lignes de l'Albanie resteront la propriété dudit groupe.

4. Par contre, dans le cas où l'opération financière ayant abouti, le Parlement, malgré la demande et l'appui du Gouvernement ottoman, ne ratifierait pas tant ladite opération que les conventions à conclure pour la construction et l'exploitation des lignes ferrées du réseau "A," le Gouvernement devrait payer au groupe précité, conformément aux conventions intervenues, les frais des études effectuées et des projets remis au Gouvernement, ainsi qu'une indemnité à fixer d'accord, mais qui ne pourra être moindre que le montant des frais des études et projets à payer par le Gouvernement ottoman.





5. Les clauses et conditions de la construction et de l'exploitation des lignes ferrées du réseau "A" seront arrêtées dans un délai maximum d'un an à partir de la date de la présente déclaration.

Si les parties contractantes n'arrivaient pas à s'entendre sur les clauses et conditions avant l'expiration de ce délai d'un an, toutes les conventions relatives aux lignes ferrées mentionnées dans la présente déclaration, seraient considérées comme nulles et non avenues, et le Gouvernement n'aurait rien d'autre à payer que les frais des études effectuées pour les lignes de l'Albanie, les projets y relatifs devenant la propriété du Gouvernement.

*Le 28 juin*, 1911.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 93.

*Convention.*

ENTRE son Excellence Houloussi Bey, Ministre du Commerce et des Travaux publics, agissant au nom du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman, d'une part, et M. Saltandrouze de Lamormaix, agissant en conformité des pouvoirs qui lui ont été conférés par le conseil d'administration de la Compagnie du Chemin de Fer ottoman Jonction Salonique–Constantinople, appelée ci-dessous la "Compagnie ottomane," d'autre part, il a été convenu ce qui suit:—

ARTICLE 1er.

La Compagnie ottomane s'engage envers le Gouvernement ottoman, qui accepte, à faire, suivant le tracé qui sera arrêté d'accord avec le Gouvernement ottoman, les études d'un chemin de fer à voie normale de 1 m. 43 centim. d'écartement partant de la frontière turco-serbe (Col de Mordaré), passant par Prizrend et la vallée du Drin Noir pour aboutir, par la vallée du Mat, à Saint-Jean de Médua, avec embranchement sur Scutari, ainsi que du port et des installations maritimes à Saint-Jean de Médua permettant l'accès direct du chemin de fer à la mer.

Les caractéristiques de ces lignes, outre les principales ci-après définies, seront celles des lignes actuellement existantes dans l'Empire; particulièrement les courbes ne descendront pas au-dessous de 300 mètres de rayon et les déclivités n'excéderont pas 20 millim., sauf en cas de nécessité absolue, reconnue par le Ministère, où elles pourront atteindre 25 millim.

ARTICLE 2.

La Compagnie ottomane s'engage à présenter au Ministère des Travaux publics, dans le délai de seize mois, à partir de la signature des présentes, en triple expédition, dont une sur toile, l'avant-projet du tracé desdites lignes.

Le dossier y relatif devra comprendre:—

1. Une carte générale à l'échelle de $\frac{1}{100000}$, figurant le tracé proposé;
2. Un plan général à l'échelle de $\frac{1}{2000}$, représentant, sur une largeur de 300 à 500 mètres en plaine et de 200 à 250 mètres dans les gorges et terrains escarpés, le relief du terrain au moyen de courbes de niveau.
3. Un profil en long à l'échelle de $\frac{1}{2000}$ pour les longueurs et de $\frac{1}{200}$ pour les hauteurs, dont les côtes seront rapportées par rapport au niveau moyen de la mer pris pour point de comparaison; au-dessous de ce profil, on indiquera, au moyen de trois lignes disposées à cet effet, savoir:—

(*a.*) Les distances kilométriques et hectométriques du chemin de fer comptées à partir de son origine;
(*b.*) Les parties droites et les courbes avec leurs rayons;
(*c.*) Les déclivités et leur longueur;

4. Les profils en travers type de la voie;
5. Les types de la voie métallique;
6. Les plans d'ensemble des stations de 1re, 2e et 3e classe;
7. Un état complet du matériel roulant, qui sera du type généralement adopté en Turquie.

Il est bien entendu que dans le cas d'empêchements de force majeure, dûment constatés, le délai prévu pour la présentation de l'avant-projet serait prolongé d'une durée à fixer suivant les circonstances d'accord avec le Ministre des Travaux publics, mais qui, en tous cas, ne sera pas inférieure à celle de l'interruption, et à la condition toutefois que la Compagnie ottomane en avise par écrit les autorités locales et le Ministère des Travaux publics.

Le Gouvernement ottoman fera accompagner la mission d'études par 4 délégués, dont 2 officiers et 2 ingénieurs. La Compagnie ottomane versera mensuellement à la caisse du Ministère des Travaux publics, pour être répartie entre les ayants droit, une somme égale aux allocations de diverses natures dues à ces ingénieurs et officiers sans toutefois que le montant correspondant puisse dépasser £ T. 200 par mois.

Enfin, l'ingénieur chef de mission, ainsi que tout le personnel des études, devront être accompagnés par des escortes suffisantes pour permettre sans encombre le travail sur le terrain, tous les frais quelconques de ces escortes restant à la charge du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman.

ARTICLE 3.

Le Ministère des Travaux publics examinera l'avant-projet dans un délai maximum d'un mois, à partir de la date où la remise lui en aura été effectuée et l'approuvera tel quel ou après y avoir apporté les modifications nécessaires. Une expédition de cet avant-projet, dûment approuvée par le Ministère, sera retournée à la Compagnie ottomane avant l'expiration du délai susindiqué d'un mois.

ARTICLE 4.

Dans le délai d'un mois, à partir de la date de la remise par le Ministère de l'avant-projet approuvé tel quel ou après modifications, la Compagnie ottomane devra notifier audit Ministère le prix forfaitaire moyennant lequel elle s'engage à construire les lignes en question, y compris le port et les installations maritimes au point d'aboutissement sur l'Adriatique et à fournir le matériel roulant, ce prix forfaitaire comprenant également tout frais, imprévus, frais généraux et d'administration.

La Compagnie ottomane devra, en même temps, faire des propositions pour la combinaison financière permettant de se procurer les fonds nécessaires à la réalisation du chemin de fer.

ARTICLE 5.

Dans le cas où les propositions de la Compagnie ottomane seraient agréées par le Ministère des Travaux publics notification devra en être faite à ladite compagnie dans le délai maximum d'un mois, à partir de la notification prévue à l'article ci-dessus ; et il sera procédé sans délai à l'établissement de la convention concédant la construction et l'exploitation desdits chemins de fer à la Compagnie ottomane, cette concession ne devenant d'ailleurs définitive qu'après approbation par une loi de la convention y afférente.

ARTICLE 6.

Si, au contraire, les propositions de la Compagnie ottomane n'étaient pas agréées par le Ministère des Travaux publics, notification devrait en être faite dans le délai précité d'un mois à ladite compagnie, avec indication du prix forfaitaire auquel se serait arrêté ledit Ministère, et, si la Compagnie ottomane n'acceptait pas ce prix, le Gouvernement deviendrait propriétaire des études et reprendrait, dès lors, sa liberté d'action, sous les deux réserves ci-après :—

1. Le Gouvernement devrait rembourser à la Compagnie ottomane dans le délai d'un mois à partir de la notification ci-dessus le coût des études faites, fixé forfaitairement à £ T. 30 par kilomètre de chemin de fer, y compris les frais d'études du port et des installations maritimes.

2. Dans le délai d'un an, à partir de la notification ci-dessus stipulée, le Gouvernement mettra l'affaire en adjudication ; dans le cas où, toutes autres conditions afférentes au présent contrat restant d'ailleurs égales, les offres les plus avantageuses résultant de cette adjudication comporteraient un prix forfaitaire de construction supérieur au prix arrêté par le Ministère des Travaux publics, le Gouvernement devra le signifier à la





Compagnie ottomane, qui pourra alors exercer un droit de préférence dans un délai maximum d'un mois, à partir de la date de cette signification.

Si l'adjudication aboutissait à un prix égal ou inférieur à celui proposé par le Ministère, la Compagnie ottomane n'aurait aucun droit de préférence.

ARTICLE 7.

Le cas de force majeure excepté, si les études ne sont pas présentées par la Compagnie ottomane au Ministère dans le délai imparti par l'article 2 ci-dessus, le présent contrat deviendrait par le fait même caduc.

Toutefois, si après avoir exécuté une partie desdites études, il venait à surgir des circonstances extraordinaires qui ne permettraient pas de les achever, la Compagnie ottomane présenterait le dossier des études exécutées, et dans ce cas les études faites seraient payées, sur la base des conditions arrêtées ci-dessus, à la Compagnie ottomane.

ARTICLE 8.

Toute contestation ou différend provenant de l'interprétation du présent contrat sera soumis à la décision du Conseil d'État. Les deux parties s'engagent à se soumettre à cette décision.

Fait en double, à Constantinople, le 2 chaban, 1329 (16 (29) juillet, 1327 (1911) ).

HOULOUSSI.

Par procuration spéciale :
DELAUNAY.

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[33718] No. 94.

*Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)*

(No. 588.)

*Constantinople, August 22, 1911.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Hodeidah, reporting on the condition of affairs in Assyr.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure in No. 94.

*Vice-Consul Richardson to Mr. Marling.*

(No. 38.)

*Hodeidah, July 22, 1911.*

Sir,

WHILE the Yemen highlands have been fairly quiet recently and the country restored to its normal condition, the state of the province of Assyr, where insurrection is still rife, and that of the Tehema in general continues to cause anxiety locally.

The Zereneek tribesmen, who have given no particular trouble to the Turks since the expedition dispatched against them in the early part of 1909, are once more on the war-path.

Besides constantly holding up camel caravans traversing their district, they have cut the telegraph line between Beit-el-Fakih and Zebeed. Telegraphic communication between this and the outer world has thus been in a state of interruption during the past six weeks.

The authorities have no available force at present to deal with these troublesome and truculent tribesmen, who are naturally taking advantage of their preoccupations elsewhere.

The tribes in the northern part of the Yemen Tehema are in a state of foment, and are continually attacking supply convoys and small detachments of troops moving in their district.

On the 11th instant a large body of Arabs from the Abs clan, inhabiting the

country lying to the north-west of Loheia and professing allegiance to Seyyid Mahomed-el-Idrisee, with supporters from the Beni Islam and Beni Merwan tribes, arrived just outside Loheia, and about one and a half hours' march from the town, and seized the wells supplying its inhabitants with drinking water.

It is estimated that their numbers exceeded 5,000, and that their approach was facilitated by the Beni Jama tribe and several of the Wayidat clans.

The cutting off of the water supply completely immediately caused the greater part of the population to quit the port and take refuge in the islands of Camaran and Farsan respectively.

The garrison of Loheia, consisting of one battalion of regulars and a battalion and a half of redifs, did not consider itself strong enough to meet the invaders.

On the 12th instant the commander of the Hodeidah division, Colonel Hamdi Bey, who was at Camaran on inspection duty, received the news that Loheia was hard pressed by the rebels, who had cut off the water supply of that place. He immediately proceeded to the latter town, taking with him a battalion of infantry (Regiment 115, Battalion 1) that happened to be at Camaran, with two Maxims and four guns.

Quite suddenly, while Hamdi Bey was making preparations to advance against the rebels, a dispute arose between the Idrisee's followers, who were under the leadership of a certain Shereef Monsoor and Mahomed-ibn-Zaid, and the Beni Jama tribesmen over some trifling question. Fighting ensued, resulting in slight loss on both sides, but which caused the invading contingent to retire from the wells after their leader was wounded.

The Sheikh of the Beni Jama tribe that inhabits the villages outside Loheia and in vicinity to the wells, then tendered its submission to Colonel Hamdi Bey, and invited him to occupy the wells. This the latter did, with two companies of infantry and one gun.

A "karagol" or blockhouse has since been established at the wells, and a permanent garrison with one gun posted there. A Mantel (8·7 contim.) gun has also been mounted in fort at Loheia, so as to command the villages outside.

Colonel Hamdi Bey returned here on the 19th instant, and was given a great ovation on landing.

It was reported here, on the 15th instant, that the combined Turkish and Shereefian troops under Hussein Pasha, the Grand Shereef of Mecca, that had advanced from Coz, near Cunfuda, on the 18th June, had defeated the rebels investing Abha under Seyyid Mustapha, the Idrisee's lieutenant, and had relieved the besieged town on or about the 27th of last month.

The above intelligence, although published officially, is received here with some reserve, and needs confirmation.

It is even stated by the local authorities that the Shereef is now diverting his attention to Sabyeah, the stronghold of Seyyid Mahomed Idrisee, where the latter is supposed to be at present.

Other forces from Zaidyia and Geezan will move simultaneously to co-operate with the Shereef's army, with the object of completely encircling the pretender and cutting off his escape to the mountains.

Mahomed Ali Pasha is still at Geezan making preparations for a forward movement, which, however, will not take place before October. Large stocks of provisions, ammunition, stores, &c., and a quantity of condensed water are being collected.

He has some 1,500 or 2,000 newly arrived regulars at his disposal, the remnants of his defeated and demoralised force having been sent away.

It is expected that further big reinforcements will shortly arrive from Constantinople to deal with the rebellion under Seyyid Idrisee. It would appear that about a half of those that have been landed here since the beginning of the year have died from the effects of the recent campaign, as also from the ravages of cholera and other diseases in this province.

I have, &c.
G. A. RICHARDSON.

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[33721]

## No. 95.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)*

(No. 591.)

Sir,

*Constantinople, August 23, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 550 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's acting consul at Bussorah, reporting on the arrival and departure from Bussorah of the commission appointed to enquire into the disturbances in the Muntafik country, and on the arrest of Saadun Pasha.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 95.

*Acting Consul Matthews to Mr. Marling.*

(No. 39.)

Sir,

*Bussorah, July 28, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 34 and 35, I have the honour to report that three military members of a mixed civil and military commission, appointed to enquire into the disturbances in the Muntafik country, arrived here about the 13th instant from Bagdad, being joined later by three civil members. The commissioners are: Mehmed Ali Bey, public prosecutor of the Bussorah Court of Appeal; Ali Suad Bey, Mutessarif of Amara; Mehmed Hamza, Kaimakam of Kurnah; Colonel Izzet Bey; Major Ahmed Effendi; and Lieutenant Hussein Hilmi. After several meetings at the vilayet, the commission came to the conclusion that there would be little use in visiting the disturbed districts while Saadun Pasha was at large. Although Saadun was known to be in the neighbourhood of Bussorah, recourse to force to effect his arrest was out of the question, the garrison of Bussorah being reduced to 200 troops, with their pay a month in arrear. Moreover, should Saadun be publicly arrested, the news of his arrest would bring some hundreds of angry and well-armed tribesmen into the town. The commission took these points into consideration, as the circumstances of Saadun's arrest will show.

The following is a brief account of Saadun's movements since his withdrawal from Nasirieh towards the end of June. Finding himself unable to collect a sufficient force to oppose the tribes in revolt, Saadun made his way to Zubair with about 1,500 followers, with the object of creating a diversion by attacking the Dhafir tribe. On the 15th instant, the vali, apprised of his approach by complaints from Zubair, where a skirmish had taken place, invited Saadun to Bussorah for an interview. Hereupon, Saadun wrote to Seyyid Talib, the local deputy, that he intended being his guest, and arrived here on the 20th instant. He had left his followers at Aloui, a settlement in the marshes, about 7 hours north of Bussorah. On the following afternoon, in response to a request from the vali, he presented himself at the "Serai," where he was informed that the vali awaited him on board the "Marmaris." Being Seyyid Talib's guest and having hitherto enjoyed the favour of the authorities, he had no suspicion that his arrest had been ordered by the commission of enquiry. He was conducted from the "Serai" to the "Marmaris" by the major of gendarmerie and a "guard of honour" of four gendarmes. After spending two hours in a vain wait for the vali, he desired to depart, but was informed that he was the commander's guest for the present. The commander's orders were to guard Saadun carefully and prevent his communicating with the shore. On the 22nd instant he was transferred with a guard of fifteen gendarmes to Agha Jaffer's steamer, the "Mesudi," which departed forthwith for Bagdad. As Agha Jaffer's steamers ply on the Euphrates, the impression was created that Saadun was returning to Nasirieh.

On the 21st instant, orders were telegraphed to Mutessarif of Nasirieh to effect the arrest of Saadun's son, Ajaimi, who is at Maiah.

It is difficult to predict what effect Saadun Pasha's arrest will have on the Muntafik tribes. It may be confidently stated, however, that unless the commission of enquiry acts with tact and moderation and refrains from discussing the surrender of firearms and the payment of arrears of taxes, the hostility recently shown to Saadun and his adherents will be openly transferred to the authorities. It is high time that the anarchy on the lower Euphrates should cease, and a policy of conciliation seems to be the only possible method left to the authorities of restoring a measure of tranquillity.

My Russian colleague who recently made a tour in the Muntafik country, informs me that two of the four battalions formerly stationed at Amara have been sent back to Bagdad, while the remaining two, consisting of about 1,400 men, have been transferred to Karadi, a small town between Hai and Shattra. Two battalions, consisting of about 1,500 men, are stationed at Nasirieh. In addition to these troops, about 200 troops were sent up the Euphrates from Bussorah by the "Frat" and "Rosafa."

I transmit herewith an extract from a letter from Amara, dated the 20th June.

I have, &c.

W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

P.S.—I have the honour to add that the commission of enquiry departed for Nasirieh on the 22nd instant.

W. D. W. M.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 95.

*Extract from a Letter addressed to Acting Consul Matthews.*

"THE 'Rosafa' had a very hard time in getting across the pond, sticking in the mud several times, at one time for eight hours on end, and when she finally arrived in Nasirieh they were sorry to see her, for it only meant another ship tied up in idleness. The fact of the case is that the town and inhabitants together with Saadun are practically in a state of siege, being surrounded by the tribes, who only let those pass who take their fancy. Orders received from Yusuf Pasha are disregarded, for the officers will not go out and sacrifice their men in a one-sided combat. Far from being subdued, the tribes are growing bolder and more saucy. In Shattra they sent to the Government officials saying that, since they (the tribes) really gave them the work and positions they held, it would be no more than right that the officials should share their salaries with them when pay-day came. This has thus far been only a threat, but it tends to show how far the Government is from subduing them."

*Amara, June 20, 1911.*

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[33765] No. 96.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)*

(No. 237.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, August 23, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the Russo-German agreement, which was signed here on the 19th instant by the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, M. Nératof, and the German Ambassador, Count Pourtalès.

The agreement as it now stands, in its final shape, differs in two important points from the revised draft, of which I forwarded you a summary in my despatch No. 201, Secret, of the 12th of last month. By the addition of a few words to the 2nd article, Germany acquires the right to secure for herself the concession for the Tehran–Khanikin line should neither Russia nor the financial syndicate to whom Russia may delegate her authority have commenced its construction within the prescribed term; while, by the suppression of the 2nd paragraph of the 3rd article, she evades taking any engagement in writing with respect to the construction of railways in the zone situated between the Bagdad line and the Russian and Persian frontiers to the north of Khanikin. As the linking up of the Bagdad Railway with the future Russian railway system in Northern Persia is one of the main advantages which Germany hopes to derive from the agreement, it is not surprising that she should claim the reversion of the concession for the line by which this object is to be effected as a guarantee that the engagement taken by Russia on the subject will not remain a dead letter. On the other hand, the formal recognition of this claim by Russia may, as the "Novoe Vremya" points out, provide direct railway access for German goods to the Persian capital before the construction of the railway from the Russian frontier to Tehran has rendered a similar service to Russian trade. This is after all but a remote danger which Russia should not find it difficult to avert, and her recognition of Germany's right to this reversion is but the logical outcome of her consent to the linking up of the two railway systems.





The omission of the clause in the 3rd article of the Russian draft, embodying the engagements which Germany was to take with regard to the construction of railways running towards the Russian and Persian frontiers, is a much more important matter. In the conversations which I had with M. Sazonow last winter his Excellency repeatedly assured me that this was a point on which he would not yield, though it might be necessary to replace the clause in question by an exchange of secret notes. When therefore M. Nératof told me in strict confidence that Germany had given a categorical verbal assurance that she would not build any railways in the zone in question except such as she was entitled to build under the Bagdad Railway Concession, I reminded his Excellency of the language which M. Sazonow had formerly held to me, and expressed my surprise at his being contented with such a verbal assurance as well as at his admitting Germany's right to construct short lines from the Diala towards the Persian frontier, and from Mosul to Arbil in addition to the line from some point on the main line to Diarbekr and Kharput.

His Excellency replied that the two lines to which I had referred were unimportant branch lines of no strategic value, and that the Russian military authorities had waived the objections which had been originally raised to them. After the communication which they had made to the Porte in consequence of the publication of the draft agreement by the "Evening Times," the German Government had declared that it was impossible for them to give any engagement in writing with respect to the railways referred to in the 3rd Article. The insertion in the agreement of a special article respecting these railways was now altogether out of the question, while the secret was sure to leak out should recourse be had to an exchange of notes. The Russian Government had therefore, accepted their verbal assurance. M. Nératof added that in doing this they had given a moral satisfaction to Germany's *amour-propre*; that the construction of these railways was a matter which really only interested Russia; and that the fact that an engagement had been consigned to writing was nowadays no guarantee that that engagement would be kept.

I remarked that his Excellency seemed to me to underestimate the importance of the two branch lines to which I had drawn his attention, and that in any case I thought the Imperial Government had done more than sufficient to gratify Germany's *amour-propre* by withdrawing their opposition to the whole Bagdad Railway scheme. M. Sazonow, I said, had always told me that whatever might be the interpretation given to the term "Bagdad Railway," Russia would continue to co-operate with us just as much after as before the signature of the agreement, and I should like to know whether his Excellency thought that it would still be possible for Russia to support us should difficulties arise with regard to the construction of the Gulf section. M. Nératof replied that Russia was under no obligation to facilitate the construction of the railway, and that though she could not now have recourse to methods of direct obstruction, she could still co-operate with us in many ways and give us her indirect support. Though his Excellency's language was not very clear on this point, I gather that Russia would still be able to support any scheme which we might put forward with regard to the construction of the Gulf section, even though it did not meet with Germany's approval.

The agreement, taken as a whole, must undoubtedly be regarded as a diplomatic success for Germany, and a retrospect of the various phases of the negotiations, which have extended over the past nine months, does not tend to enhance the reputation of those who have conducted them on Russia's behalf. The initial mistake was committed when M. Sazonow allowed himself to be entrapped, during his conversations with M. Kiderlen, into giving verbal assurances of which he did not at the time realise the full significance. This was due to his want of experience as a negotiator and to his not weighing his words, rather than to the deliberate intention of throwing over the other two members of the Triple *Entente*. Thus, without any previous consultation with them, he had pledged Russia to withdraw her opposition to the Bagdad Railway scheme, and though he subsequently endeavoured to restrict this engagement to the Konieh–Bagdad line, it was clear from the outset that Germany would hold him to the strict letter of his bond. His disregard of the understanding on which the three Governments had hitherto acted that no individual member of the Triple *Entente* was to conclude an arrangement with Germany till the other two had obtained satisfaction for their respective claims, the vacillation and deplorable weakness which he displayed in the discussion over the Khanikin–Tehran line, and the uneasiness created by the vague assurances which he had exchanged at Potsdam to the effect that neither Russia nor Germany would join any combination that could in any way be directed against the other, all combined to produce the impression that a serious blow had been struck at the stability of the Triple *Entente*. Fortunately these fears proved

to be unfounded; for, despite his occasional back-slidings, M. Sazonow was at heart a firm advocate of the maintenance of that understanding. M. Nératof, who took up the threads of the negotiations when M. Sazonow was incapacitated by illness, is equally sound on this point, though he has been obliged to follow in M. Sazonow's footsteps and to make further graceful concessions to Germany. He assures me, however, that there is absolutely nothing kept back that does not appear in the published text of the agreement, beyond the verbal assurances given by Germany respecting railway construction to the north of Khanikin, and that since the German Chancellor made his statement in the Reichstag last winter nothing more has been said about the combinations into which Germany and Russia should refrain from entering.

The signature of the Russo-German agreement at this juncture has come somewhat as a surprise, as it was generally expected that the negotiations would have dragged on for weeks, if not for months. The reason for this acceleration is probably to be found in the present critical state of international politics. To have signed an agreement with Russia at a moment when she is engaged in a very delicate conversation with France is no doubt regarded by Germany as a valuable asset; while M. Kiderlen may congratulate himself on having scored a success which will strengthen his position with his countrymen, should he eventually decide to content himself with a moderate portion of the compensation which he originally demanded from France. Russia, on the other hand, is watching with keen interest the development of the situation in Persia, and, as it is impossible to foresee at present what may be the outcome of the crisis through which that country is passing, she is no doubt well pleased to have concluded an arrangement under which Germany leaves her a free hand in northern Persia.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

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Enclosure in No. 96.

*Russo-German Agreement.*

LES Gouvernements russe et allemand, partant du principe de l'égalité de traitement pour le commerce de toutes les nations en Perse; considérant, d'une part, que la Russie possède dans ce pays des intérêts spéciaux et que, d'autre part, l'Allemagne n'y poursuit que des buts commerciaux; se sont mis d'accord sur les points suivants:—

ARTICLE 1er.

Le Gouvernement Impérial d'Allemagne déclare qu'il n'a pas l'intention de rechercher pour lui-même ou d'appuyer en faveur de ressortissants allemands ou de sujets étrangers—au nord d'une ligne partant de Kasri-Chirin, passant par Ispahan, Yezd et Khakhk et aboutissant à la frontière afghane à la latitude de Ghazik—de concessions de chemins de fer, de routes, de navigation et de télégraphes.

ARTICLE 2.

De son côté, le Gouvernement russe, ayant en vue d'obtenir du Gouvernement persan une concession pour la création d'un réseau de voies ferrées dans le nord de la Perse, s'engage à demander, entre autres, une concession pour la construction d'une voie qui doit partir de Téhéran et aboutir à Khanékine pour raccorder sur la frontière turco-persane ledit réseau à la ligne Sadidjé–Khanékine, dès que cet embranchement du chemin de fer Kouiah–Bagdad aura été achevé. Une fois cette concession obtenue, les travaux de construction de ladite ligne devront être commencés dans deux ans au plus tard après l'achèvement de l'embranchement Sadidjé–Khanékine et terminés dans le courant de quatre années. Le Gouvernement russe se réserve de fixer en son temps le tracé définitif de la ligne en question tout en tenant compte des desiderata du Gouvernement allemand à ce sujet. Les deux Gouvernements faciliteront le trafic international sur la ligne Khanékine–Téhéran, ainsi que sur celle de Khanékine à Bagdad, en évitant toutes mesures qui pourraient l'entraver, telles que l'établissement de droits de transit ou l'application d'un traitement différentiel. Si, au bout de deux années à partir du moment où l'embranchement Sadidjé–Khanékine du chemin de fer





Koniah–Bagdad aura été achevé, il n'est pas procédé à la construction de la ligne Khanékine–Téhéran, le Gouvernement russe avisera le Gouvernement allemand qu'il renonce à la concession se rapportant à cette dernière ligne. Le Gouvernement allemand sera libre dans ce cas de rechercher, de son côté, cette concession.

ARTICLE 3.

Reconnaissant l'importance générale qu'aurait pour le commerce international la réalisation du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad, le Gouvernement russe s'engage à ne pas prendre de mesures visant à en entraver la construction ou à empêcher la participation de capitaux étrangers à cette entreprise, à condition, bien entendu, que cela n'entraîne pour la Russie aucun sacrifice de nature pécuniaire ou économique.

ARTICLE 4.

Le Gouvernement russe pourra confier l'exécution du projet de la ligne de chemin de fer reliant son réseau en Perse à la ligne Sadidjé–Khanékine à un groupe financier étranger à son choix, au lieu de la faire construire lui-même.

ARTICLE 5.

Indépendamment de la manière dont la construction de la ligne en question sera effectuée, le Gouvernement russe se réserve le droit à toute participation aux travaux qu'il pourrait désirer, ainsi que celui d'entrer en possession dudit chemin de fer, au prix des frais réels encourus par le constructeur. Les hautes parties contractantes s'engagent, en outre, à se faire participer mutuellement à tous les privilèges de tarifs ou d'autre nature que l'une d'elles pourrait obtenir à l'égard de cette ligne.

Dans tous les cas les autres stipulations du présent arrangement resteront en vigueur.

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[33766] No. 97.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)*

(No. 238.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, August 23, 1911.*

IN a conversation which I had with the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs just after the signature of the Russo-German agreement, his Excellency informed me that the publication of the text of the agreement in the semi-official "Rossia" would be accompanied by an article on Russia's position with regard to the 4 per cent. customs increase and the Triple *Entente*.

The article duly appeared in the issue of the 20th August. It is mostly devoted to a recapitulation of the terms of the agreement, and the only points that call for attention are passages in which is given what may presumably be taken to be the official Russian interpretation of certain of its provisions.

With regard to the preamble, for instance, it is stated that the term "special interests" must evidently be understood to mean "the interests of a political, strategical, and economic character" which Russia possesses in Persia in virtue of her geographical position. It will be remembered that in the original draft the words used were "special political interests," and that the word "political" was omitted from the text as eventually adopted for signature.

The period allowed for the completion of the Tehran–Khanikin line is somewhat vaguely stated in article 1 of the agreement, which might be interpreted as allowing either four or six years for the completion of the line. The "Rossia" article shows clearly that the Russian interpretation is that two years are allowed for obtaining the concession and a further four years for the actual work of construction.

With regard to article 3 the semi-official article states that the reserve as to pecuniary and economic sacrifices which Russia couples with her promise not to impede the Bagdad Railway scheme refers clearly to the proposed 4 per cent. customs increase.

In a somewhat cryptic paragraph the article then refers to the wider scope of the Potsdam conversations, in which the interests of the two Powers in the Near East, as well as in Persia, were discussed. The present agreement, it says, does not give

expression to all the conclusions arrived at by the two statesmen at Potsdam, but, nevertheless, the friendly relations established at Potsdam remain in full force, and give Russia, as well as others, an undoubted right to reckon on an entirely friendly policy on the part of Germany in questions of railways and other matters affecting the political, economic, and strategic interests of Russia.

The article then asserts that the agreement in no way changes the grouping of the European Powers, and concludes with the words: "The Franco-Russian alliance and the Franco-Anglo-Russian understanding remain, as formerly, the firm basis of the policy of the Russian Government."

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

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[33767] No. 98.

*Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)*

(No. 239.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, August 23, 1911.*

THE publication of the Russo-German agreement with regard to Persia has, in general, been received coldly by the St. Petersburgh press, and M. Nératof appears to to be somewhat disappointed by the absolute lack of any display of enthusiasm.

The "Novoe Vremya" breathes a sigh of relief on at last being delivered from the long strain of uncertainty, but otherwise has little of good or ill to say of the agreement. It points out, however, that Germany's declaration of political "désintéressement" is merely a repetition of her assurances with regard to Morocco, and wonders whether it will prove any more binding.

The article compliments Russian diplomacy on its action in including in the zone, in which Germany undertakes not to seek concessions, the small strip of neutral territory along the Afghan frontier. It thinks this will tend to prevent complications, since, theoretically at least, it will exclude German adventurers from that region. It has also a good word to say for Russia's reserve as to her pecuniary and economic interests with regard to the Bagdad Railway, which will enable her to withhold her consent to any increase of the Turkish customs dues destined for the purposes of the railway.

It criticises sharply the arrangement with regard to the Tehran–Khanikin line, and says that the only chance left for Russia is to build the trans-Persian line to India as speedily as possible. Otherwise Russian traders in North Persia may as well shut up shop and return home, for their places will be taken by Germans.

The "Rech," which is always violently against the Government, takes the view that "Russian trade in Persia has been sacrificed." It cites Algeciras and Morocco as standing warnings, and concludes with the taunt that the date of the publication of the agreement was chosen in order to humiliate Russia in the eyes of her ally France, and to give Germany a breathing space in the ridiculous position in which she found herself in the Morocco negotiations.

The "Bourse Gazette" remarks sarcastically that in the agreement "obligations are distributed evenly—at least, numerically speaking." Russia has lost everything that she once possessed in Persia, but this is due rather to the lethargy and greed of Russian traders than to any fault of Germany, who has only acted in accordance with modern notions and left out of consideration everything but her own material interests. The paper does not think that Germany will follow her Moroccan tactics in the case of the Russo-German agreement, as the maintenance of good relations with Russia is a political dogma of the German Emperor.

The "Sviet," the organ of the Nationalists and the Right, says that the balance of the agreement is much in favour of Germany, but nevertheless welcomes it as putting an end to the long period of suspense and in the hope that it may induce Russia to wake up and build her own railway into Persia and so save it from the Germans.

The "Zemschina," the organ of the Extreme Right, takes an unexpectedly anti-German view. It points out that, with any considerable development of German trade in Persia, Germany, whatever she may say now, is bound to have political interests in that country. The dangerous part of the agreement is that in which a limit is set for the construction of the Tehran–Khanikin line. The article urges the immediate construction of railways in Persia, but warns its readers against being carried away by fantastic schemes, such as the line to India. What is required is a cheap type of line to carry goods at slow speed.

[33644] No. 98*.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.*

(No. 307.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, August* 28, 1911.

ACQUAINT Porte with contents of Sir G. Barclay's telegrams Nos. 353 and 358 of the 25th August respecting action of Turkish consul at Bushire with regard to registration at Lingah, and remonstrate strongly against his proceedings. Out of courtesy to Turkish Government we consented to latter representing their interests, and insulting attitude of Turkish consul to him is an offence against His Majesty's Government, and we trust action of consul will be disapproved forthwith by Porte, and that he will be instructed to offer an apology to His Majesty's vice-consul.

Reason for these wholesale registrations as Turkish subjects of persons who are really Persian subjects is unintelligible to us.







Articles still continue to appear in many of the papers, but the above brief summaries of the published views of the chief papers of widely different political complexion are, I think, sufficient to show that the agreement has not been hailed with enthusiasm in any quarter.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[33958] No. 99.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.*

(No. 236.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 28, 1911.

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that Ismail Hakki Bey Babanzade, deputy for Bagdad and ex-Minister for Public Instruction, called at this Office on the 21st instant, and, in my absence, was received by Mr. Mallet.

He expressed his regret at the change of feeling noticeable in England towards Turkey, which he was at a loss to explain, and he said that the Turkish Government were animated by the friendliest sentiments towards this country, and that they intended to lean more towards us in the future than they had done hitherto.

Mr. Mallet explained that His Majesty's Government were sincere in their appreciation of the good work which the constitutional Government in Turkey had accomplished, and in their desire for the continuance of the new régime; they had, however, experienced some disappointment at the want of confidence in them shown by the Turkish Government, at the attitude adopted by the latter towards British subjects and British enterprise at Bagdad, at the failure of the Turkish Government to accord to British enterprise a fair share in the development of the country, and latterly at the reports of the cruelties perpetrated against the Mellisor tribes in Albania. His own articles in the "Tanin" had caused much surprise here, as they showed a complete misapprehension in regard to British aims and ambitions in Mesopotamia.

Ismail Hakki Bey disclaimed any unfriendly intention, and said that his object had been to call attention to Persian Gulf questions. Mr. Mallet said that these questions were now under discussion with the Porte and he could not go into them with him, but that his Majesty's Government were very anxious to arrive at an understanding with Turkey. They had no territorial ambitions, but they meant to maintain the position which they had held in the Gulf for so many years.

Ismail Hakki Bey then proceeded to talk at some length about Albania, and he denied the stories of cruelties alleged to have been committed there by the Turkish troops, but Mr. Mallet observed that these reports were too well founded and had reached His Majesty's Government from too many separate and independent sources to make it possible to doubt their accuracy.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[32601] No. 100.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 28, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant, relative to the inclusion of certain areas in the survey which is shortly to be made in the Persian Gulf.

As regards the waters of the Khor Abdullah and the Khor Assabish, which adjoin the islands of Warba and Bubian and the approaches to the Island of Bahrein, Sir E. Grey concurs in the opinion of the Marquess of Crewe that the survey should be proceeded with immediately.

As regards the territorial waters of the El Katif coast, on the other hand, in view of the fact that His Majesty's Government have recognised the claims of Turkey as far south as Ojeir, he considers that no survey should take place, and that operations should be kept within the limits indicated in the note to the Sublime Porte (see

"Eastern Department; Secret Series" Print, the 29th July, Section 1), and should not encroach on regions where Turkish sovereignty is admitted in that communication.

Sir E. Grey would therefore suggest that the terms of the draft telegram enclosed in your letter should be modified in this sense.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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[34069] No. 101.

*Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received August 29.)*

*3, Salters' Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, August 28, 1911.*

Sir,

REFERRING to my letter of the 23rd instant on the subject of the accumulation of cargo at Bussorah, I have the honour to forward you a copy of a letter dated the 23rd instant from our representative in Constantinople, from which it would appear that the vali denies any necessity for the running of the reserve steamer. There is no justification whatever for this statement of the vali. The extra barge does not enable us to keep abreast of the increasing traffic; the cargo pours into Bussorah as rapidly as it is dispatched, and the accumulation shows no sign of diminishing.

Our representative in Constantinople has been informed of the unaltered position as regards the traffic, and we trust that His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople may see his way to assist us by bringing the matter to the notice of the central authorities with a view to their exerting such pressure on the Vali of Bussorah as may induce him to give effect to the telegram sent to him by the Minister of Public Works on the 26th July last for the running of our reserve steamer for a period of two months.

We regret the necessity for diplomatic actions, but it is evident, after months of negotiations between ourselves and the authorities, that without pressure our own efforts will result in failure.

I have, &c.
(For Secretary),
GEORGE CLARKE.

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Enclosure in No. 101.

*Mr. Whitfall to Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.*

*Constantinople, August 23, 1911.*

Dear Sirs,

Djemal Bey having arrived at Bagdad, I this morning paid a visit to Houloussi Bey and asked him whether he thought any progress could be made now with regard to the fourth steamer.

He told me that the telegram sent to the Ministry by the vali denied any necessity for the running of the fourth steamer, especially now that permission had been given you to tow the extra barge. The vali objected to a permission being granted to you to run a fourth steamer on the river, in view of the fact that you had no right to have more than three steamers running.

Houloussi Bey told me that he would bring up the matter to-day if possible before the Council of Ministers and see whether something could not be done; but in the face of the categorical statement of the vali that there was no necessity for the running of the reserve steamer, it would be difficult for him to give a valid reason for the permit being granted.

Yours very truly,
F. E. WHITFALL.

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[34169] No. 102.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)*

(No. 191.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, August 29, 1911.*

PROCEEDINGS of Turkish consul at Lingah.

I have acted as instructed in your telegram No. 307 of the 28th August. Hakki Pasha informs me he has heard nothing of the affair, but assures me he will have enquiries made without delay.

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[31875] No. 103.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 237.)
Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 29, 1911.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatches Nos. 548 and 551 of the 2nd instant relative to schemes of railway construction by French capital in Asia Minor in relation to Anglo-French financial co-operation in Turkey, and I approve the language used by you to your French colleague, as reported in the latter of these two despatches.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[32217] No. 104.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 230.)
Sir,

*Foreign Office, August 29, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 160 of the 10th June, 1910, relative to the actions brought against various British fire insurance companies in connection with the Adana riots, I have to inform your Excellency that Mr. Bentley, a representative of the Western Assurance Company, called at this Office on the 14th instant and had an interview with Mr. Hurst.

Mr. Bentley stated that the litigation against his company on the meaning of the word "émeute" had gone against them, as it had gone against the French company, but whereas in the case of the French company the dragoman of the French Embassy refused to sign the judgment of the court, so that the decision remained a dead letter, the British dragoman, on the other hand, had signed the judgment, with the result that the court's decision on that question would become enforceable against the British companies.

The Western Assurance Company were perplexed and annoyed at the action of the British dragoman, in view of the past correspondence and of the refusal of the French dragoman to sign the judgment in the corresponding action against the French company. Mr. Bentley further stated that the actual decision on the action had been postponed for a month because the defence that the Adana incident was an "émeute," and so outside the contract, was dealt with as a preliminary point, although it was in reality the substantial defence.

Mr. Hurst told Mr. Bentley that it was desirable that his company should write to this Office calling attention to what had happened and asking the reasons for the action of the British dragoman. In the meantime he would suggest that a report should be called for from Constantinople.

I accordingly have to request your Excellency to furnish me with a report on the present position of the case and on the action taken by His Majesty's dragomanate in the matter, which are presumably those given in your despatch No. 345 of the 25th May, 1910.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[30748] No. 105.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 30, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd instant relative to the proposed establishment of a wireless telegraph station at Zora (instead of at Debai) and the gradual development of the district as a centre of unobtrusive British influence.

I am to observe in this connection that His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire, in his letter of the 30th April to the Government of India, copy of which was enclosed in your letter of the 6th June, notes (paragraph 11) that the sheikhs of the trucial coast are opposed to any extension of British control, and I am to express a doubt whether such an extension, necessarily carrying with it increased responsibility for the behaviour of these chiefs and more intimate connection with their internal politics, would prove of ultimate advantage to His Majesty's Government.

I am accordingly to suggest that the attention of the Government of India should be drawn to this consideration, but at the same time to state that Sir E. Grey sees no obstacles to the particular step now contemplated, *i.e.*, the establishment of a wireless telegraph station at Zora, and that he therefore concurs in that portion of the draft telegram enclosed in your letter which refers to that question.

As regards the last sentence of that telegram, regarding the preparation of an Order in Council for the trucial coast, I am to suggest that instructions to Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to proceed with this work should be suspended, at any rate till the reply of this department to your letters of the 23rd May, the 15th June, and the 24th ultimo, making certain proposals regarding Orders in Council applicable to the Persian Gulf, has been received and considered, since, if these proposals are mutually adopted, a separate order for the trucial coast will be unnecessary.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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[31875] No. 106.

*Foreign Office to Mr. D'Arcy.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, August* 30, 1911.

WITH reference to the letter from this Office of the 13th January last relative to your interests in Eastern Anatolia and Mesopotamia, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to inform you that he has received a despatch from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, from which it appears that the so-called "Chester scheme" of railway construction may be considered definitively to have failed.

Sir G. Lowther accordingly suggests that it might be worth your while to renew your application to the Turkish Government for a concession to work the deposits of mineral oil in those regions.

Sir G. Lowther adds that your agent is at present absent from Constantinople.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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[33284] No. 107.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 241.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 1, 1911.

WITH reference to Mr. Marling's despatch No. 528 of the 25th July respecting Messrs. Lynch's fourth steamer, I transmit herewith to your Excellency copy of a letter received from the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company relative to the permission for their steamers to tow a second barge,* and to the reluctance of the Vali of Bussorah to carrying out the telegraphic instructions said to have been sent by the Turkish Minister of Public Works to the Vali of Bagdad according the company permission to use their reserve steamer.

* No. 84.





I request that your Excellency will remind the Turkish Government of the *aide-mémoire* which Mr. Marling communicated to Rifaat Pasha on the 25th ultimo on the subject of the continuation of the permission granted to Messrs. Lynch to tow a second barge, and that you will press for a favourable reply.

As regards the question of the reserve steamer, in view of the considerations advanced in the fifth paragraph of Mr. Marling's above-mentioned despatch, I would suggest that your Excellency should consult Mr. Whittall and enquire whether it is true that the Minister of Public Works sent the telegraphic instructions to the Vali of Bagdad mentioned in the company's letter, and, if so, whether he (Mr. Whittall) considers it advisable that you should urge the Porte to see that these orders are obeyed or take any action at all in the matter at the present stage.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[34321] No. 108.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 310.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, September* 1, 1911.

SMYRNA–AIDIN Railway.

Please see Sir Edwin Pears respecting new development of Saudi Bey's claim and do what you can to assist.

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[33284] No. 109.

*Foreign Office to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 2, 1911.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 23rd ultimo relative to the temporary permission accorded to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company by the Turkish Government to tow a second barge to clear off the accumulation of merchandise, and to the reluctance of the Vali of Bussorah to carry out the instructions of the Turkish Ministry of Public Works with respect to the permission granted to the company to run their reserve steamer.

I am to inform you, in reply, that a copy of your letter has been forwarded to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, who has been instructed to remind the Sublime Porte of the steps already taken by His Majesty's Embassy to obtain from the Turkish Government a renewal of the permit granted in the month of May last for your company's steamers to tow a second barge on account of the fresh accumulation of cargo at Bussorah, and to press for a favourable reply.

As regards the question of the reserve steamer, it has been suggested to Sir G. Lowther that he should enquire of Mr. Whittall whether it is true that the Minister of Public Works sent the telegraphic instructions to the Vali of Bagdad mentioned in your letter, and whether he (Mr. Whittall) considers it advisable that his Excellency should take any action in the matter at this stage.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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[34671] No. 110.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 504.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August* 24, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum, reporting on the alleged intention of the inhabitants of two Armenian villages to embrace Islam.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 110.

*Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 63.)

Sir, *Erzeroum, August* 16, 1911.

PUBLIC attention having been aroused by a report to the effect that the Armenian inhabitants of two villages in this province are about to embrace Mahommedanism, I have the honour to report the facts of the case as far as I have been able to ascertain them.

The inhabitants of the Armenian village of Kessanta, near Baiburt, have addressed petitions to the authorities at Baiburt and Erzeroum, requesting that arrangements may be made for their reception into Islam, the chief reason given being that, as the authorities have taken no notice of their repeated protests against the abduction of their women by the Moslem adjacent villagers, they see no other means of protecting their family honour and assuring their women free access to their fields. The two village priests having dissented from this proposed apostasy, have been warned that they will have either to change their minds or leave the village.

In the second case, that of Abul Hindi, four hours from Erzeroum, the Armenian inhabitants have announced their intention to the Bishop only, and have sent him the keys of the Church. They state that their existence has become intolerable, owing to the violence and licence of their Moslem fellow villagers, who, being always armed, can plunder their goods and carry off their women with impunity.

I have reason to believe that the complaints brought against the Moslems of Abul Hindi and the neighbourhood are but too well founded; but it is uncertain whether the threatened renunciation of Christianity is not meant merely as a means of drawing attention to a grievance.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

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[34672] No. 111.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 597.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August* 24, 1911.

THE "Frankfurter Zeitung" recently published an article on the subject of the concessions granted to the French in the matter of railways in this country, and while observing that Germany had no objection to the construction of the lines by the French, the writer stated that if the additional 4 per cent. to the customs duties were to serve as a guarantee, they would have good grounds for objecting, as Germany, out of consideration for Turkey, had given up any claim on the 4 per cent. for the Bagdad Railway.

The "Tanin," commenting on this article, says that nothing has been decided with regard to other matters, and that therefore the discussion of it is out of place, but adds, whatever the rights of Turkey may be, as Germany, out of friendship for Turkey, had abandoned all claim to this 4 per cent., it would be impolitic to admit such a claim on behalf of France, seeing that Germany had come to the rescue of Turkey in a moment of financial difficulty.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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[34673] No. 112.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 598.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August* 25, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Damascus, reporting on latest developments in connection with the colonisation of certain districts in Syria and Palestine by Hebrews.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure in No. 112.

*Consul Devey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 41. Confidential.)

Sir, *Damascus, August* 12, 1911.

IT may be of interest to offer some remarks on the idea, fathered on the Jewish Palestine Society, of colonising these districts with Hebrews. It has lately been alleged that the society was proposing through an agent (Mr. Nejib Asfar) of Beirut, to purchase the "Arazi" Miriyye—Crown lands, in a mass, wherever situated throughout this vilayet and Palestine. In consequence, some four or five months ago anti-semitic ideas were vigorously disseminated by the local press, and were beginning even, I believe, to cause some actual discomfort (almost incipient persecution) in respect of the small and weak European Jew colonies round about Lake Tiberias. But this ephemeral matter giving place to other themes, would seem to have dropped into oblivion.

Now, however, the subject is revived in the following way:—

The society are said to be proposing to promote the idea by obtaining the silence or perhaps even adhesion of the local press, which they would obtain by offering Damascus editors shares in the enterprise which is to be founded.

A certain Dr. Haidar, of Baalbek, has lately been here to make such proposals, and it is believed with some success. Hakki Bey, a newspaper correspondent (said to be Arab), who has influence over the Constantinople press is also said to favour the proposal. But the attention of Deputy Shukri Effendi el Assali (see my despatch No. 6, Confidential, of the 25th January) has been drawn to the matter, I hear, and very likely he will stir in the matter to thwart it.

I have, &c.
G. P. DEVEY.

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[34674] No. 113.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 599.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August* 26, 1911.

WITH reference to Mr. Marling's despatch No. 519 of the 22nd July and to my despatch No. 547 of the 31st July last, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Jerusalem, for such action as may seem desirable, in regard to the approaching trial of the men connected with the recent incident at the mosque of Omar.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 113.

*Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 58.)

Sir, *Beirout, August* 16, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 52 of the 13th July on the case of the alleged theft of ancient relics at Jerusalem, I have the honour to report that, in accordance with instructions received from the Ministry of Justice, the trial of the men detained in prison here will take place shortly without waiting for Mr. Parker, who has shown no signs of putting in an appearance.

I also beg leave to inform your Excellency that last week I received a visit from Khaja Hasan Nizamy, secretary of the All-India Sufi Conference, who told me that he had been delegated by the conference to proceed to Jerusalem to investigate the matter of the alleged theft of ancient moslem relics, and that he was convinced that no theft of any kind had taken place.

He expressed himself as having had for object to remove any bad impression that may have been created in the minds of Moslems in India against the British Government owing to the supposition that a British subject had tampered with certain ancient Moslem relics supposed to be interred in the vicinity of the Omar mosque.

He expressed himself as devoutly gratified at being able to assure the Moslem world that no such sacrilege has been committed.

I have been in constant communication with the lawyer retained to defend the prisoners, and I supported him, in a private manner, in his unsuccessful application for their release on bail, my personal interest in the case being explained to the procureur général as due to the fact that M. Agob Magasdar had acted in the capacity of dragoman of a British subject, who himself would have had the right to my official assistance had he been here.

In conclusion I enclose copy of a letter addressed to me by M. Magasdar, in which he reproaches Mr. Parker for abandoning him to his fate and claims payment of arrears of salary and reimbursement of the expenses of his trial, &c. As I am not aware of that gentleman's intentions with regard to this case I trust your Excellency may see fit to forward a copy of this letter to His Majesty's Secretary of State for transmission to Mr. Parker, who has made no communication to this consulate-general on the subject of the trial and whose address is unknown to me.

I have, &c.
H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 113.

*M. Macasdar to Consul-General Cumberbatch.*

M. le Consul général, *Prison centrale, Beyrouth, le 9 août*, 1911.

J'AI l'honneur de vous confirmer ma dernière lettre, laquelle reste sans aucune réponse.

Vous ne devez pas ignorer que je suis arrêté depuis plus de quatre mois en ma qualité de secrétaire-interprète de l'honorable M. le Captain Montagu B. Parker et de son syndicat à Londres et cela d'après un contrat en règle.

Depuis plus de quatre mois j'ai écrit à plusieurs reprises à l'honorable Mr. Parker lui exposant ma triste situation, vu qu'il est responsable pour ma personne matériellement et moralement; cependant, à mon plus profond regret, je me trouve sans aucune réponse. Etant donné que je me suis sacrifié pour lui, j'ignore le motif de son silence, qui m'étonne énormément.

Veuillez prendre aussi note que je me trouve dans un pays étranger sans connaitre personne.

Si l'honorable Mr. Parker ne veut pas s'occuper de moi, il n'a qu'à me le dire, alors je me confierais au bon Dieu et j'implorerais sa grâce.

En attendant, je désire le paiement immédiat de mes appointements arriérés depuis le mois de mai jusqu'au fin août 1911, soit 4,000 fr., soit 1,000 fr. par mois; sur la somme totale il m'a expédié seulement 400 fr., et cela comme acompte dans le courant du mois de juin 1911.

Je réclame aussi mes frais du procès et de l'avocat, soit 3,000 fr.

Je n'oublie pas, M. le Consul général, de vous ajouter que ma situation actuelle est devenue honteuse et intenable et je ne puis plus supporter cette existence pitoyable, je me trouve bien sérieusement malade et je suis au dernier désespoir, et l'honorable Mr. Montagu B. Parker est seul responsable de tout ce qui peut m'arriver, car depuis plus de trois ans que je me trouve sous ses ordres j'ai rendu des services irréprochables à lui et à son syndicat. Me voilà aujourd'hui: je suis victime de mon devoir, et l'honorable Mr. Montagu B. Parker brille par son silence. Je lui ai expédié aussi le télégramme ci-après:—

"Je suis toujours en prison; regrette silence; êtes responsable pour moi matériellement, moralement; situation devenue honteuse, intenable; câblez appointements arriérés et frais."

J'implore, M. le Consul général, au nom de l'humanité et de la justice, de me prendre sous votre haute protection et de me rendre la justice, car il m'est impossible de continuer cette situation intolérable.

J'ai, &c.
A. MACASDAR.

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[34678] No. 114.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 603.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August 28, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's acting consul at Jeddah, reporting on recent events in Assyr.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure in No. 114.

*Acting Consul Abdur Rahman to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 32.)
Sir, *Jeddah, August 13, 1911.*

WITH reference to Mr. Monahan's despatch No. 30, dated the 20th July last, regarding affairs in Assyr, I have the honour to report that according to a letter received by a respectable merchant here from the Grand Shereef himself, dated Abha 24th Rajab (21st July), the Grand Shereef leaving Goze on 8th Rajab (5th July), reached Abha on 18th of the same month, and on his way to Abha he had three encounters with rebels, in all three of which the rebels were severely defeated, and there were no serious casualties among his own followers excepting one killed and about ten slightly wounded.

Previous to the receipt of the letter referred to above, it was rumoured here that the Grand Shereef after his arrival in Abha, was besieged by the rebels who had submitted to him on the way, which was evidently not true.

Further, according to a telegram dated the 12th August, 1911, to the same merchant from Ali Bey, the son of the Grand Shereef, who is acting for him in the Hejaz, it appears that the Grand Shereef left Abha on the 29th Rajab (26th July), and is on his way to Taif, where he is expected on Thursday or Friday next (the 17th or 18th August, 1911).

I have, &c.
S. ABDUR RAHMAN.

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[34679] No. 115.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 604.)
Sir, *Constantinople, August 29, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from Colonel Hawker, giving a report on the general state of the Imperial Ottoman gendarmerie.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure in No. 115.

*Colonel Hawker to Sir G. Lowther.*

Sir, *Smyrna, August 21, 1911.*

AS some time has elapsed since any general report on the affairs of the gendarmerie has been forwarded by me, I have the honour to submit the following communication for your Excellency's information:—

*Schools.*

As the schools for the training of the gendarmes are naturally the basis of all progress, remarks concerning them naturally occupy the most prominent position in the report.

At the present moment there are four schools in this "secteur":—

1. The gendarmes school at Smyrna, where there are generally 400 to 500 men under training.

2. The "chefs de poste" school at Smyrna, where about 100 men are under training.
3. A school for 100 gendarmes at Tripoli, Barberie.
4. A school for "chefs de poste" at Tripoli.

In addition to these a school for "chefs de poste" will shortly be opened at Konia, as authority and financial approval for it has been obtained from head-quarters.

The period during which recruits remain at the gendarme school has been lengthened to five months, as arranged formerly.

The order from the commandant-general to send men to the regiments after three months' training did actually meet an urgent necessity for the men, but the period was much too short to properly train men in their various duties.

The education of the men generally who join the gendarmerie is fairly good. A considerable number know two languages, and there are comparatively few who cannot read and write.

A few men join who have been really well educated at a Jewish or French school, and these talk French fluently.

*Recruiting.*

Although the pay of the gendarmes is so small, there appears to be always a sufficient number of men to make up numbers at the school when the men of a trained company leave the school for a regiment.

In the Tripoli vilayet, where the population is Arab, the regulations concerning recruiting were altered at my suggestion, and all the new men have been locally enlisted.

A few Turkish men and instructors were, however, sent from Smyrna to form a nucleus for the schools there.

The local Arabs are very good material, and quickly learn the simple duties required of them, but as all the text-books are in Turkish and the drill is also done in that language it takes the Arabs longer to learn the regulations and instructions, which can easily be mastered by men who can read and write.

The work, however, which has to be performed by the gendarmerie in Africa is of a more military nature than in the other provinces of this "secteur," so the newly trained men are practically as efficient as men who may have passed a better examination in the various text-books that are used at the schools.

*Officers.*

There is at the present moment a lamentable want of officers, and the source of supply, which is a school at Constantinople for 100 officers for the whole gendarmerie, is not at all adequate.

To quote one case alone in support of this statement. At the present moment the Aidin regiment of gendarmerie has fifty vacancies for officers.

A few months ago it was possible to get officers transferred from the army to the gendarmerie, but there are so many calls on the number of officers who are at present in the army, that none are now allowed to join the gendarmerie.

A certain number of sergeants are in course of being selected to be promoted lieutenants, but their training will take some months, and though, if this arrangement turns out satisfactorily, it may provide a small number of officers to fill vacancies, still the very large numbers required will still not be available.

The situation is a difficult one, and the only solution I can think of is for the army authorities to fill up the vacancies by transferring a sufficient number of reserve officers to the gendarmerie.

Some hundreds of officers could easily be spared from the army, and their loss to the army would be easily balanced by the gain to the gendarmerie, and consequently to the country generally.

*Inspection.*

The system which has lately come into force in accordance with which foreign officers are constantly travelling about accompanied by a Turkish officer has now been in force for some months and has produced good results.

It enables important questions to be settled which months of correspondence would never bring to a satisfactory conclusion, and it promotes a uniformity of system, and a certain amount of emulation among the various units. A great deal of very valuable information is also collected by the inspecting officers.





In the archipelago I have arranged with the naval authorities for gendarmerie officers to be taken on ships making tours to islands where gendarmes are, and this enables the officers to make more frequent inspections, and in conjunction with the navy they are able to carry out their duties in connection with the guarding of the coasts against smugglers and brigands.

Owing to the scarcity of officers the proper inspection of the karakols could not be carried out, but I have now arranged for the men to occasionally be collected at their company head-quarters where they are inspected by their officers and put through some instruction.

This prevents them from forgetting all the instruction they had received at the school, and as the men have to walk in some distance from their posts it provides for an extensive patrolling of the country on certain days.

*Telephones.*

In several of the more important centres where gendarmes are stationed telephones have been put up, and the karakols are connected with the head-quarters of their unit.

The cost of putting up the plant is defrayed by public subscription.

Before long several karakols at Smyrna will be put in communication by telephone, and subsequently the outlying districts like Bournabat, Boudja, and Cordelio will all be in telephonic communication with the gendarmerie offices in the town.

*Building.*

Although extensive schemes are prepared for the construction of new karakols all over the country, no financial provision for this has been authorised.

Two karakols have, however, lately been constructed in the neighbourhood of Smyrna by private subscription.

*Dress.*

The system by which the men who only get about 2*l.* a-month and have to supply their uniforms does not work at all well.

It was, I understand, copied from the system in force in Italy.

The ultimate result is that the men are always in debt to the Government, and that they can seldom be well turned out.

One improvement in the men's equipment that is shortly coming into force is the wearing of putties and lace boots instead of long boots.

These latter were most unsuitable for men who had to do long distances on foot.

Some small alterations have been made in the officers' dress, such as replacing the silver lace on the kalpaks by gold lace and altering the shape of the kalpaks.

The whole of the cloth for the summer clothing of the gendarmerie of this "secteur" was made locally at Manissa.

The cloth is satisfactory, but the dyeing has not been very successful, as the colour begins to fade away a few weeks after.

*Reorganisation Schemes.*

During the past year detailed schemes have been drawn up by the reorganising officers showing the number of officers and men required and the places they should be posted at, but owing to lack of officers and also newly trained men, some years must elapse before these schemes can be put into force.

Gradually old gendarmes are being replaced by the new men, and in the large towns very few of the old men are to be seen.

Though when they first begin their duties the new men are fairly efficient, still without proper supervision owing to the shortage of officers they are apt to deteriorate very quickly for want of supervision.

*Brigandage*

Additional steps are being taken to put down brigandage in the neighbourhood of Odemish by sending there some specially selected gendarme officers and more newly trained men.

In my opinion the only way in which brigandage will be put a stop to, is to build up a properly organised civil Government supported by police and gendarmes in the various districts.

At the present moment the villagers in the various districts know that they will be severely dealt with by the brigands if they give any information of the Government.

The commander of the Aidin regiment informed me that he was lately making a tour of inspection and on arrival at some villages the inhabitants made for the hills, so unaccustomed were they to seeing Government troops or officials concerned with the maintenance of public security.

As soon as they understood who the gendarmes were, they asked for some to be stationed in their villages.

In a district where every one is much more afraid of the brigands than of the Government the brigands can easily evade a few gendarmes or soldiers, especially as the country is very mountainous, and can be compared to Switzerland as far as its physical features are concerned.

During the last few days I have been to Odemish, the centre of the district where the brigands are, and was much impressed by the difficult nature of the country, which is all in favour of the brigands.

Before long a company of new gendarmes will be formed for carrying on a regular system of strong patrols independent of other work in that district.

Patrols of fifteen to twenty men will be constantly moving about the country keeping up communication between the various karakols, and this may eventually inspire so much confidence that perhaps some individuals may be induced to give the information that is so much required.

There is no doubt that, owing to the misrule and bad government which before the declaration of the constitution had been in force for years and years, little faith is even now put in promises made by the Government officials; and so, till the Government employ some entirely independent official to be more or less responsible for the suppression of the brigandage, there is little hope of the particular band headed by Tchakirdjali being suppressed.

I have discussed the question with all kinds of officials and officers, and all agree that till the inhabitants of the country can be persuaded to give information about the brigands there is very little chance of the band in question being captured.

I have, &c.

C. J. HAWKER,
*Imperial Ottoman Gendarmerie.*

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[34681] No. 116.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 606.)

Sir, *Constantinople, August 30, 1911.*

IN accordance with the instruction contained in the last paragraph of your despatch No. 231 of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a copy of a note addressed by His Majesty's Embassy to the Sublime Porte on the 4th December, 1910, relative to the application of the ancient treaties in the holy cities of the Hedjaz.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure in No. 116.

*Noté Verbale communicated to Sublime Porte.*

HIS Britannic Majesty's Embassy has recently had occasion, in its "takrir" No. 45 of the 26th October, 1326, to complain of the action of the Mecca authorities in trying and condemning four British subjects on a charge of assault brought by certain other persons of the same nationality. In this case the local authorities appear to have acted under the impression that the privileges enjoyed by British subjects in virtue of the ancient treaties do not extend to such subjects when resident in the holy cities. The Sublime Porte will readily admit that no such exception is made in the text of the treaties themselves or by any subsequent agreement. As regards the practice, the embassy has never failed to protest, when its attention has been called to attempts on the part of the local authorities to deprive such British subjects of the protection of the consular authorities, and the Sublime Porte has on more than one occasion admitted that British subjects in the holy cities are entitled to the protection of His Majesty's



consulate at Jeddah. Thus, in its note No. 149 of the 4th December, 1884, the embassy having occasion to complain of the detention of two Moslem ladies in Mecca, cited in support of its attitude the case of the British Indian, Abdulaziz, who had been tried by the Mecca court during the previous year, in the presence of a dragoman of His Majesty's consulate at Jeddah; and the Sublime Porte, in its reply, raised no question as to the right of His Majesty's consulate to protect the parties concerned in either case. A fresh case arose in 1888, when the Mecca authorities imprisoned a British Indian subject named Abdulkadir Joumpouri; and on this occasion the Sublime Porte, acting on representations made by the embassy, first instructed the Vali of the Hedjaz to send the man to Jeddah to be tried according to the usual forms, and eventually ordered him to be released. Again, in 1896, the embassy, in its notes Nos. 32 and 53 of the 26th March and the 23rd May, protested against the arrest in Mecca of a British Indian named Abdulhakk.

In view of these precedents, His Majesty's Embassy is compelled to maintain the view that the ancient treaties operate in the holy cities in the same way as in other parts of the Empire, and that the proper course in such cases is to invite a Moslem representative of His Majesty's consulate at Jeddah to attend the trial of any British subject who may be amenable to the jurisdiction of the Mecca courts, and to hand over to the consulate any British subject whose case may be within the jurisdiction of the consular authorities. At the same time, the embassy realises the existence of special circumstances which make it difficult to apply this procedure strictly in all cases. It would therefore be disposed to recommend to His Majesty's Government some arrangement whereby penal cases of minor importance should be tried in the holy cities without consular assistance, subject to a right of appeal to a court in Jeddah, at which the consular delegate would be present; it being understood that the local authorities should notify the consulate of all British cases heard in this way at Mecca or Medina, and that an appeal to Jeddah should suspend execution of sentences.

*Pera, December 4, 1910.*

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[34685] No. 117.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 4.)*

(No. 610.)

Sir, *Therapia, August 30, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith a copy of the proposals made by Creusot for all the ports set down in the Government programme.

No doubt the French will consider they have a preferential right to the contracts for the building of these ports.

Creusot's representative is M. Cugnin, who also represents the Société des Batignolles. He is at present in Constantinople.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure in No. 117.

*Proposed Agreement.*

*Étude et Construction de Ports maritimes dans l'Empire ottoman.*

ENTRE son Excellence Haladjian Effendi, Ministre du Commerce et des Travaux publics, agissant au nom du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman, d'une part; et MM. Hersent, Jean et Georges, et Schneider et Cie., ingénieurs-constructeurs, demeurant, respectivement, 60, Rue de Londres, et 43, Rue d'Angou, à Paris, d'autre part; il a été convenu et arrêté ce qui suit:—

Article 1er. MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie. se chargent des études et, ultérieurement, de la construction des ports maritimes de l'Empire ottoman qui sont ci-après

désignés, et dont l'importance respective se trouve approximativement chiffrée ci-dessous.

| | Fr. |
|---|---|
| Premièrement— | |
| Trébizonde .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 5,000,000 |
| Samsoun .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 20,000,000 |
| Inéboli et Amasra .. .. .. .. .. .. | 2,000,000 |
| Héraclée .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 5,000,000 |
| Bartin .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 2,000,000 |
| Deuxièmement— | |
| Midia .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 1,000,000 |
| Troisièmement— | |
| Deux ports le long de la côte Adriatique conjointement à l'établissement des chemins de fer à établir dans cette partie de l'Empire .. | 20,000,000 |
| Quatrièmement— | |
| Mersine .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 18,000,000 |
| Alexandrette et Tripoli de Syrie .. .. .. .. | 10,000,000 |
| Jaffa .. .. .. .. .. .. .. | 15,000,000 |

La nomenclature ci-dessus pourra être complétée par l'adjonction d'autres ports de l'Empire ottoman dont la désignation sera fixée ultérieurement d'un commun accord.

Art. 2. Il sera fait remise à MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie. de toutes les études déjà faites par le Ministère des Travaux publics. Pour les forages des ports de Samsoun et de Mersine, qui sont en cours d'exécution, MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie. prendront à leur charge le traitement du chef sondeur et la location du matériel proprement dit, en non encore payé.

Art. 3. Les projets des ports d'Alexandrette, de Tripoli, de Syrie et de Jaffa, dont les forages sont terminés, devront être présentés au Ministère des Travaux publics dans un délai maximum de quatre mois à dater de la signature du présent contrat.

Les projets des ports de Samsoun et de Mersine devront être fournis dans un délai de neuf mois.

Pour les autres ports dont la construction immédiate serait décidée les projets devront être fournis dans un délai de douze mois.

Art. 4. Les projets à fournir devront être présentés en quatre exemplaires, dont un sur toile.

Ils comprendront :

[Voir modèle du contrat d'études. Nomenclature à insérer à l'article 3.]

Tous les dessins, projets, rapports susmentionnés devront être pliés aux dimensions de 21 centim. de largeur sur 31 centim. de longueur, porter un numéro d'ordre, la date de leur présentation et la signature de MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie.; chacun de ces documents sera revêtu d'un timbre fixe de 3 piastres.

MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie. fourniront, en outre, à titre de renseignement, une étude d'ensemble économique et financière sur le régime des ports dans les divers pays.

Art. 5. Dans un délai d'un mois à partir de la signature du présent contrat, MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie. devront déposer dans une banque agréée par l'État ottoman un cautionnement de £T. 1,000.

Dans le cas où le dépôt serait effectué en titres, la banque devra prendre l'engagement de parfaire la différence en cas de baisse des cours.

Si la banque est étrangère, elle devra déclarer en outre, par un acte spécial en due forme légalisé par son ambassade, la compétence des tribunaux ottomans en cas de contestations portant sur le cautionnement.

Art. 6. Pour l'étude, la présentation et l'approbation des projets techniques, ainsi que des devis estimatifs des différents ports dont la construction se trouve dès à présent décidée, ou se trouverait ultérieurement décidée par le Gouvernement, il sera procédé de la manière suivante :—

Les études seront entièrement faites aux frais de MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie. et elles devront être poursuivies de manière à rechercher dans chaque cas particulier les meilleurs moyens de satisfaire aux nécessités locales, tout en restant dans le cadre des prévisions générales des dépenses déjà admises pour chaque port.

Les projets, une fois établis, seront soumis à l'examen d'une commission technique, composée de cinq membres désignés par le Ministère des Travaux publics et devant laquelle MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie. seront entendus. Cette commission aura pour mission d'approuver les différents projets, ou, si elle ne les approuve pas, d'indiquer les modifications qu'il lui paraîtrait utile d'apporter auxdits projets, tant au point de





vue de la disposition des ouvrages qu'en ce qui concerne leur estimation et les conditions et délais d'exécution.

La décision de la commission devra être prise dans un délai qui ne devra pas dépasser deux mois à partir de la présentation des projets et la notification devra être transmise aussitôt à MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie.

Les conclusions qui seront proposées par cette commission, et qui seront acceptées par MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie., deviendront *ipso facto* définitives. Celles de ces conclusions, notamment pour la fixation de certains prix qui donneraient lieu à désaccord, seront soumises à un arbitrage.

A cet effet, s'il y a lieu, le Gouvernement ottoman désignera deux arbitres. MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie., de leur côté, en nommant deux autres, les quatre arbitres, préalablement à toute opération, établiront d'un commun accord une liste de quatre noms sur laquelle sera, soit choisi par eux, soit, s'il n'y a pas d'accord, tiré au sort, le nom du cinquième arbitre qui sera éventuellement appelé à les départager en cas de désaccord.

Tous les arbitres seront choisis parmi des personnalités techniques déjà au courant du genre d'affaires qu'elles auront à examiner.

D'une manière générale, les prix de base pour l'estimation des travaux devront être établis dans les mêmes conditions que les autres entreprises de travaux publics exécutés dans le pays et être comparables aux prix normalement pratiqués pour des ouvrages analogues dans la région, en tenant compte, pour chaque cas particulier, des conditions locales et des charges que peuvent entraîner les circonstances spéciales.

Afin de faciliter et de rendre plus rapide l'examen des projets, le Ministère des Travaux publics désignera, dès la signature du contrat, un des membres de la commission prévue ci-dessus, ou un inspecteur de son Ministère, pour suivre officiellement les études des différents projets auprès de MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie.

Art 7. L'importance des travaux envisagés dès le début pourra s'élever à la somme de 100,000,000 de francs, qui comprendront, outre les dépenses afférentes aux travaux proprement dits, une majoration de 10 pour cent sur le montant de ces dépenses pour imprévus, ainsi que les frais divers pour intérêts intercalaires pendant la durée de construction des ouvrages et éventuellement, les commissions banquières. Cette somme sera fournie par MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie. au fur et à mesure des besoins pour être répartie entre les différents ports à construire suivant les proportions indiquées à l'article 1er.

Il ne pourra être décidé de nouveaux travaux devant entraîner le dépassement de la somme ci-dessus fixée que d'un commun accord entre MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie. et le Gouvernement ottoman, et à la condition que les garanties spéciales affectées à la construction des ports déjà construits ou à construire présentent un excédent suffisant pour faire face à la garantie des nouvelles dépenses à engager.

Art. 8. Le Gouvernement ottoman sera débiteur envers MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie. du montant total des dépenses de construction des ports ainsi que des autres avances que MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie. lui auront faites avec les intérêts intercalaires de ces sommes à raison de 5 pour cent par an jusqu'à complet remboursement.

Le montant total de ces sommes (capitaux et intérêts) sera payé intégralement à MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie. en soixante annuités, calculées au taux du 5 pour cent d'intérêt annuel, plus l'amortissement.

Le paiement de ces annuités sera garanti :

1. Par tous les produits de l'exploitation des ports construits en vertu du présent contrat et dont le service d'exploitation sera assuré par MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie. sur la base du régime des autres ports ottomans déjà concédés et cela à partir de l'approbation des projets y relatifs ;

2. Par l'excédent des recettes de douanes dans chacun des ports désignés, à l'article 1er, sur la moyenne des recettes opérées pendant les trois années antérieures à la présente année, 1911.

Lorsqu'il s'agira des ports nouveaux pour lesquels il n'y a pas eu, par conséquent, de recettes douanières antérieures, on considérera comme excédents la totalité des droits de douane qui seront perçus dans les ports dès l'établissement d'un service de douanes.

Ces excédents de recettes devront être versés toutes les semaines à un compte spécial à l'ordre de MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie. dans une banque désignée par eux.

Il est entendu à ce sujet que les excédents des recettes de douanes dus au relèvement des tarifs actuels ne seront pas compris dans la susdite affectation.

Les affectations des douanes pour tous les ports dont la construction sera confiée à MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie., feront une seule masse, et en cas de reprise d'un ou de plusieurs ports par remboursement anticipé les affectations relatives aux douanes de ce ou de ces ports continueront à s'appliquer à l'ensemble des autres ports concédés.

3. En cas d'insuffisance des garanties spéciales telles qu'elles sont définies ci-dessus, le Gouvernement ottoman s'engage à parfaire la différence au moyen des ressources générales de son budget.

Art. 9. L'exploitation des ports construits par MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie. leur sera confiée jusqu'à complet remboursement des sommes qui y auraient été dépensées.

Cette exploitation se fera sur la base des tarifs des ports ottomans déjà concédés. Les dépenses d'exploitation sont dès à présent admises à forfait, à raison de 50 pour cent ou moitié, du montant des taxes perçues. Les 50 pour cent restant des recettes encaissées par application des taxes, ou la seconde moitié des recettes brutes ainsi opérées, constituera le produit net de l'exploitation.

MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie. sont dès maintenant autorisés pour assurer le jeu de la garantie stipulée par l'article 8, à prélever tout d'abord, sur le produit net de l'exploitation, le montant des annuités, avec amortissement et intérêts, telles qu'elles sont définies par l'article 8, le surplus disponible, après ce prélèvement serait réparti dans la proportion de—

Un tiers pour le Gouvernement, et
Deux tiers pour MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie.

Art. 10. A tout moment le Gouvernement de l'Empire ottoman pourra reprendre l'exploitation d'un ou de plusieurs ports concédés par un remboursement anticipé des annuités correspondantes restant à payer, augmenté de 20 pour cent du montant de ces annuités; mais les produits nets de l'exploitation de ces ports continueront, si c'est nécessaire, à faire masse, dans les mêmes conditions que les excédents des recettes des douanes, pour servir de garantie, pour les annuités restant à payer à MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie., et pour toutes sommes qui leur seraient dues à quelque titre que ce soit.

Art. 11. En représentation des annuités concédées par le Gouvernement ottoman, MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie. aurait la faculté d'émettre des obligations du type 5 pour cent prises ferme par eux au taux de 90 pour cent pour leur tenir compte des frais généraux d'études, de commissions de banque, frais d'émission et droits de timbre.

Sur ces titres seront reportés les articles du contrat avec le Gouvernement ottoman relatant les garanties qui leur sont spécialement affectées.

Ils seront signés pour contrôle, par un représentant du Gouvernement ottoman.

Art. 12. MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie. auront la faculté de substituer à eux-mêmes, pour l'exécution des présentes, une société anonyme dont la dénomination est dès à présent la suivante: "Société des Ports ottomans," ou bien, "Société des Ports de l'Empire ottoman," dont le capital-actions sera de x millions de francs.

Art. 13. Toutes les dispositions de l'arrêté ministériel du 7 (20) octobre, 1326 (1910), sur les permis d'études, dont un exemplaire dûment contresigné par les deux parties est ci-annexé, sont applicables aux soussignés en tant qu'il n'y ait pas dérogé par les présentes.

Art. 14. En cas de contestations sur l'interprétation des présentes, les différends qui surgiraient seraient jugés par un tribunal arbitral.

Ce tribunal sera composé par cinq membres, dont deux choisis par le Ministre des Travaux publics et deux par MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie.; le cinquième arbitre sera désigné à la majorité des voix par les quatre premiers ou, en cas de désaccord, par le Président du Tribunal fédéral suisse.

Tout litige entre le Gouvernement et MM. Hersent et Schneider et Cie. qui ne serait pas résolu dans un délai de six mois pourra *ipso facto* être soumis au tribunal arbitral.

La constitution de ce tribunal ne devra jamais demander plus de deux mois, et la sentence devra être rendue par les arbitres dans un délai maximum de quatre mois, à moins de cas de force majeure dûment justifié.

Toute sentence sera sans recours et immédiatement applicable.

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[34999] No. 118.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 5.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 28th August, relative to the proposed visit of Colonel Cox to Kasr-es-Subaih.

*India Office, September 4, 1911.*

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Enclosure in No. 118.

*The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, August 28, 1911.*

PLEASE refer to your telegram dated the 12th August, 1911.

I approve proposal that resident, Persian Gulf, should visit Kasr-es-Subaih, while taking care that *status quo* is not disturbed.

Examination and submission of report on situation will thus constitute sole object of visit. Turkish flagstaff could not presumably be objected to by His Majesty's Government, since place appears to lie outside limits of Koweit (see your telegram dated the 25th March). Instructions to this effect should be sent to resident.

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[34069] No. 119.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 244.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 5, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 241 of the 1st instant, I transmit to your Excellency herewith copy of a letter from the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, requesting your intervention with the Turkish Government with a view to obtaining permission for them to use their reserve steamer in navigating the Tigris.*

If your Excellency thinks it advisable in the interests of the company, you should approach the Turkish Government on this subject and press them to grant the permission desired.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[33765] No. 120.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.*

(No. 240.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 5, 1911.*

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 237 of the 24th ultimo, forwarding, with observations, the text of the Russo-German Agreement respecting Asiatic Turkey and Persia.

I approve the language held by your Excellency to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs in the course of the conversation which you had with him on the subject.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[34069] No. 121.

*Foreign Office to Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, September 5, 1911.*

I AM directed by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 28th ultimo, respecting the running of your reserve

* No. 81

steamer on the River Tigris, and to inform you that His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople will be instructed to approach the Turkish Government and press them to grant the permission you desire, if he considers such a step advisable in the interests of your company.

I have, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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[35169] No. 122.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 6.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Marquess of Crewe, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosures in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 17th August, relative to—

1. Demolitions at Bagdad.
2. Policing of southern trade routes in Persia.

*India Office, September 5, 1911.*

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Enclosure 1 in No. 122.

*Consul-General Lorimer to Government of India.*

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Bagdad, July 17, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of my despatch dated the 17th July, 1911, which I have addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

2. The last reference to this subject is my letter dated the 4th February, 1911.

I have, &c.
J. G. LORIMER, *I.C.S., Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

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Enclosure 2 in No. 122.

*Consul-General Lorimer to Sir G. Louther.*

(No. 27. Confidential.)
Your Excellency, *Bagdad, July 17, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to draw attention to the long-continued failure of the Turkish Government to meet some British claims for compensation which were submitted to your Excellency in separate correspondence ending with my despatch No. 4 of the 4th February, 1911, and No. 66 of the 2nd December, 1910.

The former set of claims relate to wrongful demolitions of houses and shops, and though the demolitions were carried out from six months to a year ago, not a farthing of the compensation due, estimated by me at £ T. 5,400, has yet been paid to the owners. The most important of the dismantled premises still lie unrepaired and unoccupied, a depressing sight for persons under British protection, and one calculated to excite arrogance in the Turks.

The other claim of old standing related to a loss of £ T. 228 suffered by 'Abdul 'Ali, ice merchant, in consequence of illegal interference with his trade by the local authorities at Bagdad in July and August 1910. 'Abdul 'Ali informs me that only a few days ago noisy demands for a reduction in the price of his ice were made by a crowd at the gate of one of his factories, and I attribute this demonstration to the mischievous efforts, which nothing has yet been done to remove, of the unlawful proceedings by the Local Government against him last year.

I had the honour to report the origin of the various claims from time to time as they arose. Since then I have adverted more than once to their existence and to the unfortunate results of their remaining unsatisfied. It is now my duty to state that, if decisive action is longer deferred, the decline of British influence in





Mesopotamia, against which I have contended in vain with the means at my disposal, is likely to become permanent. The fact that I have been unable in the course of a year to obtain redress for a series of flagrant aggressions upon British subjects has so undermined my position that my representations to the vilayet are no longer received by them with the same attention as formerly.

From experience here, and from information obtained on a recent visit to Constantinople, I am convinced that the heavy assault upon British interests at Bagdad which began about eighteen months ago was prearranged, and that it was inspired by the most influential political personages for the time being in Turkey. If this view is correct—and the evidence in favour of it seems to me overwhelming—the Turkish Government, whether they acted spontaneously or at the dictation of an occult body, must be held responsible for the hostile actions committed.

The following are reasons for believing in the non-local character of the attacks:—

(*a.*) Some months before Nazim Pasha's arrival a rancorous agitation against the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company broke out at Bagdad, marked by features which have since come to be recognised as Salonican.

(*b.*) Nazim Pasha, before his appointment to Bagdad, was accounted an Anglophil. His recommendation to his Government, made within a fortnight after his arrival, that steps should be taken for the abolition of the British post-office, residency guard, and stationnaire at Bagdad can only be explained on the supposition that it really emanated from those whom he could not disobey, or from the staff with which they had surrounded him. His scheme, two months later, for making a useless street through the middle of the British residency is a still clearer indication of his having become the tool of bitter and influential enemies of the British Government.

(*c.*) The injuries for which compensation is now claimed were accompanied by others of a different but still serious character (such as the illegal arrest, beating, and trial of Seyyid Muhammad, a British subject), and by various petty insults and annoyances (*e.g.* the attempted prosecution of the British residency surgeon criminally for practising medicine in Turkey without a Turkish diploma). In fact, the persecution of British subjects was so vehement and so sustained as to indicate that it had the support of the Central Government. Without this, in the face of British diplomatic and consular protests, it could not long have continued.

(*d.*) An inspired campaign against the British position in Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf which was being conducted at the same time in the Constantinople press is strong circumstantial evidence of the connection of the central authorities with the occurrences at Bagdad.

(*e.*) If it was ever pretended at Constantinople that Nazim Pasha could not be restrained by his own Government, the falsity of that excuse has since been demonstrated by the ease with which he was set aside the moment that his presence at Bagdad ceased to be desired by his masters.

(*f.*) Anti-British machinations did not come to an end with the departure of Nazim Pasha from Bagdad. Since then, as your Excellency is aware, the local representatives of the Ministry of Justice have claimed for the Turkish courts here the right of deciding, without regard to consular registration, who is and who is not a British subject. In connection with this novel pretension a registered British subject has already spent three months in a Turkish prison, while this residency—notwithstanding its utmost efforts—has failed to obtain an entrance, even, into the discussion regarding his status.

It will be within your Excellency's recollection that, according to a recent report by my *locum tenens* (summary of events for April 1911, V, 20), the Central Committee of Union and Progress at Salonica lately called on the Bagdad branch of the committee for a report as to the progress made in overthrowing foreign, and especially British, influence in Mesopotamia. If that report has since been made, it can hardly have failed to be satisfactory to those who had been working for our humiliation. Great pecuniary loss has been inflicted on British subjects, and in some cases a whole year has passed without the recovery of a single piastre of compensation. British extra-territorial jurisdiction has been infringed with impunity. Last, but not least, the British and British Indian communities have been kept in a state of constant anxiety and apprehension, which is highly detrimental to their well-being. The only cases in which aggressions on British interests have been frustrated are those of the attempt on the British Residency in August 1910, and of a later design against Messrs. Lynch's premises in January 1911. These two failures, however, are of little consequence to our well-wishers in view of their triumphant advance along the rest of the line.

I earnestly beg your Excellency to take the foregoing facts into consideration, and to recommend some line of action towards the Turkish Government which will result not only in the recovery of compensation due, but also in the rehabilitation of British prestige in Mesopotamia and in a prudent resolve on the part of our adversaries not to provoke the British Government any further. It seems to me, with respect, that patience and toleration carried beyond the point to which they have now been maintained will seriously endanger all British interests here, including prospective concessions, by bringing our national character into contempt. Not the least irritating reflection in regard to the inroads made upon our rights and privileges is that they seem to be the work of a gang of irresponsible political adventurers, whose own position, though involved in mystery, is probably precarious, and under whose direction the Ottoman Empire appears to be drifting fast towards financial bankruptcy and other disasters.

I would suggest that, in view of the unjustifiable procrastination of the Turkish Government, discussion of the amount of compensation claimed should now be refused altogether, and that a demand for moderate interest on the sums due should be added to the original claims.

I have, &c.

J. G. LORIMER, *I.C.S., Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

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[35175.] No. 123.

*Western Assurance Company to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)*

Sir, 14, *Cornhill, London, September* 5, 1911.

REFERRING to our correspondence during the last two years and our recent interviews *re* Adana and with the object of asking the aid of His Majesty's Foreign Office, the company has to submit the facts relating to several claims against the Western Assurance Company which will shortly be brought before the Turkish court in Constantinople. These claims arise out of the incendiary fires at Adana during the revolutionary movement of 1909. In the only one of the claims which has so far been decided by the court, the company submits that the decision is contrary to law and common sense.

In a case decided by the same court in Constantinople on an action instituted against the French assurance company "l'Union," the French dragoman, acting on instructions from the Ambassador of France approved by the French Government refused to sign the judgment, which consequently remains null.

The Western Assurance Company trusts that when our own Foreign Office has examined the matter, it will adopt the same attitude for the protection of the interests of a British company.

The Western Assurance Company had effected several insurances on houses in Adana. On the 13th, 14th, and 15th April, 1909, disturbances occurred in the city, including a massacre of the Christian population by the Moslems. The houses in the Christian quarter were burnt, and the governor was either unwilling or unable to prevent the action of the Moslems in destroying the property of the Christians. It is admitted that the properties insured by the "Western" were burnt during the general riot and disturbances in the town. Troops were sent to "re-establish order," but it is openly affirmed that the French Ambassador claims that the troops sent contributed to the burning of the town. When the persons insured in the "Western" claimed the amount of their insurance, the answer of the company was to plead article 5 of the "conditions" of the policy, which, omitting irrelevant words, states that

"The insurance does not cover loss or damage by fire during or in consequence of . . . .

"(*a.*) Earthquake, &c., or other convulsion of nature.

"(*b.*) Invasion, act of foreign enemy, riot, civil commotion, rebellion, insurrection, military or usurped power, or martial law."

These words are taken textually from the conditions upon the English policy. As many of the insured preferred a policy in French, policies in that language were issued





and the conditions were translated. The words quoted above in English appear in the French translation as follows:—

"La présente police ne garantit pas les pertes et dommages résultant de tout incendie qui se serait produit au cours des événements ci-après énumérés . . . .

"(*a.*) Earthquakes, &c., as in English.

"(*b.*) Invasion et guerre par des troupes étrangères, émeute, insurrection ou complot à main armée ou non armée, révolution civile or militaire, ou état de siège."

In the only case of insurance in the "Western," which has been brought before the court, the argument turned almost solely on the signification of the word "émeute." It was not contended that there was invasion or war with foreign troops or insurrection or revolution, state of siege or martial law. It may be admitted at once that the English clause by including the words "riot and civil commotion" is more explicit than the French, the word "émeute" having been employed to cover both these terms. The advocates for the assured contend that the word "émeute" meant nothing more nor less than "a seditious movement of the people against constituted authority;" that this was practically the only point on which the court had to decide, because as no such seditious movement against constituted authority existed, the plea was valueless. The court accepted this contention, and admitted the definition of the word "émeute," as given in the dictionary of the French Academy, as follows: "Émeute—tumulte séditieux, soulèvement dans le peuple." The word "sédition" is declared to signify an "émeute populaire, révolte, soulèvement contre la puissance établie."

The advocates, as already stated, claimed that there was no movement against the authority at Adana, and using the phrase in the narrowest sense, it may be admitted, for the sake of argument, that the movement was one directed by one section of the population against another without regarding the Government. Of course, a movement amongst the population where one part burns the houses of the other may, with at least equal reason, be considered a movement against constituted authority. Indeed, any movement against public order is, in French law, from which Turkish law is adapted, against constituted authority. We have not been able to obtain a copy of the judgment, but from the written conclusions of our advocate, a distinguished French lawyer, who unfortunately died a few weeks ago, and just previous to the delivery of the decision of the court, we learn that the judgment itself was based on precisely the same set of arguments as in the case of an action brought against the French Assurance Company "l'Union." The same court in that case accepted the definition of "émeute" as "mouvement contre la puissance établie," this definition evidently being compounded of the definitions of the two words "émeute" and "sédition." The same advocate points out that to form a definition given by the court from the two others is to overlook the important phrase in the definition of "émeute" which speaks of it as a "rising in the population," "soulèvement dans le peuple." Accepting, however, for the sake of argument, the definition mentioned, a rising against the established authority has been held in French to be a rising against public order, and *vice versâ*.

If one asks what was the meaning intended by the two parties to the policy, it is difficult to believe that they could have thought of any other interpretation than that of "riot or civil commotion," as expressed in English form of policy. The discussion before the court was not, however, as to what was the intention of those who signed the policy of insurance, but purely a linguistic one. The advocate for the company claimed that in conformity with Turkish law itself (article 3 of the Medjellé), the Court should have asked, "What did the parties understand by 'émeute'"? The court itself had recognised in the case of the action against "l'Union" that the premium paid was calculated on the base of probabilities based upon statistics, which are without doubt founded on the normal condition of life in the places where the contract of insurance was to be applied, and the clear inference from the doctrine so laid down in the court is, that so abnormal a condition as that which arose, of one section of the population destroying the property of the other and creating a riot, was one of cases excluded from the policy, was, in fact, like earthquake so abnormal that the companies of insurance specially excluded such risk from their policies.

It was alleged, and indeed was not denied, that on the eve of the day when the troubles in Adana broke out, the vali and other superior officers organised patrols during the night, and that the Christian population took refuge in the schools and churches; that the houses were sprinkled with petroleum and set on fire; that at four places in the city these incendiary acts were notorious; that the fire, massacre, and pillage

continued for four days and nights, destroying nearly the whole of the city and the neighbourhood, and that in the course of these troubles the British consul was attacked and wounded. The patrols were sent out to prevent disturbances. In other words, they were employed to preserve public order, and to defend the constituted authority. The various Church authorities at Adana telegraphed to their Patriarchates in Constantinople that everywhere there was fire and massacre. The consuls of the respective Powers telegraphed to their embassies asking for measures to be taken for the protection of their subjects. In reply to a question in the Chamber of Deputies, the Minister stated that necessary measures had been taken to "re-establish order." The Minister of the Interior officially declared that the armed force was unable to repress the troubles in Adana. All these statements go to show that the "soulèvement" was "contre la puissance établie."

In the presence of all these facts the Turkish court maintained that the movement was not directed against authority, and therefore it was not an "émeute."

Put nakedly, the contention of the other side was that people might burn each other's houses and commit any amount of pillage and any number of murders, and so long as they did not declare their intention to act against the Government there was no riot or "émeute."

The doctrine is a remarkable one to be enunciated by a court of law, and would never have been listened to in any other court of law than a Turkish one.

As already mentioned, the contention which has been allowed to prevail in the Turkish court is to the effect that the word "émeute" means only a movement against the established authority.

In the actual rising, or "mouvement dans le peuple," the agents of the Government were admittedly present. They either intervened or did not intervene. If they intervened, there resulted a struggle against the constituted authority, which would be an "émeute" even in the narrow sense of the definition accepted by the court.

It cannot be contended that the agents of the Government were not present, for, as already mentioned, there were seven patrols sent into the town to re-establish order.

If they were present in insufficient number, the movement was still an "émeute," unless, indeed, it should be alleged that the agents of the Government took no part in resisting the mob.

The Government, however, claimed that the authorities had done their best to preserve order. It may be asked why seven patrols of soldiers were sent into the town? The official answer given is that they were sent to re-establish order; in other words, that order had ceased. The Government must at least be given credit for endeavouring to do its first duty, namely, to maintain order as the guardian of public order; the movement was considered as "contre la puissance établie." As such, it was an "émeute."

It was contended in the discussion before the court that there might be cases of disorder amongst the people when there was no intention of rising against the established authority. It was alleged, for example, that in a strike the strikers may have nothing against the Government. But the courts in France and elsewhere have held that when a strike degenerates into disorder the movement is one against the Government, and thus becomes an "émeute."

Accepting, therefore, for the sake of argument, the definition of "émeute" as a rising of the people against the established authority, the company submits that beyond all reasonable doubt the disturbances in Adana were an "émeute."

The fact of the French authorities having refused to recognise a judgment based on the same lines strengthens the view of the company's advocates, if it needs strengthening.

They claim also that the definition of the Turkish court was obtained only by stretching the signification of that in the dictionary of the French Academy.

The company may add that in the "Grand Dictionnaire français-anglais," the word "émeute" is translated by only two words, "riot" and "disturbance."*

In the dictionary of the academy, two definitions of "émeute" are given—

1. "Tumulte séditieux"; and
2. "Soulèvement dans le peuple."

* "Émeute" ("tumulte séditieux, soulèvement dans le peuple"), riot, disturbance, dangerous riot. "D'où vient cette émeute?" What is the cause of that riot, disturbance?—From the "Grand Dictionnaire français-anglais rédigé d'après la sixième édition du Dictionnaire de l'Académie Française," by Professors Fleming and Tibbins.



The company declare that if the Adana riots were not a "soulèvement dans le people" it is difficult to know what would be such a rising. The dictionary of the French academy does not imply in this definition that this rising among the people should have hostile intentions towards the Government.

Without quoting other dictionaries which confirm the view of the company they conclude by mentioning that the great French dictionary of Littré, the word "émeute" contains the following:—

"Émeute"; "tumulte séditieux, sédition, trouble contre l'ordre public, contre l'autorité légale."

The phrase "trouble contre l'ordre public" amply covers all which the company contends; so does also the last phrase, "contre l'autorité légale."

Under the above circumstances, the company respectfully suggests that they should either not be permitted to present themselves before the Turkish court in Constantinople in answer to similar claims, or that if in the judgment of His Majesty's Government it is expedient that they should so present themselves, that instructions should be sent to His Majesty's Ambassador in Constantinople to the effect that the dragoman should refuse to sign any judgment of the court in similar cases, such judgment being a flagrant denial of justice.

I have, &c.
R. H. R BURDER, *Manager*.

P.S.—Our assistant manager, Mr. H. M. Boutley, will call upon you about noon to-morrow, if convenient, to further discuss this matter.

R. H. R. B.

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[35188] No. 124.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)*

(No. 200.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September 6, 1911.*

LINGAH.

New Turkish consul left for Bushire a fortnight ago, with instructions to enquire fully into subject of complaint on part of His Majesty's Government.

Meanwhile, Grand Vizier says that the late consul cannot be required to offer apology to Mr. Now, as he has been dismissed, and it is unlikely that he will be appointed elsewhere.

Grand Vizier at the same time expressed regret at what had happened.

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[35402] No. 125.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 8.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and, by direction of the Marquess of Crewe, forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of enclosure in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, dated the 17th August, relative to alleged Turkish subjects at Lingah.

*India Office, September 7, 1911.*

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Enclosure in No. 125.

*Lieutenant-Colonel Cox to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P. *Bushire, August 15, 1911.*

UNDER instructions from the Turkish Embassy, our vice-consul at Lingah (who is in charge of Turkish interests) carefully investigated last year the claims of all applications for Turkish registration certificates, about twenty-five in number in all, and after exhaustive enquiry informed Ambassador, in February last, that only

one individual was entitled to Turkish protection in Persia. A visit has just been paid to Lingah by the Turkish consul at Bushire, and Vice-Consul New telegraphs that, without making the slightest reference to him, he has enrolled 272 Persians and Oman subjects as Turkish protégés. On hearing the news, the Governor of Gulf Ports has telegraphed to his deputy to protest, and to confiscate any such certificates as he can get hold of. Mr. New now asks what course he should take, as Turkish vice-consul, to challenge the Turkish consul's unwarrantable proceedings. I am inclined to think that as New was not consulted he can conveniently avoid altercation with the consul and ignore the matter for the present, but that we should keep the Persian authorities up to the mark, and that after Persian Government has protested and declined to recognise registrations New should then complain of having been placed in a false position, and ask Turkish Embassy, through your Excellency, to protect him in future from such vagaries on the part of Turkish consul at Bushire. The Turkish action is of course most discourteous to our representative, but no doubt it has been carried out under instructions from embassy, and it seems to me that if we let Persian Government move first we shall be in a stronger position. Will you please favour me with your instructions.

(Addressed Minister, Tehran, and repeated to India.)

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[35188] No. 126.

*Foreign Office to India Office.*

Sir, *Foreign Office, September* 8, 1911.

WITH reference to your letter of the 28th ultimo, relative to the proceedings at Linga of the Turkish consul at Bushire, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to ask whether the text of the telegrams of the 15th and 18th ultimo from His Majesty's consul-general at Bushire to His Majesty's Minister at Tehran, referred to in the telegram of the 26th ultimo from the Government of India, is expected shortly to arrive.

I am to state that, in Sir E. Grey's opinion, if this text cannot be received within the next few days, steps should be taken to obtain it, or at least a summary of it, by telegraph, in view of the importance of knowing whether natives of Koweit and the Katar coast have in fact been registered as Turkish subjects, for, should such prove to be the case, he would be disposed to concur at once in the instructions which the Government of India suggest sending to Lieutenant-Colonel Cox.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

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[35586] No. 127.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 11.)

(No. 616.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September* 1, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 580 and 582 of the 17th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum, reporting further on the Armeno-Kurdish question, and enclosing a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Bitlis relative to the recent utterances of Osman Pasha.

The result of the Government enquiry has not yet transpired.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 127.

*Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 61. Confidential.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, August* 21, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 57 of the 7th instant, in the second paragraph of which mention was made of the offensive language said to have been held by Mushir Osman Pasha to various Armenian notables in the district of Mush, I have the honour





to enclose herewith a copy of a despatch from Mr. Safrastian, acting vice-consul at Bitlis, giving a detailed account of his Excellency's utterances on the occasions referred to.

Whether or not it be the case that the Government meditates taking advantage of this incident to recall the mushir, it is generally considered that his outspoken language is no more than an untimely revelation of the policy now in favour with regard to the Armeno-Kurdish question, which, unless the few available facts are entirely misleading, tends to a close understanding between the Government and the Kurdish chieftains, at the expense of the Armenians.

Leaving aside the situation in Bitlis, which has already been dealt with in Mr. Safrastian's previous reports, and also the situation in the vilayets of Van and Diarbekir, which is rumoured to be analogous, I am informed that the real object of the tour which the ex-vali of Erzeroum made this summer in the western districts of this province was to come to terms with the Kurdish beys of Kighi and Plümer, most of whom are now enrolled as members of the committee; the result of which is that all claims for restitution of land are met with the stereotyped reply that nothing can be done until a Bill has been passed in Parliament; and even in the case mentioned in the penultimate paragraph of my despatch No. 53, Confidential, of the 7th ultimo of an Armenian claim at Plümer, where the vali was said to have personally intervened in favour of the wronged Armenian peasant, the local authorities have declined to take any action.

Turning to the eastern districts of the province, it is not without significance that Hussein Pasha of Patnotz should have arrived at Erzeroum during the visit of Javid Bey, with whom and with the vali he had several interviews. Hussein Pasha was among those who accompanied the vali several hours' distance on his departure for Adrianople, and it is now announced that he himself, having become a member of the committee, is about to proceed to Constantinople and Salonica, both of which towns were recently visited by his son when the latter took part in the Moslem deputation to Kossovo. (See my despatch No. 33 of the 8th May last.)

From the standpoint of the committee, the present policy of the Government seems intelligible enough. The Armenian population is disaffected, the relations between the Union and Progress organisation and the "Tashnaksutiun" are daily losing in intimacy, and the proceedings of the "Bedrkhans" are admittedly causing the authorities anxiety; while recent events in Khuyt show that military preoccupations elsewhere cause even the trifling display of energy necessary to save the prestige of the Government in that district to be contemplated with hesitation. It would, therefore, appear that the inevitable bid for the support of Moslem popular opinion is now being made, and the strongly pan-Islamic undercurrent of thought perceptible in Javid Bey's public utterances here, taken in connection with the attitude of the Government towards the Kurds and the land question, indicates a sound appreciation of the only lines on which such an appeal can be made with any prospect of success.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 127.

*Acting Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor.*

(No. 23.)
Sir, *Bitlis, August* 8, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that Mushir Osman Pasha, on his way to Mush at the beginning of last month, used a very insulting and threatening language in Khaskeui, Armenian village in the plain of Mush, to the priests and notables of the village who came to meet him.

Before submitting to you these utterances of a very serious nature of this constitutional mushir addressed to the Armenian nation, I thought it wise to verify them first, and, after full particulars received by me from two different reliable sources, I humbly venture to quote them in their essentials. In the presence of the men of the notorious Haji Faris of Kolossig and other Kurds, Mushir Osman Pasha told to the Armenian priests in an angry mood: –

"In the course of the last three years your people are causing a good deal of trouble by raising the agrarian question and by depriving Kurds from their means of livelihood.

"You are educated politicians and know how to defend your rights, whereas the

Kurds, being ignorant and semi-savage, can defend theirs only by force and fire-arms . . . .

"It is true that all these lands belonged to you at first, but we conquered them with a few hundreds of warriors, and, converting the natives to Islamism, we formed the present-day Turkish population of 25,000,000 . . . .

"All your revolutionary efforts under Abdul Hamid tended only to acquiring an independent kingdom similar to Bulgaria, Montenegro, &c. Happily, however, you did not succeed . . . .

"You have been throughout a disloyal people to the Ottoman Throne . . . . You are buying the weapons sold by Kurds and are preparing bombs, &c. . . . . But you are sadly deceiving yourself.

"The valis of to-day are afraid of you; they even are kissing the hands of Armenian bishops, &c.

"If you want, the mushir has further added, to get the Hamidieh organisation suppressed, you must suppress first your Daschnak committees . . . .

"Owing to the murder of Armenians at Taghavank (Khuyt) some Kurds have been arrested, but you must be sure that they will shortly be acquitted . . . . Everywhere in your villages there are 'shapkali' (wearing a hat) teachers and Daschnak committees. These men are preaching you false ideas . . . . You are a turbulent and troublesome element, and that is the reason why the prisons in Russia are full of Armenian prisoners," &c.

Abstaining myself from any other comment, I humbly venture to point out that, considering the highly responsible position which this lunatic mushir is holding in the Ottoman army and in such a delicate place as Mush, his provoking and insane utterances in respect to the land question cannot possibly fail to affect the Armeno-Kurdish relations, which, I regret to say, are so much strained already by the agitation of reactionaries of the notorious Musa Bey type.

Another noteworthy point is that the mushir has held almost the same language in other villages, too, and that he was more outspoken in Khaskeui owing to his being a guest to the notorious Musa Bey of Khevnor the night before.

I have, &c.

A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

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[35588] No. 128.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)*

(No. 619.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September 2, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith a copy of a report, dated the 10th July, which I have received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Mosul, relative to the progress of the Bagdad Railway, &c., in his district.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure in No. 128.

*Report respecting Progress of Bagdad Railway in the Mosul District.*

[XII. Bagdad Railway (last reference, paragraph 8 of my despatch No. 23 of the 3rd May).]

MEISSNER PASHA, chief engineer of the third section, arrived in Mosul on the 5th June from Aleppo, accompanied by a doctor named Yako Miloshovitch, who is believed to be of Servian origin, and to have served as an artillery officer in the Austrian army, and by a Montenegrin named Georji Popovitch, who apparently acts as a secretary, and is said to know something of engineering.

A revision of the survey made some years ago, which, my German colleague tells me, has proved inaccurate, is given out as the object of Meissner Pasha's present journey. After remaining a week in Mosul he left for Bagdad by the desert road (west of the Tigris). It was his alleged intention to survey on his way, and he expected to reach



his destination in about twenty days—a very short time if more than a superficial revision of this part of the survey is intended.

The chief engineer of this vilayet tells me that it is at present proposed to carry the main line in as straight a course as possible from Nisibin to Tekrit, and to connect Mosul with its nearest point by a branch. Such a branch, if carried across the Tigris, could tap the more populous agricultural districts of Erbil and Kerkuk, and would, with its possibilities of still further extension, be of much strategic value.* It would probably take off most advantageously from the main line in the neighbourhood of Sinjar, which, besides being the point nearest to Mosul, is the centre of an agricultural district and of a region whose Arab, Yezidi, and Turkoman inhabitants are a constant source of embarrassment to the Turkish authorities.

It was reported in a previous despatch that work was proceeding on a new road from the Sinjar Gate, which is near the north-western extremity of Mosul, in the direction of Tel' Afar and Sinjar. As yet only a few hundred yards of this road has been superficially made, and for some time the work has been almost at a standstill from lack of funds; but a further grant of money is expected soon, and it is possible that this work may prove to be more closely associated with the future railway than is at present admitted.

It must, however, be stated as an argument against the probable use for railway purposes of the road under construction that Meissner Pasha is said to have selected for a large building to contain forty offices a site near the barracks and Government buildings at the southern extremity of the town. There the banks of the river would offer special facilities for bridging, should the line be carried across the Tigris, and could be reached without interfering with existing buildings or streets. Much of the neighbouring land is owned by one Suleiman Bey, with whom the German vice-consulate is believed to be cultivating especially friendly relations.

But my German colleague assures me that the main line is to enter Mosul at or near the Sinjar Gate.

It appears that Meissner Pasha is himself sceptical about the enterprise from the point of view of a profitable concern. The German vice-consul admits that a kilometric guarantee has been given, and the vali told me in private conversation that he believes it to be the case.

Meissner Pasha is reported to have said that he regards the lack of hard stone in this district as a serious difficulty.

Jevad Bey, chief of the staff of the Mosul army corps, who has spent some years in Germany, and was much with the German engineer during his stay in Mosul, tells me that when the railway company has submitted its plans and they have been approved by the Porte the work of construction will, if possible, begin at both ends. He says, however, that unless a reduction of the Suez Canal dues can be obtained it is probable that all the material will be landed at Alexandretta and the idea of simultaneous work from Bagdad abandoned.

In view of the suspected mineral wealth of this district and of railway enterprises undertaken or contemplated, a statement recently made to me by the vali to the effect that no concessions are at present to be granted to foreigners may be of interest. Petroleum, known to exist at Gayara and in the Zakho and Kerkuk districts, has recently been found under conditions which, I am informed, suggest its presence in abundance on the left bank of the Tigris, at three places south of and within 25 miles of Mosul. At one point about 12 miles south of the town it is said that, when the river is low, oil issues from both banks, and may be seen floating on the water. The quality of this oil was at one time considered questionable, but, although refined by the crudest methods at Gayara, it is now being used with apparent success as fuel for an ordinary English (Blackstone) oil engine, purchased in Bagdad by a Mosul merchant, and used to work a flour mill.

The recent discoveries would seem to be further proof of the existence of an extensive oil-field.

A sample of brimstone found near Tel' Afar was recently shown me by a native of Mosul, who has resided some years in the United States, and is the only authority here on such matters. He assures me that it contains about 75 per cent. of pure sulphur, and that he believes it to exist in considerable quantities. The same enterprising native has recently experimented with some coal found near Zakho, and pronounces it the equal of the soft quality known in England as "Cannel" (?) coal.

The official paper of this vilayet, the "Mosul," published on the 15th June an

* But I am not aware of any survey having yet been made east of the Tigris.

article stating that "Irak will be restored to life when the railway is made," and the reactionary "Nijah" has also commented favourably. Neither the Arabs nor the Kurds are likely to share this view. But I have not yet heard of negotiations on this subject having been opened with the sheikhs in this district.

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[35592] No. 129.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)*

(No. 623.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 6, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 578 of the 16th August, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah, reporting on the disturbances on the Lower Tigris.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure in No. 129.

*Acting Consul Matthews to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 43.)
Sir, *Bussorah, August 10, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to report, for your Excellency's information, that on the 3rd instant the vali informed me, in the course of conversation, that 600 Persian brigands had crossed the frontier and had reached the Tigris some distance below Ezra's tomb (Ozair). Jelal Bey was unable to give me any further information on the subject.

After leaving the vali, I requested Messrs. Lynch Brothers' agent to telegraph a warning to the Lynch steamer, which was on its way from Bagdad to Bussorah.

The arrival on the evening of the 3rd instant of a grain lighter, which had been fired on near Ezra's tomb, confirmed the vali's statement.

On the 4th instant I saw the vali twice, and urged him to take measures for the protection of life and property on the Tigris. After some hesitation he was prevailed upon to accept the offer of Messrs. Lynch Brothers' launch "Bulbul" to convey troops to Ezra's tomb, in order to learn what the situation really was.

On the 5th instant the "Bulbul" proceeded up river with some sixty troops. On arrival at Seraifah, between Kurnah and Ezra's tomb, negotiations were opened with the "brigands," who were discovered to be for the greater part Arabs of the Al-bu-Muhammed tribe, reinforced by a few hundred Arabs from the Beni Turuf tribe of Hawizeh, in Persia. Their leader was found to be Abdul Kerim-bin-Seihud, a member of a leading family of the Al-bu-Muhammed tribe, which occupies both banks of the Tigris from Amarah almost to Kurnah. The colonel in command of the expedition, sent up river by the "Bulbul," availed himself of the good offices of a local sheikh, Gebashi-as-Saad, to inform Abdul Kerim that his demands would be granted provided that he, on his part, undertook not to molest river traffic. The "Bulbul" then proceeded to Ezra's tomb, whence the news was telegraphed to Shattrat-al-Amarah (Kaleh Salih) that the river was open. Lynch's steamer, "Mejidieh," and the Turkish river steamer, "Hamidieh," then came down and arrived in Bussorah on the 8th instant.

The "Marmariss" was dispatched up river on the 7th instant, but was unable to proceed beyond Kurnah, as the river is now low.

The cause of Abdul Kerim-bin-Seihud's demonstration is as follows: For the past fifty years certain lands, known as the Chuala Mukataa and situated in the neighbourhood of Amarah, have been farmed out to the Seihud family. Since the restoration of the constitution, the Government's policy has been to break the power of the more powerful chiefs. In pursuance of this policy, the leading members of the Seihud family were outlawed, little attention being paid to their applications for the Chuala Mukataa, which was assigned to one Arabi and to certain petty sheikhs. The Seihud family resented this treatment, more especially as they had made a deposit of £T. 2,750 with the Governor of Amarah, on the understanding that the land would be farmed out to them.

Abdul Kerim's secretary arrived here on the 8th instant, and is negotiating with the vali. It is understood that the authorities have promised to grant half of the





Chuala Mukataa to the Bin Seihud family, and it is thought that, if this solution of the difficulty is adopted, the situation on the Lower Tigris will become normal.

Abdul Kerim's followers, who are estimated by competent eye-witnesses at 2,000 armed men, have not yet been disbanded. In addition to Martini and antiquated rifles, they are said to have 400 Mauser rifles of modern type and 175,000 rounds of ammunition. Military operations against Abdul Kerim would be difficult, as the country between Ezra's tomb and Hawizeh is marshy and favourable to Arab methods of warfare.

Although from the 3rd to the 8th instant several grain lighters were plundered, and two at least with their cargo, worth £T. 500, were burnt, while some twenty lighters were delayed at Ezra's tomb by his followers, Abdul Kerim maintains that brigandage is not his object. It is quite possible that the grain lighters were plundered without his knowledge.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

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[35830] No. 130.

*Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)*

(No. 391.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Gulahek, September 11, 1911.*

TURKISH activity at Lingah.

Reference to your telegram No. 254 of the 7th September.

Colonel Cox telegraphs as follows [No. 219, dated the 10th September]:—

"Turkish consul was unable to hand over charge and leave Bushire by German steamer as he had proposed, as his successor is still detained in quarantine.

"Mr. New has sent me two certificates of registration which subjects of the Trucial chiefs had handed over to him. These certificates state that Lingah is the place of residence of the holders, and that they are of Oman origin. Individuals in question asseverate that Turkish consul compelled them to accept the certificates on the ground that Trucial Oman belonged to Turkey.

"Nebell Zia Bey professes to have visited Lingah in the capacity of a journalist to which profession he is returning. He maintains that the Porte will be compelled by his action to make their presence felt in the Persian Gulf although they may disavow him."

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[35898] No. 131.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 12.)*

Sir, *India Office, September 11, 1911.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 16th August, 1911, and to the telegraphic correspondence subsequently communicated, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to address you regarding the request of the Turkish Government to be furnished with copies of the agreements with the Sheikhs of Koweit and Bahrein, and with the trucial chiefs.

2. *Koweit.*—As regards the agreement of 1907, the attitude of the sheikh, as reported in the telegram of the Government of India, seems decisive against its communication to the Turkish Government, and the Marquess of Crewe agrees, in the circumstances, with the suggestion of the Government of India that the Porte should be informed that we have a lease of land at Koweit, but do not consider it necessary to discuss the details. With regard to the 1899 agreement, Lord Crewe agrees that it might be communicated, with the addition of the note suggested by the Government of India in lieu of Colonel Meade's letter of the 23rd January, 1899.

There seems no objection to the communication of the agreement of the 24th May, 1900 (Arms Traffic) or the 28th February, 1904 (Post Office).

With reference to the final paragraph of your letter I am to observe that, since it is not proposed to communicate to the Turkish Government a complete set of our agreements with Koweit, the previous understanding suggested in that paragraph seems more than we have a right to demand.

3. *Bahrein and the Trucial Chiefs.*—I am to enclose copies of these treaties

extracted *en bloc* from Aitchison's "Treaties, Engagements, and Sanads," and to say that Lord Crewe sees no reason why they should not be communicated if Sir E. Grey thinks fit. But it seems expedient to remind the Porte that British rights in the Gulf and on the coast rest not merely on the agreements concluded but on the custom, consent, and long established relations between the local chiefs and the Government of India.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

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[35936] No. 132.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 12.)*

(No. 202.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September 12, 1911.*

HIS Majesty's acting consul at Bussorah telegraphs (No. 142 of the 11th September) respectfully urging that one of His Majesty's ships should be stationed on river during date season.

Mr. Matthews states that situation has changed since date of Mr. Crow's despatch No. 8 of the 7th February, 1910, and he thinks it likely that there will be a renewal of river piracy; in which case he is of opinion that, as shown by the experience of the past two years, the authorities will contemptuously overlook British claims for compensation, and that they have no means of protecting navigators, as reported in his recent despatches to this embassy.

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[35830] No. 133.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 335.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September 12, 1911.*

TURKISH consul at Bushire.

I have repeated to you Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 391 of yesterday, from which consul appears to be still at Bushire. We presume, therefore, that he will be instructed by Porte to apologise to our vice-consul. Mention this to Grand Vizier, and remind him that result of immediate enquiry which was promised in your telegram No. 194 of the 29th August has not yet reached us.

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[36089] No. 134.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 14.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a telegram to the Viceroy, dated the 7th September, relative to the proposed wireless station at Zora.

Copy has been sent to the Admiralty.

*India Office, September 13, 1911.*

Enclosure in No. 134.

*The Marquess of Crewe to Government of India.*

(Telegraphic.) P. *India Office, September 7, 1911.*

SEE your telegram dated the 28th July, 1911. I approve instruction which it is proposed to give to resident, Persian Gulf, to submit a scheme for a wireless station at Zora. But the Foreign Office (see their letter, dated the 30th ultimo, forwarded to India on the 1st instant) are doubtful whether extension of control over chiefs will be of advantage ultimately. Pending further communication, resident's work on his draft order had better be suspended.

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[36110] No. 135.

*Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to Foreign Office.—(Received September 14.)*

3, *Salters' Hall Court, Cannon Street, London, September 13, 1911.*

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that we have just received a telegram, of which I enclose a copy, from our agent in Bagdad, on the subject of the contract which we hold to convey material on the River Euphrates for Sir John Jackson (Limited).

On the 10th May last we entered into a contract with Sir John Jackson (Limited), in London, under which we agree to convey the material which they are sending to the Hindieh Barrage, commencing with an estimated quantity of about 10,000 to 12,000 tons. It was contemplated that the contract would extend over a period of years, and we have already made special provision to carry it out by ordering steamers and barges in this country. Some 5,000 tons of the material has already arrived in Bussorah and is lying on our wharves. On one pretext or another the local authorities have hitherto prevented any of this cargo going except what was carried by one of our smaller steamers and barges. The present telegram seems to prove that the new Vali of Bagdad, who has just arrived at his post, has taken up an attitude definitely hostile to us in this matter.

Before entering into the contract we made it quite clear to Sir John Jackson that we should have to run under powers possessed by him. Sir John Jackson satisfied himself and us that he possessed all the necessary powers from the Turkish Government, and a clause to this effect is contained in the contract. From the first we instructed our representatives abroad to inform the local authorities that those steamers would be run not as commercial steamers—they would carry no ordinary cargo—but merely for the conveyance of the material under Sir John Jackson's powers. No protest was made at the time by the local or central authorities with whom Sir John Jackson was in daily contact.

I am directed by my board to add that this company obtained the contract in open competition, and that they therefore feel that they are entitled to claim the fullest support from His Majesty's Government. The action of the local authorities in introducing technical delays in connection with the forwarding of the material has already lost us practically the whole of this season, as the period of low water has now commenced.

We have the honour to request that a copy of this despatch may be transmitted to His Majesty's Ambassador in Constantinople, and that his Excellency may be instructed to insist upon the maintenance of our contract and upon the cessation of the obstructive tactics hitherto practised by the local authorities.

We have, &c.
T. H. ROBERTS,
*Acting Secretary.*

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Enclosure in No. 135.

*Copy of Telegram from Bagdad dated September 7, 1911.*

THE Vali of Bagdad insists that our contract with Sir John Jackson (Limited) for the transport of material to the Hindieh Barrage must be transferred to the Turkish Government Steamer Administration, and he has given notice to this effect to the representative of Sir John Jackson (Limited) in Bagdad.

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[36046] No. 136.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 14.)*

(No. 204.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September 13, 1911.*

PROCEEDINGS of Turkish consul at Lingah.

Please see my telegram No. 200 of the 6th September and your telegram No. 335 of the 12th September.

I have received reply from Porte intimating that late consul cannot be called upon to apologise to Mr. New, as he has been dismissed from the service, and that enquiry can only be conducted by his successor.

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[36110] No. 137.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 337.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September* 14, 1911.

THE Vali of Bagdad insists, I am informed by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, that the contract for transporting material to the Hindieh barrage which they have with Sir J. Jackson shall be transferred to the Turkish steamer administration.

I understand that the contract was concluded with the knowledge and approval of the Turkish authorities. You should urge the Turkish Government strongly to instruct the vali immediately to allow the company to carry it out.

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[36254] No. 138.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September* 15.)

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, copy of a letter to the Admiralty, dated the 14th September, relative to Persian Gulf surveys.

*India Office, September* 14, 1911.

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Enclosure in No. 138.

*India Office to Admiralty.*

Sir, *India Office, September* 14, 1911.

WITH reference to previous correspondence regarding the surveys proposed to be made in the Persian Gulf, I am directed by the Secretary of State for India to enclose, for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, copy of a telegram from the Government of India, reporting that, with two survey vessels, the work is expected to take four years or more, and suggesting that it might be carried out by one of His Majesty's ships and one of the Royal Indian Marine vessels conjointly.

The Marquess of Crewe had not, I am to explain, apprehended that the work contemplated would be so laborious or occupy so long a period, and he would be glad, before considering the matter further, to receive the observations of the Lords Commissioners on the proposals made in the telegram of the Government of India.

If the Lords Commissioners should be prepared to detail a vessel, he would be glad to learn (1) the estimated cost, and (2) the basis on which such cost is calculated, with a view to addressing the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs as to the division of the expenditure.

A suggestion has been made in connection with a scheme for providing additional lights in the Persian Gulf that a vessel may have to be obtained for use as a lighthouse tender, but his Lordship is not at present aware whether it could, if provided, be used also for survey work, in substitution for one of the two vessels that the Government of India propose should be employed.

Copy of this letter has been communicated to the Foreign Office.

I am, &c.
R. RITCHIE.

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[36441] No. 139.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 17.)

(No. 206.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, September* 17, 1911.

MATERIALS for Mesopotamian irrigation works.

(Referring to your telegram No. 337 of the 14th instant.)

In the event of Turkish Steam-ship Administration refusing to undertake transport of material, Jackson is empowered by his contract to arrange for transport as he pleases.

The Turkish administration declined to undertake transport via Euphrates, and the contract for transport by that river was made subsequently with the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.

It seems likely that transport will now be effected via Tigris and Bagdad, as lack of water in the Euphrates has rendered navigation of that river impracticable. An offer had been made by Turkish company to transport material by this route, and this would seem to give them right to first refusal for any contract for transport in this manner.

Messrs. Lynch's object, according to Messrs. Jackson's agent here, is to make use of the latter firm, and Messrs. Jackson's agent is therefore opposed to his firm becoming an instrument in the hands of Lynch and so compromising themselves with the Turkish Government. He has sent telegrams to Bagdad and to London asking for full details. Until further information can be obtained respecting points noted in preceding paragraph, I think it best to suspend action.

I request that preceding paragraph may be regarded as confidential.

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[36467] No. 140.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 18.)

(No. 628.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September* 9, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum reporting further on the state of affairs in the Bitlis vilayet.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 140.

*Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 65.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, August* 28, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 64, Confidential, of the 21st instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a despatch from Mr. Safrastian, acting vice-consul at Bitlis, reporting further on the unsatisfactory condition of public order in the province of Bitlis, with particular reference to the districts of Khuyt and Khizan.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 140.

*Acting Vice-Consul Safrastian to Consul McGregor.*

(No. 24.)
Sir, *Bitlis, August* 18, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report as follows upon the present condition of things as prevailing in certain parts of this vilayet, which, in view of the avowed inaction displayed by the authorities, are drifting daily into a state of confusion and uncertainty.

The complaints of the Armenians against the injustices and oppressions to which they are being systematically subjected throughout this region are rightly growing more frequent, and the Government seems to be inclined to slip back into its old

indifference towards every act of aggression perpetrated by Kurds upon the Armenians.

*State in Khuyt.*—As you are aware from my previous reports, the actual murderers and culprits of Khuyt are free still. These brigands have been of late taking a threatening attitude towards the Armenians of Khuyt. Even in the presence of 650 soldiers in the district, the horror-stricken Armenians cannot properly attend to their field works. The criminal complicity of several Government officials in the recent events at Khuyt is becoming more evident. Rumours have lately been current to the effect that the soldiers would be withdrawn from the district. The mudir of the Nahié told some time ago to the Armenian Bishop of Mush that he would irrevocably leave Khuyt after the departure of the soldiers, as, he added, it was impossible for him to live amid those wild cutthroats with a force of twelve gendarmes.

After due consideration of the situation in Khuyt as it stands now, I humbly venture to express the opinion that the withdrawal of the soldiers from Khuyt under the present circumstances, following the ill-judged utterances made by Mushir Osman Pasha (my preceding report), would mean the extermination of the whole Armenian people of about thirty villages in Khuyt and Pernashen (Eastern Sasun).

*In Khizan.*—The miserable condition of the Armenians in Khizan, as described in my despatch No. 19 of the 9th July, is growing worse. The local authorities are absolutely impotent to protect the Armenians and the defenceless Kurds against the ever-increasing demands of the Sheikh of Khizan. The men of this notorious brute killed three weeks ago one Armenian, Kantcho, a notable of the village Ostin, five hours from here. The unfortunate victim was a well-known leader and had fought for years against the sheikh for defending the lands of his fellow-villagers. The most ridiculous thing is that an Armenian villager has been imprisoned for the murder.

Since the above murder, terror is reported as prevailing in Khizan and the neighbourhood. The free circulation of the Armenians has ceased and great uneasiness prevails. I know for certain that attacks by Kurdish brigands upon Armenians in Karjikan (Kaza of Van) are now of daily occurrence, and that one Armenian was killed there a week ago.

As to the general situation prevailing throughout this province, I regret to inform you that cases of Moslem aggression against the Christians are reported as becoming more and more common in almost every district. The anti-Christian sentiment and tendencies both among certain Government officials and Kurdish chiefs are obviously increasing. The ill-advised statements of Mushir Osman Pasha in Khaskeui have left a pernicious impression, and the visit of Djavid Bey, the ex-Minister, to Mush and this town was not utilised to dispel the indignation created among the Armenians by those utterances.

The lands of the Armenians of Toghud, in Akhlat, were lately given to Kurds. These disappointed peasants as well as the Armenians of Khizan applied to the Russian consul here for protection. Both of them, however, were left unanswered.

Briefly, I humbly venture to end my report by stating that never before since July of 1908, such feelings of uneasiness had prevailed throughout this region.

I have, &c.
A. S. SAFRASTIAN.

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[36468] No. 141.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 18.)*

(No. 629.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 9, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 581 of the 17th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Erzeroum, reporting on Javid Bey's dealings with Kurdish notables during his recent visit to Erzeroum.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure in No. 141.

*Consul McGregor to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 67.)
Sir, *Erzeroum, August 29, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 58 of the 7th instant regarding the tour now being made by Javid Bey in these provinces, I have the honour to report that, according to private information, the ex-Minister was received with a good deal of show by the authorities and Moslem notables of Bitlis, and made a public speech on the same lines as that summarised in my despatch referred to above. Most of his time was, however, devoted to private colloquy with Haji Faris and other notorious Kurds, and I understand that even in his interviews with Armenians with regard to the land question he displayed a pronouncedly pan-Islamic spirit which has left a disturbing impression among the Christian population, and has correspondingly elated the Moslems.

I have, &c.
P. J. C. McGREGOR.

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[36469] No. 142.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 18.)*

(No. 630.)
Sir, *Constantinople, September 11, 1911.*

IN accordance with the instruction contained in your despatch No. 230 of the 20th ultimo, I have the honour to report that the present position of the action brought against the Western Insurance Company for damage caused by fire during the Adana massacres is that the mixed court here rejected on the 1st August the company's plea of non-responsibility under article 5 of the policy, and asked the company whether it had any further defence to the action.

An adjournment was granted at the request of the company's counsel till the 29th August. On that day the parties applied for and obtained a further adjournment.

With regard to the action taken by the British dragoman in the matter, as I had the honour to report in my despatch No. 659 of the 19th September, 1910, the company was invited to prove its allegation that the events at Adana constituted "émeute." Owing to the illness and death of the company's counsel, M. Barozzi, the case was not pleaded again until the 23rd May last. No fresh evidence was then produced on behalf of the company, but the pleadings turned as before on the definition of the word "émeute."

The deliberation of the court on this fresh pleading took place on the 18th July, and was adjourned at the request of the British dragoman. On the 1st August it was resumed, and Mr. Waugh stated to the court his reasons for disagreeing with the restricted interpretation which the plaintiff's counsel sought to place upon the word "émeute." A full discussion took place, and finally the court, basing itself upon the French Academy definition of "émeute" as a movement directed against the established authority, decided that the company had failed to show that such a movement had taken place at Adana, and rejected its plea of non-responsibility under clause 5 of the policy.

This decision was given by a majority of 3 to 2, the two British assessors dissenting.

Mr. Waugh saw no ground to justify him in following the example of the French dragoman in withdrawing from the court and refusing to accept the decision, which was, in his view, the honest opinion of three judges, two of whom are lawyers of good local repute.

The precise meaning of the word "émeute" is open to argument, and it seems right that restrictive clauses in policies should be interpreted strictly. The company contented itself in this case with the doubtful word "émeute," whereas in others of its policies it inserts the more general terms "riots" and "civil commotions."

Under the circumstances, it seemed to the British dragoman that to insist upon the opinion of the minority prevailing over that of the majority on what is certainly a doubtful point would be an abuse of our treaty rights, and, acting upon the discretion

allowed him by your despatch No. 160 of the 10th June, 1910, he acquiesced in the decision of the court.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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[36801] No. 143.

*India Office to Foreign Office.—(Received September 19.)*

THE Under-Secretary of State for India presents his compliments to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and forwards herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State, with reference to Foreign Office letter of the 21st June, 1910, copy of a letter dated the 15th September, 1911, to the Secretary, Foreign Department, Government of India, regarding the affairs of the Aden Protectorate.

*India Office, September* 18, 1911

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Enclosure in No. 143.

*India Office to Government of India.*

Dear Sir, *India Office, September* 15, 1911.

YOUR letter to Sir A. Hirtzel, of the 7th August, 1911, on the subject of protectorate treaties with the Beda and Audali Sultans has been submitted for the orders of the Secretary of State.

In reply I am directed to say that he will be ready to consider any official despatch that the Government of India may wish to send home, but he has been led to this conclusion solely on the ground mentioned in your letter, *i.e.*, the differential treatment of the two Sultans, since he entirely approves the general policy already laid down of intervening as little as possible in the affairs of the Aden hinterland. His Lordship must reserve further comment until he receives the text of the agreements proposed and the despatch referred to.

Yours faithfully,
J. E. FERARD.

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[35169] No. 144.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 344.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, September* 20, 1911.

BAGDAD demolitions.

Please forward your observations on Captain Lorimer's despatch No. 27 of the 17th July, 1911, with the least possible delay.

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[37307] No. 145.

*Memorandum with reference to Sheikh Said, on the Coast of Arabia.*

Extract from the "Republique" of January 30, 1901 (see Mr. Herbert, No. 37, February 1, 1901).

THE accompanying cutting from the "République" of the 30th instant, which has just been received from Mr. Austin Lee, shows the reception accorded to M. Hugues Le Roux by the Turkish military authorities at Sheikh Said.

The claims or designs of France with reference to this locality have given rise to much correspondence in the past, and more than one memorandum has been written on the subject.

Memorandum by Sir E. Hertslet, March 6, 1882 (Confidential 1590).

The place was originally purchased from an Arab sheikh by two Frenchmen named Maas (or Mass) and Poilex in January 1869, but the Porte denied the validity of the sale, and the sheikh declared that it was void by reason of the purchase money not having been paid.

Memorandum by Mr. Barrington, April 27, 1895.

Memorandum by India Office, April 9, 1897.

His Majesty's Government have always maintained that Sheikh Said belongs to Turkey, and in 1893, when it was reported that the French authorities at Obokh were negotiating for its transfer to France, urged that a strong Turkish force should at once be sent there.

To Sir C. Ford, No. 44, May 8, 1893.

On the 2nd May, 1895, M. H. Maas, who had written to this Office on the subject, was informed that the opinion already expressed to him that Sheikh Said was Turkish territory was in no way altered.

To Mr. H. Maas, May 2, 1895.

The question of the occupation of Sheikh Said by France was again mooted in Paris in 1897, and enquiries were made at His Majesty's Embassy as to whether it was occupied by British troops.

Sir E. Monson, No. 186, March 12; No. 191, March 14; No. 196, March 17, 1897.

The India Office concurred in the proposed reply that there was no truth in the rumoured British occupation, and that His Majesty's Government considered it to be Turkish territory.

India Office, March 31, 1897.

In April 1897 a resolution for the "reoccupation" of Sheikh Said by France was introduced into the French Chamber of Deputies, when M. Brisson's proposal that it should be printed and circulated, and, if unopposed, transmitted to the Colonial Commission, was agreed to by the house.

Sir E. Monson, No. 269, April 11, 1897.

Memorandum by Mr. Fairholme, July 1, 1899.

The Turkish Ambassador at Paris was instructed to call M. Hanotaux's attention to the fact that Sheikh Said was part of the Ottoman dominions.

Sir N. O'Conor, No. 314, May 8, 1897.

The last reference to this place in the correspondence now in the custody of the librarian appears to be the announcement made by Sir E. Monson in June 1899 that an offer had been made to the United States Ambassador at Paris on behalf of Messrs. Bazin and Rabaud, who claimed Sheikh Said, to sell it to the United States for 400,000 dollars.

Sir E. Monson, No. 348, June 30, 1899.

This information was forwarded to the India Office and to His Majesty's Ambassadors at Constantinople, St. Petersburgh, and Washington.

A. H. OAKES.

*Foreign Office, January* 31, 1901.

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[Continuation of Memorandum of January 31, 1901.]

IN February 1903 the French Ambassador asked Lord Lansdowne for information as to our difficulties with the tribes in the neighbourhood of Aden, adding that France had no interest in the matter except to this extent—that there were French claims upon a spot called Sheikh Said opposite the Island of Perim.

Lord Lansdowne gave him a rough sketch of the circumstances which had created somewhat strained relations between His Majesty's Government and the Turkish authorities in the Yemen, and told him that the territory of the tribes in which we had an interest did not extend so far to the west as Sheikh Said, but wished him, however,

To Sir E. Monson, No. 56, February 12, 1903.

to understand that he expressed no opinion as to the validity of the French claims to Sheikh Said.

On the 11th January, 1905, the French Ambassador told Lord Lansdowne that he had observed that we were engaged in a discussion with the Turkish Government as to the boundary of the Aden cantons, and that he wished to take this opportunity of reminding him that France had certain claims at Sheikh Said. The French Government had no desire to raise the question, but it was desirable that we should be aware that it existed.

To Sir F. Bertie, No. 28, January 11, 1905.

Lord Lansdowne replied that, without making any admissions as to the rights of France at Sheikh Said, he was able to say at once that the frontier line as we proposed to draw it would strike the coast at a point considerably farther south than that place. It was therefore not necessary that the question of Sheikh Said should be discussed between them.

Minutes, January 1905.

It was then suggested that the matter should be referred to the Defence Committee, as Sheikh Said if fortified would render Perim untenable and close the narrow strait, though it would not dominate the wide strait, but the suggestion does not appear to have been acted on.

*Procès-verbal*, April 20, 1905.

Sheikh Said is in the Subaihi territory, and, in connection with the boundary agreement of 1905, the Turkish Government has undertaken never to alienate to a third Power the Subaihi territory lying between Husn Murad and Kudam, in which Sheikh Said is situate. Two masonry pillars in cement were built by the British Commission, and the Turkish had a cairn of rough stone erected in the vicinity of Sheikh Said.

G. E. P. HERTSLET.

*Foreign Office, September* 23, 1911.

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[36441] No. 146.

*Foreign Office to Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.*

*Foreign Office, September* 23, 1911.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter of the 13th instant relative to the transport of material to the Hindieh barrage, I am directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to state that he learns from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, to whom a telegraphic enquiry was addressed upon the receipt of your letter under reply, that according to their contract with the Turkish Government, Sir J. Jackson (Limited) are entitled to make arrangements for the transport of material to the barrage, provided the Turkish steam-ship administration declines to undertake it.

Sir G. Lowther states that the contract with your company was made for the transport of the material by the Euphrates, which the Government administration had refused to undertake. His Excellency understands, however, that owing to the lowness of the water the navigation of the Euphrates is now impossible, and that it seems probable that the material will be transported viâ the Tigris and Bagdad. This the Turkish Government steam-ship administration are prepared to undertake, and would appear in any case to be entitled, under the contract of Sir J. Jackson with the Turkish Government, to have the first refusal of the work.

I am, &c.

LOUIS MALLET.

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[37331] No. 147.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 25.)

(No. 633.)

*Therapia, September* 16, 1911.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 234 of the 10th April last, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch from His Majesty's Acting Consul at Bussorah relative to the proposed transfer of Agha Jaffer's steamers from the Euphrates to the Tigris.

I may observe that Mr. Matthews appears to be under misapprehension when he states in paragraph 5 of his despatch that the permission accorded to Agha Jaffer to transfer his steamers from the Euphrates to the Tigris would appear to constitute an infringement of the concession granted to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation





Company, which, Mr. Matthews understands, expressly excludes navigation on the Tigris and Euphrates by foreign companies or companies financed by foreign capital, Messrs. Lynch never having obtained anything in the shape of a monopoly. They did, it is true, virtually enjoy, jointly with the Idare-i-Nehrieh, the monopoly conferred on the latter company, which was a Civil List concern, by the ex-Sultan, but that monopoly has since been abolished by the decision of the Constitutional Government declaring the navigation of the rivers of Turkey open to all Ottoman subjects, and it would be impossible for me to maintain these arguments at the Porte.

Agha Jaffer's association with foreign capital will no doubt be difficult to prove, and Messrs. Lynch and Co. might easily have acted in the same manner as the German firm is now said to be doing had they been disposed to do so.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure in No. 147.

*Acting Consul Matthews to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 44.)

Sir,

*Bussorah, August* 18, 1911.

WITH reference to Mr. Crow's despatch No. 12 of the 18th March last, I have the honour to report, for your Excellency's information, that it is stated on excellent authority that Agha Jaffer has obtained permission from the Ministry of Public Works to transfer his steamers from the Euphrates to the Tigris. Agha Jaffer is said to owe this permission chiefly to the whole-hearted support given to him by Jelal Bey, the late Vali of Bussorah.

It appears that Agha Jaffer found it impossible to run his steamers at a profit on the Euphrates on account of the insecurity of the country (my despatch No. 34 of the 30th June) and the heavy toll levied by the riverain Arabs.

It is anticipated that the existing river steam-ship companies—the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company and the Turkish Idare-i-Nehrieh—will be unable to cope with the large consignments of material which are expected to arrive shortly for the Bagdad Railway, that freights will be raised, and that steamers on the Tigris will earn large profits. Whether these anticipations are likely to be realised or not, several other natives besides Agha Jaffer are endeavouring to obtain permission to put steamers on the Tigris. I might mention Yusuf Abdul 'Ahad, a Turkish subject enjoying French protection, who about a year ago obtained a permit from Nizam Pasha, ex-Vali of Bagdad, for two steamers on the Tigris. Yusuf Abdul 'Ahad has not seen his way to avail himself of this permit, as by one of the conditions it is revocable at the pleasure of the Government. He is now trying to have this objectionable condition omitted.

With regard to Agha Jaffer, there is no doubt that he has Persian partners and that he receives financial assistance from the German firm of Wönkhaus and Co., the local agents of the Hamburg-Amerika line. I have the authority of my Russian colleague for stating that Agha Hassan, honorary dragoman of the Russian Consulate, who is a Persian subject, is a partner of Agha Jaffer, but it would be more difficult to prove Agha Jaffer's association with the Germans, which, however, is certain.

The permission accorded to Agha Jaffer to transfer his steamers from the Euphrates to the Tigris would appear to constitute an infringement of the concession granted to the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company (Messrs. Lynch Brothers), which, I understand, expressly excludes navigation on the Tigris and Euphrates by foreign companies or companies financed by foreign capital.

Since writing the foregoing, I am informed that Agha Jaffer's permission contains no restriction as to the number of steamers which he may employ, and that, while giving him the right to navigate on the Tigris, it does not withdraw the right to navigate on the Euphrates. I give this information for what it is worth.

I have, &c.

W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

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[37334] No. 148.

*Sir C. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)*

(No. 636.)

Sir, *Therapia, September 18, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to forward to you herewith an article from the "Gazette financière" of the 5th instant on the subject of railways in Asia Minor, in which it is stated that the Chester scheme has been finally abandoned by the Ottoman Government, the latter having almost completed negotiations with the Anatolian Railway Company for the construction of lines to link up the Angora branch line with the Samsoun–Sivas, and to be extended to Diarbekir and Kharput.

From enquiries I have made I have ascertained that the statements contained in this article are practically correct.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure in No. 148.

*Extract from the "Gazette financière" of September 5, 1911.*

LES CHEMINS DE FER EN ANATOLIE.—LES PROJETS ALLEMANDS.

EN dehors des lignes Samsoun–Sivas, Sivas–Kharpout–Erzindjan–Erzéroum, Erzéroum–Trébizonde, qui font l'objet de l'accord récemment intervenu avec les groupes français, il est toute une série de voies ferrées, dont la construction est envisagée depuis longtemps déjà, afin de compléter le réseau de l'Asie Mineure.

Jusqu'ici ces projets paraissaient comprendre le prolongement de l'embranchement d'Angora du Chemin de Fer d'Anatolie et le projet Chester.

Nous avons eu à diverses reprises à nous occuper de l'un et de l'autre.

En ce qui concerne le projet Chester, que nous avons suivi depuis ses origines dans ses diverses transformations, jusque sous la forme en laquelle il fut présenté au Parlement à la fin de la session dernière, nous n'avons jamais cessé d'émettre des doutes sur ses chances de succès.

Or, d'après certaines informations récentes et que nous avons tout lieu de croire fondées, le projet Chester aurait été définitivement abandonné par le Gouvernement. Cette décision se rattacherait aux pourparlers actuellement en cours avec le groupe allemand concessionnaire des Chemins de Fer d'Anatolie et de Bagdad, pourparlers qui portent sur la concession à ce groupe de diverses lignes qui constituent le complément du réseau allemand en Anatolie.

Si les tracés de ces lignes ne nous sont pas encore très exactement connus, il est possible cependant, avec les informations que l'on possède et par l'étude des droits résultant des accords antérieurs, de donner quelques indications intéressantes sur les projets qui font actuellement l'objet des négociations entre le Gouvernement et le groupe allemand. Il ne s'agit pas en effet, d'une façon générale, de conceptions nouvelles, mais de lignes ferrées dont la construction est projetée depuis longtemps et qui ont été même visées dans une certaine mesure dans les actes de concession déjà intervenus. Sans doute, il ne s'agit pas de réaliser à la lettre les tracés prévus autrefois, mais ceux-ci se retrouvent en partie dans les lignes dont on s'occupe aujourd'hui, avec les modifications que nécessitent les concessions octroyées depuis lors ou les projets dont la réalisation a été décidée.

Le prolongement au delà d'Angora était prévu par l'article 31 de la convention du 4 octobre, 1888, qui donnait au concessionnaire de la ligne Ismidt–Angora un droit de préférence sur ce prolongement. La convention du 15 février, 1893, accordait de façon plus précise au Chemin de Fer d'Anatolie la concession de la ligne Angora–Césarée, qui devait être éventuellement prolongée jusqu'à Bagdad par Sivas et Diarbékir. C'était le tracé primitivement prévu pour le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad, tracé qui fut abandonné pour être remplacé par le prolongement de la ligne de Konia (convention du 5 mars, 1903).

Cependant les droits reconnus par les conventions de 1888 et de 1893 n'en restaient pas moins acquis au Chemin de Fer d'Anatolie.

Mais en 1900, alors que se discutait le tracé du futur Bagdadbahn, ces droits





avaient été précisés sur l'intervention du Gouvernement russe, qui se faisait reconnaître un droit de préférence sur les lignes à construire dans les parages de la Mer Noire; il était formellement entendu que les lignes dont la concession était octroyée en principe au groupe allemand devaient suivre un tracé reliant directement Angora à Césarée, Césarée à Sivas, Sivas à Kharpout, Kharpout à Diarbékir, et Diarbékir à Van.

Depuis lors, la question du prolongement d'Angora a été souvent discutée et nous avons eu à signaler à diverses reprises les tentatives faites pour l'adoption de tracés qui présentaient l'inconvénient de se heurter aux droits de préférence reconnus à la Russie.

La décision de confier à un groupe français la construction pour compte du Gouvernement du réseau ferré du nord de l'Anatolie, en même temps qu'elle tranchait le problème délicat des chemins de fer des parages de la Mer Noire, allait avoir pour conséquence d'activer les négociations entre le Gouvernement et le groupe allemand.

Les projets envisagés autrefois allaient prendre une forme plus précise: l'idée fondamentale était de réaliser un raccordement entre la ligne d'Angora et le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad à proximité d'Eregli, par Césarée et Nigdé.

Mais si la fixation du tracé à partir de Césarée jusqu'au Chemin de Fer de Bagdad ne présente aucune difficulté, il n'en est pas de même du tracé d'Angora à Césarée. Ici se pose en effet la question du raccordement du prolongement d'Angora avec le futur Samsoun–Sivas.

En stricte interprétation des conventions intervenues et des droits de préférence reconnus, conventions et droits que nous rappelons plus haut, ce raccordement ne pourrait se faire que par une ligne de Césarée à Sivas. Or, ce tracé n'a jamais paru rencontrer beaucoup de faveur: on a toujours manifesté une préférence pour un prolongement de la ligne d'Angora par Yozgat: un embranchement partant de cette ville irait rejoindre la ligne Samsoun–Sivas au nord de Sivas, vers Soulon-Sérai et un autre descendrait vers Césarée.

Reste la question de savoir si le tracé par Yozgat ne pourrait pas soulever certaines protestations. S'il a été réellement adopté, comme d'aucuns le prétendent, c'est qu'on a pu s'assurer l'acceptation des intéressés.

Les négociations avec le groupe allemand portent en outre sur les lignes destinées à desservir la région de Kharpout et de Diarbékir.

Comme nous l'avons vu plus haut, il avait été prévu en 1893 le prolongement d'Angora par Césarée et Sivas jusqu'à Kharpout et Diarbékir. Mais depuis lors est intervenu l'acte de concession du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad qui dans son article 38 porte que "le concessionnaire s'engage à construire et à exploiter, aussitôt que le Gouvernement lui en fera la demande, un embranchement partant de la ligne Konia–Bassora et aboutissant à Diarbékir et à Kharpout." C'est de la réalisation de cette ligne que l'on s'occupe aujourd'hui, et l'on se propose de la compléter par un embranchement vers Bitlis et le lac de Van.

De ce fait le projet Chester, déjà diminué de la ligne Sivas–Kharpout comprise dans la combinaison française, se trouve n'avoir plus de raison d'être. D'où la décision qui aurait été prise de l'abandonner.

Les négociations avec le groupe allemand dont nous nous sommes occupés aujourd'hui auraient déjà conduit à un accord presque complet. Il est possible que l'échange des conventions en ait lieu dès avant le commencement de la prochaine session parlementaire.

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[37336] No. 149.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)*

(No. 638.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September 19, 1911.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 623 of the 6th instant, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's acting consul at Bussorah, reporting on the situation on the Lower Euphrates and Tigris.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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Enclosure in No. 149.

*Acting Consul Matthews to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 47.)

Sir, *Bussorah, August* 26, 1911.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 39 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to report, for your Excellency's information, that the commission appointed to enquire into the recent disturbances in the Muntafik country has now visited Suk-as-Shuyukh, Nasirieh, and Maiah. It is reported that the Bedur tribe and the Ghazi tribe have promised to submit to the authorities and pay taxes in future. Early in August two nominal battalions of troops, about 450 men in all, arrived at Kurnah from Bagdad; at Kurnah barges had been prepared to convey them to Nasirieh. It is reported that the Dhaffir tribe was attacked near Khamisieh on the 14th instant by a force under Thamir and Hamud, sons of Saadun Pasha. Saadun's sons were defeated, losing their camels and tents, with thirty men killed and twenty wounded. The "Rosafa" and "Frat" are still on the Lower Euphrates, where they will have to remain until next spring, as the river has fallen.

The situation on the Lower Tigris (my despatch No. 43 of the 10th instant) is not satisfactory, and a renewal of the recent disorders is to be anticipated. Abdul Kerim-bin-Seihud's force is reported to have been augmented by contingents from the Amarah district. The situation is complicated by the fact that, about the 20th instant, a relative of Abdul Kerim assassinated a brother of Arabi, to whom the greater part of the Chuala Mukataa is farmed out by the authorities. The authorities appear to be procrastinating over Abdul Kerim's demands, and are making a serious mistake, unless they are prepared to deal effectively with Abdul Kerim should he renew his operations.

I received a letter to-day from Abdul Jebar El-Khedery, agent in Bussorah of Messrs. Andrew Weir and Co., of London, requesting me to transmit to the vilayet, on behalf of his principals, a demand for compensation for a lighter of barley, burned on the 6th instant, between Shatrat-al-Amarah and Ezra's Tomb, by followers of Abdul Kerim. The lighter contained 45 tons of barley, valued at 200*l*.

Messrs. Lynch Brothers' steamers, which convey the Bagdad mail to Bussorah, where it is transhipped into the British India steamers, have not yet been able to make up for the four days lost, the 3rd to 7th August. It appears probable that this week's mail, like the two preceding mails, will miss the connection, and will be delayed for a week at Bussorah.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

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[37340] No. 150.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 25.)

(No. 642.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September* 20, 1911.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have to-day received a telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Bagdad stating that he has heard that it is the intention of the Italian Government to establish a vice-consulate at Mosul, ostensibly for commercial reasons, but at the same time Mr. Lorimer's information leads him to suppose that the Italians intend to compete with German influence throughout the whole Ottoman Empire.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

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[37341] No. 151.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 25.)

(No. 643.)

Sir, *Therapia, September* 20, 1911.

THE Grand Vizier yesterday told me with evident gratification that his Government had received satisfactory replies from the Russian and German Governments with regard to the arrangement recently concluded between them regarding the Khanikin junction railway.





On the conclusion of the arrangement the Ottoman Government had called the attention of those Governments to the fact that, as the line in question was to be constructed on Ottoman territory, the exclusion of this Government from all participation in, and knowledge of, the arrangement seemed singular.

His Highness said that the Russian Government had replied that, as the German Government was giving the undertaking, referring presumably to those contained in article 1, they supposed that the Ottoman Government had been duly notified beforehand by that Government.

The German Government had, through its chargé d'affaires here, sent a note stating that, the line in question being Ottoman, they had had no intention in the smallest degree of encroaching on Ottoman sovereignty.

The "Tanin" has also mentioned the matter, and added that the omission to communicate the intention of the arrangement had been explained in the German note as being due to the absence of Herr von Kiderlen Waechter from Berlin at the time, but expressed the hope that such misunderstandings might not be repeated.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER

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[37343] No. 152.

*Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September* 25.)

(No. 645.)

Sir, *Constantinople, September* 20, 1911.

IN reply to your despatch No. 241 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to report that as regards the question of the permission for Messrs. Lynch's steamers to tow a second lighter, I received a "notice" from the Sublime Porte dated the 6th instant, informing me that the Imperial Government had decided to allow the second barge until the 3,800 tons of cargo accumulated at Bussorah had been forwarded, and that the necessary instructions had been sent to the competent authorities. The "notice" went on, however, to say that, inasmuch as this permission was accorded in exceptional circumstances, it cannot constitute a precedent, and it must be understood that when the accumulation of cargo had been forwarded, the steamers would not employ barges at all.

As this appeared to indicate a desire on the part of the Porte to deny to Messrs. Lynch the right of towing even one barge, I made repeated representations at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs against any such intention, and yesterday spoke very strongly to the Grand Vizier on the subject. His Highness said that the "notice" had been badly worded, and that he had not intended to interfere with the one barge. He would, however, look up the correspondence. I fear that if Hakki Pasha does go thoroughly into the question, he will find out that we have no very firm ground to stand on. As you will remember, the permission to tow a barge was obtained by Sir N. O'Conor in June 1899, his request being based on the argument that the lowness of the water in the river made it impossible to load the steamers to their full capacity, but no specific time-limit was set to the authorisation. At the end of the summer season of the same year Sir Nicholas had to protest against an attempt to stop the use of the barges, and in his *note verbale* to the Porte he strongly insisted on the absence of any time limit. The Porte made no reply, but on the 10th March, 1902, they complained that Messrs. Lynch were still availing themselves of the temporary authorisation conferred in 1899. Sir N. O'Conor (No. 112 of the 11th March, 1902), reported the circumstances to your Department, and recommended that no reply should be made, and approval of this course was given in the Foreign Office despatch No. 94, of the 31st idem.

In these circumstances it appears to me impossible to pretend that Messrs. Lynch's claim to tow even one barge to each steamer rests on anything more than the fact that they have succeeded in doing so, so far as I am aware, continuously and without any other protest on the part of the Turks, except that of March 1902, since the summer of 1899. The question therefore is a delicate one, but I am not without hopes of inducing the Grand Vizier to withdraw the notice of the 6th instant.

As regards the employment of Messrs. Lynch's fourth (reserve) steamer, Mr. Whittall informed me of the dispatch of Houloussi Bey's telegram to the Acting Vali of Bagdad of 26th July on the same day. The reply from Bagdad was evasive as to the existence of political objections, but recommended the immediate purchase

of three more steamers for the Ottoman company, and the Minister of Public Works seems to have been content to delay a definite decision till the new vali should have taken up his post. Mr. Whittall thinks that in the circumstances it would be useless for me to press the Porte to agree to the reserve steamer being put into service, especially as the recently given permission to tow a second berge robs the argument based on the accumulation of cargo of much of its force. In this opinion I entirely agree, and I think that it would be injudicious to run the very grave risk of encountering a point blank refusal which might prejudice the firm's chances of a successful application at some future and more propitious occasion. In speaking with the Grand Vizier yesterday, I nevertheless observed, tentatively, and without mentioning the question of the fourth steamer, that it seemed a pity that the Government took so little account of the interests of the merchants, and that the Idareh-i-Nakrieh were unable to cope with the volume of trade. Hakki Pasha said that this might be so, but that there was great jealousy of the Turkish rights of river navigation. His Highness added that he had instructed the Vali of Bagdad to maintain the best relations with His Majesty's consul-general and not to raise questions.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
CHARLES M. MARLING.

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[37829] No. 153.

*Enclosures in letter from India Office, dated September 26, 1911.—(Received September 27.)*

(1.)

*Consul-General Lorimer to Government of India.*

Sir, *Bagdad, August 14, 1911.*

I HAVE the honour to submit, for the information of the Government of India, a copy of my despatch dated the 14th August, 1911, which I have addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
J. G. LORIMER, *Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

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(2.)

*Consul-General Lorimer to Sir G. Lowther.*

(No. 36.)

Your Excellency, *Bagdad, August 14, 1911.*

I have the honour to bring to notice two cases, affecting British subjects in the Bagdad vilayet, in which an important question of principle has been raised—that of the effect of the registration of British subjects as such by British consular authority.

*First Case.*—One Abbas, son of Ghulam Hussein, a registered British subject, was arrested at Tawairij by the Turkish authorities on or about the 26th March, apparently on a charge of theft, and brought to Kerbela.

His father, Ghulam Hussein, was accepted as a British subject by the British consular agent at Kerbela in 1895, and Abbas was then included in his father's registration and shown as a child 4 years of age. After Ghulam Hussein's death, which occurred some years ago, the name of Abbas, who was still a minor, was entered in the certificate of his elder brother, Muhammad Ali, until the 21st February, 1911, when, having come of age, he was granted a personal certificate of registration by the British vice-consul at Kerbela.

The British vice-consul, on becoming aware of Abbas's arrest, at once sent to the examining magistrate of Kerbela to know the cause and the charge against him. The reply was that the court of testing charges at Bagdad had ordered the arrest, from which it would appear that there had been previous proceedings in the case and that the vice-consul had been kept in ignorance of them. The reasons given for not informing the vice-consulate of the arrest, &c., were that Abbas could not be recognised





as a foreign subject until he had proved himself one, and that his registration certificate was worthless as it had not been attested by the Turkish authorities at Constantinople. According to Abbas's own statement, he was snatched from his shop at Tawairij, beaten, tied by the arms, and dragged behind a horse to Kerbela.

The vice-consul next wrote officially to the mutessarif complaining of the facts and requesting Abbas's release. The mutessarif replied giving various reasons for the course pursued by the authorities, of which the principal was that a person must prove himself to be a foreign subject before he could be tried as such.

By the end of May Abbas had twice or thrice appeared before the Criminal Bidayat Court of Kerbela on the footing of an Ottoman subject, the intervention of the British vice-consul being still disallowed. It is understood that he produced his certificate of British nationality before the court, but that the assistant procurator-general objected to its being received in evidence. Also that the census office was called on for information, and reported that Abbas was not registered as a Turkish subject. Also that the police office made a similar report, and recommended that Abbas should be treated as a British subject. Nevertheless the court, influenced by the assistant procurator-general, decided to proceed with the trial of Abbas as an ordinary Turkish subject.

Everything that could be done by this consulate-general to obtain an entrance into the case was done, but without success. A memorandum was presented by the first dragoman to the procurator-general of the Istinaf, Bagdad, on the 5th April. On the 16th April I went to the Sarai in person and presented a second memorandum to the acting vali, in which a means of settlement was suggested, but could obtain no definite answer from him. On the 5th May Captain Scott, I.M.S., my substitute during my absence at Constantinople, sent the first dragoman to the Sarai to obtain an answer, but the vilayet replied that my memorandum had been lost, and asked that an official letter might be written then. Captain Scott accordingly sent another copy of the memorandum on the 16th May with an official letter. On the 31st May Captain Scott followed his letter up by a reminder, to which the acting vali merely replied on the 4th June that "he had received no reply from the Mutessarif of Kerbela, but had now reminded him." On the 8th July, shortly after my return to Bagdad, I interviewed the vali and assistant vali at the Sarai, and arranged that a joint enquiry should be made into the case by the British vice-consul at Kerbela and the procurator-general of the Istinaf, who was then on tour in the direction of Kerbela. But on the 10th July, in consequence of a fresh nationality case at Bagdad, with which I may have to deal in a future despatch, I though it better to ask the acting vali to cancel the arrangement, a course to which he only too readily assented.

Meanwhile Captain Scott had had the honour of telegraphing to your Excellency with reference to this case on the 28th June, and further telegrams were sent by myself on the 7th and 10th July.

At length, on the 22nd July, Abbas was discharged as innocent by the Turkish tribunal and released from the prison in which he had been confined for very nearly five months. His British nationality remained unrecognised to the end, and there was some difficulty in recovering his certificate of registration from the court, to which he had submitted it. There is, of course, no security against his re-arrest, later on, on an appeal by the prosecuting authorities to some higher court.

*Second Case.*—On the 10th March a burglary occurred at Kerbela, in which a registered British subject, Seyyid Hasan, son of Seyyid Muhammad Ali, complained that he had lost £T. 16. His complaint was not entertained by the Turkish authorities because he claimed the intervention of the British vice-consul was refused. The ground of refusal was that Seyyid Hasan must himself satisfy the Turkish authorities of his British nationality before the intervention of the vice-consul could be admitted. His British certificate of registration was treated as waste paper, in the same manner as Abbas's, and consideration of his claim has been up to the present denied.

My proceedings, and those of Captain Scott, in this case, were practically the same as in the case of Abbas, and they have been equally ineffectual.

It only remains to state that I have satisfied myself of the correctness of the registration of the complainant in each of the above cases as a British subject. One of Ghulam Hussein's elder sons, a brother of Abbas, was actually born in India, and speaks Panjabi. The father of Seyyid Hasan, who was himself first registered at Kerbela in 1895, has appeared before me at Bagdad, and conversed in my presence in Kashmiri with another Kashmiri.

I was at first inclined to discuss the grounds of registration with the Turkish authorities in the two present cases; but on the occurrence of a third case, it having

become evident that their policy was one of obstruction merely, I thought it better to withdraw the proposals which I had made in that sense.

I have never presumed to deny the right of the Turkish authorities to call our registration in question, and I am always ready to justify them by evidence when properly challenged. What I do protest against is the arbitrary action of the Turkish authorities in refusing to stay proceedings until the question of nationality has been settled, and in ignoring the British consular authorities in the discussion of that question. The present procedure of the local authorities will evidently have the result, if consistently applied, of depriving British subjects here of the advantages of British protection.

In the case of Abbas, I would respectfully suggest that your Excellency should claim £T. 10 as compensation for his illegal detention during five months. Until the Turkish authorities here shall have been compelled in some public manner, as by payment of compensation, to acknowledge the incorrectness of their action, I have no hope that their present policy of attacking British rights, first by one means and then by another, will be discontinued. In this connection I would refer to the penultimate paragraph of my despatch of the 17th July, 1911.

I have, &c.

J. G. LORIMER, *Political Resident in Turkish Arabia, and His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General, Bagdad.*

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(3.)

*Memorandum submitted by the First Dragoman to the Procurator-General of the Istinaf, Bagdad, on April* 5, 1911.

Papers which will be exhibited by the first dragoman of this consulate-general show that the Turkish authorities at Kerbela are making difficulties about the recognition as a British subject of one Seyyid Hasan, son of Muhammad Ali, whose status is vouched for by the British vice-consul at Kerbela. Property belonging to Seyyid Hasan was stolen nearly one month ago, but it appears that the proceedings are stopped because the authorities do not accept the vice-consul's statement that the man is a British subject.

Another case has occurred at Kerbela in which one Abbas, son of Ghulam Hussein has been arrested and imprisoned without reference to the British vice-consulate, though he has been claimed by the British vice-consul as a British subject.

It would be well that the Kerbela authorities should be communicated with by telegram on the subject of these two cases.

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(4.)

*Memorandum communicated to the Acting Vali by Consul-General Lorimer.*

Abbas, son of Ghulam Hussein, residing at Tawairij, was recently arrested and brought to Kerbela by the Turkish authorities.

Abbas was already registered as a British subject in the British vice-consulate at Kerbela, and the British vice-consul therefore protested against his arrest without reference to the British vice-consulate.

The British vice-consul's intervention seems to have been rejected, however, on the ground that it was uncertain whether Abbas was a British subject.

If the Turkish authorities have any doubt about Abbas's being a British subject, he should be brought to Bagdad and the case should be discussed with the British consul-general here. The papers relating to Abbas's registration are ready at Bagdad, but it is desirable that the man should be present in order that he may be seen and be questioned in the presence of the Turkish authorities and the British consul-general.

*Bagdad, April* 15, 1911.

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[37901]

No. 154.

*Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.*—(*Received September* 28.)

(No. 647.)

Sir, *Therapia, September* 22, 1911.

IN reply to your telegram No. 344 of the 20th instant on the subject of the demolition last year of buildings at Bagdad the property of British subjects, I have the honour to report as follows:—

You, Sir, will remember that Nazim Pasha, after a somewhat brief occupancy of the post of Vali of Bagdad, was withdrawn, and an enquiry was instituted which has just terminated, but the result of which is not yet definitely known, as to whether the accusations against him were founded or not.

I repeatedly urged Rifaat Pasha to settle the question of our claims for the demolition of the property of British subjects, and he several times assured me that the new Governor had been instructed to examine the matter and report. I concluded that this implied a joint examination with His Majesty's consul-general, and I informed that officer that the new vali had been so instructed, but, on the latter's arrival at Bagdad, he informed Mr. Lorimer that he had no such instructions. Rifaat Pasha having then left, I enquired of the Grand Vizier what instructions had been given to the vali, and his Highness said that his intention had not been that a joint enquiry should take place, but that the vali should, after examination of the question, report to him, and his Highness added that he then hoped he would be able to find a solution. A few days ago I again enquired of his Highness whether this report had come, and I observed that a one-sided examination could hardly produce a satisfactory result, and I reminded his Highness that under instructions from you last year I had pointed out that, after what had occurred, little reliance could be placed on the justice of the local administration, and also that no lawyer could be found to undertake a case against the local government.

The new Governor has been but a short time in Bagdad, and the municipality has evidently no funds at its disposal. It would seem, therefore, advisable to await the result of the Governor's enquiries and possibly some proposal for payment from the Sublime Porte. The difficulty in which the latter find themselves is that, if the municipality pays the British subjects the compensation due to them, the Ottoman subjects who likewise suffered and who are far more numerous will naturally claim on the municipality, a contingency the Grand Vizier seems to wish to avoid by settling the matter here.

His Highness recently observed that Nazim Pasha had been of opinion that the property left to the British subjects who had suffered would now rise so much in value as to leave them with but little loss. This, I said, might or might not be the case. The fact remained that the authorities had acted arbitrarily and in contravention of the expropriation laws, and the sufferers must be compensated.

His Highness also added that he had given categorical instructions to the new vali to entertain the most friendly relations with the British consul-general and to avoid the raising of questions.

The claim of the ice merchant for 228*l.* has also occupied my attention on several occasions, but has not yet been settled, no doubt owing to the same reason, an entire absence of funds in the municipality coffers. Recently renewed attempts were made to arbitrarily reduce the cost of ice sold by the merchant in question on the ground that ice was a necessity, and an endeavour was also made to compel him to take out a licence, but this does not appear under the law to be a necessity, and, on my representations, the Grand Vizier sent satisfactory instructions on both these points.

The important question of the recognition of British certificates of registration has engaged the constant attention of the embassy since Dr. Scott first reported it at the end of June. Both the administrative and judicial authorities of Bagdad have now been instructed to admit these certificates without any Turkish legalisation, unless the circumstances are such as to justify a real doubt as to the nationality. The wording of the qualification is not entirely satisfactory, but I trust that the instructions will suffice to obviate any serious difficulty in the case of British subjects generally. The details of the particular cases complained of by Mr. Lorimer have only just reached me, and I am now considering what action can usefully be taken on behalf of the individual British Indians concerned.

Mr. Lorimer appears to write under the impression that the illegalities and vexatious proceedings are specially directed against British subjects. This is not, I

believe, the case. All my colleagues have similar complaints to make, and they are, I think, in a great measure the result of a strong nationalist feeling to which often incapable Government officials have to pander in order to be able to maintain their posts in the provinces, and also due to the fact that for the past two years no strong Government has existed at Constantinople. The "gang of irresponsible political adventurers," as Mr. Lorimer calls them, have no doubt caused an immense amount of harm to the new régime in this country, but the well-wishers of Turkey are inclined to the belief that their influence is on the wane, and that, with their disappearance or with a modification of their views, a saner policy and one by which the interests of British subjects in Mesopotamia will suffer less will obtain.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

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